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ABSTRACT 
 
The mixed findings in the literature pertaining to the relationship between 
corporate governance mechanisms and firm value have resulted in the endogeneity 
issue of the former becoming central to discussions in corporate governance and 
corporate finance studies. As endogeneity can be in the form of reverse causality 
(Bhagat & Bolton, 2008) and/or in a dynamic sense (Wintoki, Linck, & Netter, 2007), 
this thesis examines the relationships between corporate governance mechanisms that 
are proxied by ownership concentration and debt and firm value in the largest 
Australian firms from 1997 to 2008. 
 
The research in this thesis focuses on the dynamic endogeneity issue to 
investigate whether this issue influences the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm value in the largest Australian firms. The study investigates this 
issue through three different tests. First, the study examines whether there are any 
causal relationships between ownership concentration, debt and firm value. Second, the 
study investigates whether ownership concentration, debt and firm value are best 
treated as a group in order to assess their influence on each other. Therefore, the study 
assesses their substitutability or complementarity. Third, the study examines whether 
there are any non-linear relationships between ownership concentration and firm value 
on the one hand and between ownership concentration and debt on the other hand, as 
well as between debt and firm value. In investigating the dynamic endogeneity issue 
through these tests, the study employs two methodologies: two-way fixed effects (FE) 
and the two-step system generalised method of moments (GMM). 
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In the first test, the study finds a causal relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm value as well as between debt and firm value. The causality is 
found to run from firm value to ownership concentration in a negative direction and 
from debt to firm value also in a negative direction. No causal relationship is found 
between ownership concentration and debt. However, further investigation by using 
sub-samples of ownership concentration reveals that there is causality between these 
two corporate governance mechanisms. It is found that causality runs from ownership 
concentration to debt in a negative direction. This test finds that firm value causes 
ownership concentration, thus providing evidence that endogeneity in the form of 
reverse causality exists. However, in the dynamic sense, it is found that dynamic 
endogeneity is not an issue in this test. 
 
The second test discovers that there is no evidence that ownership 
concentration, debt and firm value are effective as a group. Therefore, the study fails to 
identify their substitutability or complementarity. Furthermore, this test finds that 
dynamic endogeneity is not an issue in influencing ownership concentration, debt and 
firm value when they are tested as a group. However, dynamic endogeneity does 
influence ownership concentration and firm value when they are tested as stand-alone 
mechanisms. 
 
In the final test, the study finds that there is a non-linear relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm value. This non-linear association is found to have an 
influence on the non-linearity between ownership concentration and debt. Further, the 
study also finds that debt and firm value are non-linear. It is found that the dynamic 
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endogeneity issue does influence the non-linearity functions of ownership concentration 
but not the non-linearity functions of debt. 
 
The thesis concludes that dynamic endogeneity is not a serious issue in 
influencing the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm value 
in the largest Australian firms.  
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CHAPTER 1:   INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Background 
This study investigates the complex relationships between corporate governance 
mechanisms (proxied by ownership concentration and debt) and firm value by taking 
account of endogeneity issues. Within a corporate finance framework, the study 
integrates corporate governance and capital structure theories using a dataset of the 100 
largest non-financial Australian listed firms (subsequently referred to as the largest 
Australian firms) for the period of study 1997 to 2008. 
 
Previous studies found that corporate governance mechanisms affect firm value 
or performance (among others, Thomsen, Pedersen & Kvist (2006); Hu & Izumida 
(2008)). However, firm value or performance has also been discovered to have an 
impact on corporate governance mechanisms (such as Cho, 1998; Miguel, Pindado, & 
de la Torre, 2004; Wintoki et al., 2007). This raises the issue of endogeneity between 
corporate governance and valuation or performance (Henry, 2010). This thesis takes a 
novel approach by simultaneously addressing endogeneity in the form of reverse 
causality (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008) and/or in a dynamic form (Wintoki et al. 2007). 
 
Ownership concentration and debt are corporate governance mechanisms. 
Bhagat and Bolton (2008) suggest that the endogenous relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance might need an explanation on the causality issue. 
Wintoki et al. (2007) claim that in estimating the relationship between governance and 
performance, endogeneity is not the only concern and the dynamic issue should also be 
taken into account. 
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In general, an endogeneity issue arises when the mechanisms that are supposed 
to affect a particular device depend themselves on that device. In order to meet the 
characteristic of causality in this study, the value of the cause variable must precede the 
value of the effect variable. This study uses the term ‘dynamic’ according to the 
definition by Wintoki et al. (2007, p.1): ‘the relationships among a firm’s observable 
characteristics are likely to be dynamic. That is, a firm’s current actions affect market 
conditions, governance, and firm performance in the future, which in turn, affect the 
firm’s future actions’.  
 
A review of the extant literature reveals that there are no extensive studies on 
relationships between ownership concentration, debt and firm value which take into 
account not only the endogeneity issues but also the heterogeneity and simultaneity 
issues. 
 
1.2 The Australian Environment 
Before the year 2000, issues of corporate governance in Australia received 
occasional attention, generally during a time of economic downturn. This situation has 
changed since 2001 due to the major corporate collapses which not only involved large 
corporations in the United States such as Enron and WorldCom but also One.Tel, HIH, 
Harris Scarfe, Pasminco and Centaur in Australia. 
 
As a consequence of these corporate collapses, in March 2003, the Australian 
Securities Exchange (ASX) released the ASX Corporate Governance Council’s first 
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edition corporate governance guidelines, the ‘Principles of Good Corporate Governance 
and Best Practice Recommendations’. There are 10 essential corporate governance 
principles that underlie these guidelines. These principles come together with 28 best 
practice recommendations and were in particular targeted at large listed firms. Hu and 
Tan (2012, p. 40) stated that, ‘In general, the corporate governance principles’ 
emphasis on strong independent directors and an independent chair on a single-tier 
board are comparable to that of many corporate governance codes and guidelines 
around the world’. The recommendations are introduced with the desires that good 
corporate governance practices could maximise the board of directors’ accountability 
and firm performance. Hence, it is focusing more on strengthening the corporate 
governance structure of Australian public listed firms’ internal control in order to 
prevent these firms from expropriating investors’ wealth. 
 
In August 2007, ASX released the second edition, the ‘Corporate Governance 
Principles and Recommendations’. The corporate governance principles are reduced to 
8 principles and 27 best practice recommendations. On 30 June 2010, the amendment to 
the second edition, the ‘Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations with 
2010 Amendments’ was released. This applies to listed entities from 1 January 2011. 
These documents articulate the core principles that the ASX Corporate Governance 
Council believes underlie effective corporate governance with the objectives to 
promote investor confidence and to assist companies in meeting stakeholders’ 
expectations (ASX, 2011). 
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Besides the ASX Corporate Governance Principles and Recommendations, 
ASX also has outlined ASX Listing Rules which have been regularly revised from time 
to time. This Listing Rules function not only for the interest of listed firms, but also 
investors where they should protect the ownership interests and the right to vote of 
shareholders. The ASX Listing Rule 4.10.3 requires listed firms to disclose in their 
annual reports any corporate governance recommendations that they do not comply 
with. In case of non-compliance, firms need to provide explanations about any 
recommendations which are not followed. In addition, the ASX Listing Rule 4.10.9 
requires listed firms to disclose the names of the 20 largest shareholders in their annual 
reports. As Brown and Sargent (2010) stated in their article
1
, ‘Regimes of 
shareholder‐related disclosures vary around the world. Companies from the United 
States and the United Kingdom do not disclose their largest 20 shareholders in their 
annual reports, but rather are required to disclose the owners of shareholdings that 
exceed sizes prescribed by their respective Listing Authority or Stock Exchange. The 
sizes prescribed by the U.K. Listing Authority and the Securities and Exchange 
Commission in the U.S.A. are not the same. The divergence of shareholder disclosure 
regimes across the globe suggests that there is no consensus as to the most beneficial 
shareholder disclosures’. These listing rules might help investors in understanding a 
firm’s disclosures and they will be able to make comparison in terms of disclosures 
between firms. However, whether these rules would be able to protect investors 
                                                 
1
 See Brown, P., and Sargent, E. (2010). The Top 20 Shareholders. Paper presented at AFAANZ 2010, 
(http://www.afaanz.org/openconf/2010/modules/request.php?module=oc_program&action=view.php&id
=87) 
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especially the small or minority shareholders from being expropriated by large 
shareholders are not instantly evident. 
 
From a wider perspective, the regulations of all private and public listed firms’ 
registrations and operations are outlined in the Corporations Act 2001. Further, the 
corporations and financial markets are regulated by the Australian Securities and 
Investments Commission (ASIC) in which its administrative power and functions are 
established in the ASIC Act 2001. In addition, ASIC, under the ASIC Market Integrity 
Rules 2010 undertakes market supervision task of public listed firms which are traded 
on the ASX. Figure 1.1 illustrates the outline of this regulatory framework. 
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Figure 1.1 Overview of the regulatory framework of Australian companies 
 
 
 
Source: Hu and Tan (2012, p. 39) 
Note: The diagram has been removed due to copyright restrictions.   
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1.2.1 Ownership Concentration 
In describing the corporate governance developments in Australia, Stapledon 
(2011) discussed corporate governance ‘mechanisms’ which play a role in decreasing 
the divergence of interests between shareholders and managers. The mechanisms that 
are reviewed include market forces, laws protecting investors, monitoring by 
shareholders, monitoring by non-executive directors, disclosure rules and governance 
codes, independent audits and incentive remuneration for senior executives. 
 
Stapledon (2011) focused on the large blockholders and institutional investors 
in the discussion on the monitoring by shareholders. Blockholders are identified based 
on the percentage of shares owned by particular shareholders such as 5% or greater, 
10% or greater etc. The focus of the study in this thesis is slightly different from 
Stapledon’s (2011) as it uses the ownership concentration of the largest shareholders 
instead of  blockholders. Ownership concentration is the sum of the percentage of 
shares held by the firms’ largest shareholders. Usually, they are viewed as: largest 
shareholder, largest 5, largest 10, largest 15 and largest 20 shareholders.   
 
Studies on ownership concentration have a different basis from studies on other 
types of ownership structure. Ownership concentration is the opposite type of  structure 
to dispersed ownership, which is used as the basis by Berle and Means (1932) for their 
argument of the separation between ownership and control, and it is also used by Jensen 
and Meckling (1976) on the divergence of interests between shareholders (owners) and 
managers (agents). It is hypothesised (example, Ramsay & Blair (1993)) that with a 
concentrated structure of ownership, there are greater incentives for shareholders to 
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monitor managers so that managers act in accordance with shareholders’ interest, which 
is to maximise their wealth. 
 
Two studies on ownership concentration have used the largest Australian firms 
as a sample. Wheelwright and Crough (cited in Ramsay & Blair (1993)) used samples 
of the 100 and 98 largest listed firms, respectively. Wheelwright’s study was conducted 
over the period 1952 to 1953 and found that the largest 20 shareholders held on average 
37.1% of the issued shares. Crough’s study was conducted over 1979 and found that, on 
average, the largest 20 shareholders held 51.2% of the issued shares. In comparison, in 
this present study, it is found that, on average, the percentage of shares held by the 
largest 20 shareholders of the 100 largest listed firms for the period of 1997 to 2008 is 
67.8% of the issued shares. Hence, the ownership concentration in the largest 
Australian firms has steadily and significantly increased since the 1950s. 
 
1.2.2 Debt Financing 
From a corporate finance perspective, sources of external financing can be 
either equity or debt financing. Firm managers might prefer to obtain capital by issuing 
debt as that can lower the overall cost of capital. Shareholders might also prefer firms 
to issue debt as that can increase their returns to compensate for the higher risk of 
financing carried by debt. On the other hand, from a corporate governance perspective, 
debt has a role as a corporate governance mechanism. The decision of firm managers 
and shareholders, particularly large/controlling shareholders, to employ more debt or 
not would depend on whether or not they consider debt to be the most efficient 
corporate governance mechanism in the circumstances. 
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For an overview of the Australian listed firms’ debt levels, Figure 1.2 shows the 
gearing ratios by sector and Figure 1.3 shows the distribution of the largest 250 listed 
companies’ gearing ratios for years 1997 to 2009. Gearing ratio is defined as gross debt 
scaled by the shareholders’ equity. 
 
Figure 1.2 Gearing ratios by sector, 1997–2009 
 
 
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia 
 
Figure 1.2 shows the gearing ratios by sector of the listed firms, which exclude 
foreign firms. The following figures refer to the book value of the gearing ratios only. 
For resource firms, the highest level of debt employed by this sector was at the 
beginning of 2001, which was slightly above the 70% level. It then dropped to a lower 
level and finally regained its highest 70% level in 2007. Infrastructure and real estate 
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are the two sectors that have the highest debt levels. In 2008 their debt levels were 
approximately 200% for the infrastructure sector and 100% for the real estate sector. 
For the other firms, the highest debt level was above the 70% level in 2006. 
 
Figure 1.3 Distribution of the largest 250 listed companies’ gearing ratios, 
1997–2009 
 
                                                 
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia 
 
Figure 1.3 shows the gearing ratios based on the book value. It consists of the 
largest 250 listed firms by total assets and it includes non-financial firms (except for the 
real estate firms) and excludes foreign firms. The debt level of the firms at the 10
th
 
percentile shows a reasonably stable pattern throughout the years. A stable long-run 
level of debt can also be seen for the median gearing ratios of the companies, increasing 
to a higher than 50% level at the end of 2004. The debt level of the firms at the 90
th
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percentile shows a pattern of increase with a slight and short run downward at the end 
of 1998, 2001 and 2006. It reached its peak at approximately the 240% level at the end 
of 2008.   
 
1.3 Research Motivation 
In investigating corporate governance mechanisms, it is important to take into 
consideration the interaction and relationship between these mechanisms as testing 
them in isolation might exhibit biased findings. In this study, the ownership 
concentration of the large shareholders has been chosen, as large shareholders have 
strong and direct incentives to monitor managers actively (Berger, Ofek & Yermack 
1997). However, whether large shareholders contribute to the solution of agency 
problems or whether they aggravate them remains questionable as there are 
inconclusive findings from previous research (Sánchez-Ballesta & García-Meca, 2007). 
For instance, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) suggested that as the suppliers of funds or 
capital, shareholders need to ensure that firm managers do not expropriate the funds on 
unattractive investments but generate returns from the investments. This is referred to 
as the Type I agency problem between shareholders and managers. Expropriation might 
also be undertaken by large shareholders at the cost of small shareholders. This is 
referred to as the Type II agency problem between large/controlling shareholders and 
small/non-controlling shareholders. In the words of La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes and 
Shleifer (1999, p.2), ‘the principal agency problem in large corporations around the 
world is that of restricting expropriation of minority shareholders by the controlling 
shareholders, rather than that of restricting empire building by professional managers 
unaccountable to shareholders’. 
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Research on corporate ownership mostly focuses on insider or managerial 
ownership as a proxy rather than on large shareholders (Holderness, 2009), where the 
impact on firm value and debt might be different between these two types of ownership 
structure as large shareholders are assumed to have little affiliation to the firm’s 
management, hence they might have different interests (Demsetz & Villalonga, 2001).  
 
Capital structure has been chosen for the study, as debt may itself act as a 
disciplinary mechanism quite distinct from traditional internal or external controls 
(Jensen, 1986; Williamson, 1988). On the other hand, debt may also increase the 
agency cost of debt financing between shareholders and debt holders (Jensen & 
Meckling, 1976). The study of capital structure is one of the important areas that are 
frequently debated in the corporate finance field, especially in relation to firm value. 
There is a lack of literature on the relationship between debt and the ownership 
concentration of large shareholders, yet this is a unique relationship that is interesting to 
explore and also motivates this study to choose these two corporate governance 
mechanisms.  
 
Australia is chosen for this research for a number of reasons. First, because it is 
a common law country. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) argued 
that this type of countries provide high levels of  protection to investors compared to 
civil law countries. Additionally, López-de-Foronda, López-Iturriaga and Santamaría-
Mariscal (2007) concluded that ownership structure (in the form of managerial 
ownership) and capital structure are the most effective control devices in common law 
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countries. More recently, it has been found that a good legal system in terms of 
corporate governance, shareholder protection and a monitoring mechanism in common 
law countries are important determinants on making profit from corporate investment 
(Inci, Lee, & Suh, 2009). These findings motivate this study to investigate the 
efficiency of ownership structure (in the form of ownership concentration) and debt as 
corporate governance mechanisms in Australia. 
 
Second, Australia is chosen for this research because it has fairly concentrated 
ownership relative to the US, where the majority of previous studies have been 
undertaken. While studies in Australia have examined the concentrated ownership of 
large shareholders (Setia-Atmaja, 2009; Setia-Atmaja, Tanewski, & Skully, 2009), 
there is no study examining the reverse causality and dynamic endogeneity issues of 
ownership concentration, debt and firm value. This study therefore contributes to the 
literature in this respect.   
 
The third reason is that institutional investors in Australia are keen to invest in 
large firms (Henry, 2008). In general, institutional investors invest a huge amount of 
capital compared to retail investors. As such, large firms should have a significant 
impact on the Australian stock market. Stapledon (2011) indicated that at 31 August 
2009 the 100 largest firms represented more than 90% of the Australian total market 
value. It should be noted that this study also found that the largest Australian firms 
represented more than half of the Australian total market value during the study period 
(1997–2008), as shown in figure 1.4 below. 
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Figure 1.4 Largest firms’ market capitalisation to total market capitalisation, 
1997–2008 
 
   
Sources: Aspect Huntley; World Federation of Exchanges 
 
Figure 1.4 shows that only in the years 1997 and 1998 were the percentages of 
the largest firms’ market capitalisation to total market capitalisation below the 40% 
level. In the other years, the percentages were above 40%. On average, for the 12-year 
period of this study, the largest Australian firms represented approximately 51% of the 
Australian total market value.  
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1.4 Objectives of the Study 
There are four main objectives. The first objective is to study the causality 
relationship between: (1) ownership concentration and firm value, (2) ownership 
concentration and debt, and (3) debt and firm value. Therefore, the first objective is to 
answer the following research question:  
1.  Are there any causal relationships between ownership concentration, debt and firm 
value?  
 
This study investigates whether or to what extent these three corporate 
mechanisms can be identified as having a causal relationship. To do so, this study 
employs a causality test for panel data to examine the direction of causality (if there is 
causality) between the three corporate mechanisms.   
 
The second objective is to study the interactions between ownership 
concentration and firm value, ownership concentration and debt, and debt and firm 
value, and the effects of the interactions on debt, firm value and ownership 
concentration. The individual effect of each of the variables is also tested. Hence, the 
second objective seeks to answer the following research question: 
2.  Should ownership concentration, debt and firm value be utilised as a group in order 
to ensure their effectiveness as corporate mechanisms?  
 
Agrawal and Knoeber (1996) concluded that the evidence from studies that use 
control mechanisms individually can be misleading. Separate works by Mulherin 
(2005), Bhagat, Bolton and Romano (2010) and Kim and Lu (2011) suggested that the 
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investigation of a particular corporate governance mechanism should also control for 
the interactions with other governance mechanisms. Some extensive previous studies 
have investigated the impact of corporate governance mechanisms on firm value or 
performance to discover whether these mechanisms are effective devices that can 
increase firm value. This study treats firm value as one of the important corporate 
mechanisms that can mitigate agency problems, either by itself or by its interaction 
with ownership concentration or debt.   
 
The third objective is to examine the non-linear relationships between 
ownership concentration and firm value, ownership concentration and debt, and debt 
and firm value. Therefore, the third objective is to answer the following research 
questions:  
3.  (i) Do ownership concentration and firm value have a non-linear relationship, and 
how does the relationship affect the non-linear relationship between ownership 
concentration and debt?  
      (ii)  Are debt and firm value also non-linearly related?  
 
This thesis examines whether ownership concentration monitors managers in 
mitigating the Type I agency problem and/or expropriates its small shareholders thus 
increasing the Type II agency problem, and how ownership concentration might affect 
firm debt selection. In their conclusions, Faccio, Lang and Young (2003) argued that 
the role of debt as a potential disciplining mechanism is weakened if firms have a 
concentrated ownership structure. Hence, it is an objective of this study to investigate 
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whether a disciplining effect of debt exists in the sample firms with concentrated 
ownership by large shareholders. 
 
The fourth objective is to investigate the dynamic endogeneity issue. As such, 
the final objective is to answer the following research question: 
4.  Is the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and performance in 
the largest Australian firms influenced by the dynamic endogeneity?  
 
Wintoki et al. (2007) found that dynamic endogeneity exists in the US sample 
firms and, after controlling for it, they found no relationship between board structure 
and firm performance. Thus, they suggest applying this technique in other studies 
related to corporate finance and corporate governance.   
 
1.5 Methodology and Main Findings 
This study uses two types of estimation: the two-way fixed effects (FE) 
estimation and the two-step system generalised method of moments (GMM). The 
former controls for the unobserved heterogeneity across firms and over time, whereas 
the latter not only controls for the unobserved heterogeneity across firms and over time, 
but also for the dynamic endogeneity effect. As such, GMM is the main estimation used 
in this study in deriving conclusions from the empirical findings as well as the overall 
final conclusions. As a result, FE is employed purely as a robustness exercise for the 
GMM results. Moreover, comparing the FE and GMM estimation results provides for 
an intuitively accurate method to answer the fourth research question: whether the 
relationship between corporate governance and performance in the largest Australian 
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firms is influenced by dynamic endogeneity. If there is consistency in the results shown 
by both of the estimations, it will be concluded that the relationship is not influenced by 
the dynamic endogeneity issue, and vice versa. The objectives are now restated as 
research questions followed by a brief outline of the methodology and a summary of 
the findings. 
 
Research Question 1: 
Are there any causal relationships between ownership concentration, debt and firm 
value?  
 
To answer the first research question, the study conducts the causality test for 
panel data within multivariate equation framework. The results from the GMM 
estimation show that firm value causes ownership concentration in a negative direction, 
but ownership concentration does not cause firm value. Also, the results show that debt 
causes firm value in a negative direction, but firm value does not cause debt. As for the 
causality between ownership concentration and debt, the results show that there is no 
causal relationship between these two corporate governance mechanisms. However, 
further investigation by using sub-samples of ownership concentration reveals that 
ownership concentration does cause debt in a negative direction in the high level of the 
largest shareholder sub-sample. 
 
Research Question 2:  
Should ownership concentration, debt and firm value be utilised as a group in order to 
ensure their effectiveness as corporate mechanisms?  
22 
 
To address the second research question, the study performs an interaction test. 
The results of the GMM estimation fail to find evidence that ownership concentration 
and firm value; ownership concentration and debt; and debt and firm value should be 
employed as groups in order to attain their effectiveness as corporate mechanisms. As 
such, this study found no evidence to support the existence of the interaction effects 
between these mechanisms, thus failing to find the substitutability or complimentarity 
of them. However, it was found that the ownership concentration of the largest five 
shareholders uses debt as a substitute monitoring mechanism when it functions as a 
stand-alone mechanism. 
 
Research Question 3: 
(i)  Do ownership concentration and firm value have a non-linear relationship, and how 
does the relationship affect the non-linear relationship between ownership 
concentration and debt? 
(ii)  Are debt and firm value also non-linearly related?  
 
A non-linear test is conducted to answer the third research question. The results 
from the GMM estimation show that the ownership concentration of the largest 
shareholder has a ‘U-shape’ non-linear association with firm value. This study found 
that the inflection point of the ownership concentration is at 46%. Also, it is found that 
the non-linear relationship between the ownership concentration of the largest 
shareholder and firm value has an effect on the non-linearity between the ownership 
concentration of the largest shareholder and debt, where two inflection points of 
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ownership concentration towards debt are found at 23% and 44%. Finally, in the model 
with the largest shareholder as a proxy for the ownership concentration, this study 
found that debt and firm value are non-linearly associated with two inflection points of 
debt towards firm value at 29% and 159%. 
 
Research Question 4: 
Is the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and performance in the 
largest Australian firms influenced by dynamic endogeneity? 
 
The fourth research question is addressed by comparing the results of the FE 
and GMM estimations in all three of the aforementioned tests. It is found that dynamic 
endogeneity is not a serious issue in the largest Australian firms, which have a fairly 
high concentration of ownership structure. This is a different finding from the previous 
studies on US firms, which are mostly claimed to have a dispersed type of ownership 
structure. 
 
1.6 Contributions of the Thesis 
Numerous studies examine the relationships between ownership structure, debt 
and firm value. Although the impacts of ownership on firm value, ownership on debt, 
and debt on firm value have been extensively explored in the corporate governance and 
corporate finance literature, little attention has been given to the reverse effects of firm 
value on ownership, debt on ownership, and firm value on debt. In respect to 
ownership, much attention has been paid to managerial ownership as a proxy. It is 
therefore expected that this thesis will provide new insights by using the concentrated 
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ownership of large shareholders as a proxy in the study. Furthermore, the causality test 
for panel data models used in this study is expected to result in an original contribution 
to the investigation of the causality relationship between ownership concentration, debt 
and firm value from the Australian perspective.   
 
By investigating the interaction between ownership concentration and firm 
value, ownership concentration and debt, and debt and firm value,  the aim of this thesis 
is to contribute new knowledge on the substitutability or complementarity of these 
corporate mechanisms (Brown, Beekes, & Verhoeven, 2011; Ward, Brown, & 
Rodriguez, 2009), which have not previously received much attention. The thesis also 
contributes to the literature on the roles played by ownership concentration and debt as 
corporate governance mechanisms, in light of mixed results being found previously 
(Byers, Fields, & Fraser, 2008; Y. Hu & Izumida, 2008; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; 
Thomsen et al., 2006).  
 
A comprehensive analysis of the relationships between the corporate 
mechanisms provides a number of insights into the relationship between corporate 
governance and firm performance. All models that are tested in the study use two 
different methods of estimation. These analyses contribute to the literature by providing 
empirical findings on whether dynamic endogeneity exists in the largest Australian 
firms.  
 
This thesis has significant practical importance as the findings of the study 
empirically and theoretically suggest which of these three corporate mechanisms should 
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be given priority in a corporation’s decision making and which is the best mechanism 
to be taken into consideration by corporations. As such, this thesis answers some 
questions that have received much attention in the literature and that have significant 
policy consequences. 
 
1.7 Thesis Structure 
The remainder of the thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 outlines the 
theoretical underpinnings of the relationships between ownership concentration, debt 
and firm value. That is followed by a literature review that surveys previous studies 
related to the subject matter of this thesis. The data, summary statistics and 
methodology used for analysis are explained in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 presents the 
analysis of the causality relationships between ownership concentration, debt and firm 
value. This is followed by the analysis of the interaction effects between these three 
corporate mechanisms in Chapter 5. The non-linear relationships between ownership 
concentration and firm value, ownership concentration and debt, and debt and firm 
value are examined in Chapter 6, where the effectiveness of ownership concentration 
and debt as corporate governance mechanisms is the focus of the study. In conclusion, 
the key findings, contributions, research limitations and suggestions for future studies 
are provided in Chapter 7. 
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CHAPTER 2:   LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
Chapter 1 presented an overview of the key issues relating to monitoring, large 
shareholders, debt and firm value. This chapter presents a review of the literature 
relating to the topic of this thesis. It focuses on relevant literature that can motivate this 
thesis to make contributions. Section 2.2 surveys the literature on causality, Section 2.3 
presents the literature on interaction studies and Section 2.4 surveys non-linearity 
literature. The chapter is concluded in Section 2.5. 
 
2.2 Literature on Causality Studies 
In attempting to control for the endogeneity issue that is now commonly 
included in the corporate governance and firm performance literature, previous studies 
have generally used the simultaneous equation model, by applying either the two-stage 
or the three-stage least square estimations. The significance of the independent variable 
in affecting the dependent variable in these estimations is sometimes interpreted as 
causality that runs from x to y, hence a causal relationship is found between the 
variables. This study attempts to investigate the causality relationship by using the 
causality test for panel data developed by Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001), in order 
to meet the causality definition of the study, which is that the value of the cause 
variable should precede the value of the effect variable.  
 
Causality might run from ownership concentration to firm value or vice versa. 
In both cases, the causality can be in either a positive or a negative direction. According 
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to the monitoring hypothesis, ownership concentration positively affects firm value due 
to the effective monitoring of firm managers performed by large shareholders, and this 
result in the convergence of interests of firm shareholders as owners and firm managers 
as agents. A negative effect of ownership concentration on firm value is observed if 
large shareholders, through their concentration of ownership, use firm resources for 
their own benefit at the expense of firm small shareholders; this is referred to as the 
expropriation hypothesis. On the other hand, according to the control preference 
hypothesis, firm value positively affects ownership concentration where large 
shareholders retain their majority shares when the firm is valued relatively high by the 
market,
2
 as only a few new shares are issued to external investors. Based on the 
opportunity cost hypothesis, a negative effect of firm value on ownership concentration 
is perceived as large shareholders intending to sell their shares, thus reducing their 
fraction of ownership, when the firm value is high.  
 
Thomsen et al. (2006) examined the causal relationship by using the Granger 
causality test between blockholder ownership and firm value of the largest continental 
Europe, UK and US firms. The study was conducted for the period 1988 to 1998 with 
276 firms from continental Europe and 587 firms from the UK and the US. They used a 
broad measurement of blockholder ownership, which included the fraction of shares 
held by firm managers as well as external large shareholders. In this study, Thomsen et 
al. (2006) found that causality runs from blockholder ownership to firm value in 
continental Europe but not in the UK or the US. Further, this causality runs in a
                                                 
2
 High market value of firm shares denotes high wealth of holding firm shares. 
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negative direction thus, they suggest, the high percentage of continental Europe 
blockholder ownership creates conflicts of interest between blockholders and firm 
minority shareholders. This thesis argues that the findings in Thomsen et al. (2006) are 
not robust to the dynamic endogeneity issue as they only use ordinary least square 
(OLS) and random time and firm effects models. 
 
More recently, Hu and Izumida (2008) investigated the causality between 
ownership concentration and firm performance in Japanese manufacturing firms. Their 
unbalanced panel data was constructed of 715 firms listed in the first section of the 
Tokyo Stock Exchange for 1980 to 2005. However, in applying the Granger causality 
test, they limited the estimations for firms that were observed for at least four 
consecutive years, which were 666 firms in total. Using two proxies for the ownership 
concentration variable, the top five shareholders and the top ten shareholders, as well as 
two proxies for firm performance, Tobin’s Q and return on assets (ROA), they found 
that causality runs from ownership to performance in a positive direction, and that the 
findings did not support the reverse causality. Contrary to Wintoki et al. (2007), Hu and 
Izumida (2008) found that the causal relationship remains significant regardless of 
whether two-way fixed effects or generalised method of moments (GMM) is used. 
They argue that this is due to the illiquidity of Japanese shares as Japan retains bank-
centred financial systems. This study expands on the causality study by applying the 
causality test for panel data to investigate the causal relationship not only between 
ownership concentration and firm performance, but also between ownership 
concentration and debt as well as debt and firm performance. 
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Using a simultaneous equation model for a sample of 867 US acquisitions that 
occurred between 1978 and 1988, Loderer and Martin (1997) found no evidence that 
larger managers’ stockholdings have a positive effect on firm performance. However, 
they found the reverse causality that firm performance appears to have an impact on the 
size of managers’ stockholdings. This finding is consistent regardless of the 
measurements of firm performance used: acquisition performance and Tobin’s Q. The 
difference in Loderer and Martin’s (1997) findings is the directions of causality, where 
it was found that acquisition performance positively affects managers’ stockholdings 
while Tobin’s Q shows a negative effect. They conclude that competition in product 
and labour markets are more effective in disciplining managers than the ownership 
itself. Also, they conclude that managers liquidate at least part of their stockholdings 
when a firm is valued relatively high by the market. 
 
Cho (1998) examined the relationship between ownership structure, investment 
and corporate value on a cross-section of 326 Fortune 500 manufacturing firms in 1991. 
Using ordinary least square (OLS) estimation, Cho found that ownership structure 
affects investment, which consequently affects corporate value. In order to control for 
endogeneity, he applied the two-stage least squares estimation and found that 
investment affects corporate value, which consequently affects ownership structure. As 
such, he argues that previous studies that treat ownership structure as exogenous 
variable might be misinterpreted. Cho (1998) used insider ownership as a proxy for the 
ownership structure. This study expands on Cho’s study in several ways: by using 
ownership concentration and debt instead of insider ownership and investment 
respectively; by using panel data instead of cross-sectional data; and by using the 
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generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation instead of the two-stage least 
squares estimation, in order to control for the endogeneity issue. 
 
Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) pointed out that many corporate governance 
theories came to the conclusion that capital structure can be used to reduce agency costs 
and as a result increase firm value. This is due to the disciplinary effect of debt on large 
shareholders if they intend to expropriate small shareholders. Hence, a positive effect of 
debt on firm value is expected (Byers et al., 2008; Harris & Raviv, 1990). On the other 
hand, increasing debt may increase the agency cost of debt as a result of a conflict of 
interest between shareholders and debt holders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In this case, 
debt negatively affects firm value. 
 
Hovakimian, Hovakimian and Tehranian (2004) stated that profitability and 
market-to-book ratio are found in the literature to be especially important determinants 
of corporate financing choices. This suggests that causality might run from firm value 
to debt. A firm with high growth opportunities that can be represented by high firm 
value might experience a negative effect of firm value on debt due to two possibilities: 
the firm wants to minimise the bankruptcy risk of debt that might jeopardises its growth 
opportunities, or the firm wants to mitigate the underinvestment problems due to the 
agency cost of debt (Myers, 1977). On the other hand, a firm that is valued relatively 
high by the market easily obtains debt financing from creditors (Rajan & Zingales, 
1995). As such, firm value positively affects debt. 
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Hu and Izumida (2008) used the  two-stage least square estimation in their study 
using Japanese panel data and found that debt is negatively associated with firm 
performance, especially when it is proxied by ROA. They interpreted this as the 
conflict of interest between bondholders and shareholders increasing when the firm has 
a high debt level which increases the agency cost of debt finance. Similarly, Hu and 
Izumida (2008) found that firm performance has a significantly negatively effect on 
debt. Their explanation is based on the pecking order theory (as ROA is also used as a 
proxy for firm performance), which suggests that a firm with high profitability uses 
internal financing first before employing debt financing. Hence, a firm’s debt level is 
lower when profitability becomes higher as the firm has more retained funds to finance 
its investments. It is worthwhile noting that in this estimation, Hu and Izumida (2008) 
included industry and year dummies to control for the fixed industry and time effects 
respectively. They did not control for firm unobserved heterogeneity as firm fixed 
effects were not included in the estimation. 
 
Ownership concentration and debt have a unique relationship that is interesting 
to explore. Ownership concentration may positively or negatively affect debt depending 
on whether it functions as an effective monitor on firm managers or it expropriates its 
small shareholders. In the former case, a positive association between ownership 
concentration and debt is expected if they complement each other (Friend & Lang, 
1988), while the association is negative if they substitute for each other (Miguel, 
Pindado, & de la Torre, 2005). On the other hand, if expropriation by ownership 
concentration is the case, a positive relationship indicates three possibilities: large 
shareholders intend to retain their large fraction of ownership by issuing more debt to 
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finance firm investment (the control preference hypothesis); it is an attempt to avoid 
being taken over; or it is a fake signalling mechanism to external investors that the large 
shareholders do not mind being bonded with the fixed obligations carried by debt (Du 
& Dai, 2005). According to the free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986), debt itself can 
act as a disciplinary mechanism and this reduces the agency problem by reducing the 
agency costs of free cash flow. Hence, a negative effect on debt is expected as large 
shareholders want to benefit from free cash flow. 
 
Jensen (1986) and Hitt, Hoskisson and Harrison (1991) found that the creation 
of a firm’s capital structure can influence the governance structure of the firm. This 
suggests that causality may also run from debt to ownership concentration. If ownership 
concentration plays a role as an effective monitoring mechanism, the same previous 
positive and negative effects that represent the complementary and substitute functions 
respectively of debt on ownership concentration is expected. In the expropriation 
scenario, debt positively affects ownership concentration because large shareholders 
use debt as a signal of their intention to alleviate the agency problem (Hu & Izumida, 
2008). According to the risk-based argument of Demsetz and Lehn (1985), a negative 
association is expected as large shareholders want to limit their risks and a high 
percentage of firm debt makes ownership concentration reduce its fraction of shares. 
 
Du and Dai (2005) investigated the impact of ultimate corporate ownership 
structure on corporate debt in the corporations of nine East Asian countries – Hong 
Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan 
and Thailand. They purposely conducted the study over 1994 to 1996 in order to 
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examine the impacts of capital structure decisions made by controlling shareholders on 
the Asian 1997 financial crisis. Du and Dai (2005) found that, even with a relatively 
small fraction of ownership, controlling shareholders tend to increase debt in order to 
avoid the dilution of their ownership. They argued that these debt-increasing effects 
contributed to the risky capital structure choice that might have been one of the reasons 
that weakened Asian corporate governance and thus contributed to the corporate value 
losses during the Asian 1997 financial crisis. However, in their study, Du and Dai 
(2005) employed ordinary least square (OLS) estimation and thus they did not control 
for the potential endogeneity of ownership structure. This study investigates not only 
the impact of ownership structure on debt but also the impact of debt on ownership 
structure by taking into consideration the potential dynamic endogeneity of both 
ownership structure and debt.   
 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) re-examined the effect of ownership structure 
on firm performance. This was the first study to measure the fractions of shares owned 
by insiders and outsiders separately. They used the fraction of shares owned by 
management and the fraction of shares owned by the largest five shareholders to proxy 
for the insiders’ ownership structure and the outsiders’ ownership structure 
respectively. Their sample was based on 223 US firms for 1976 to 1980. Unlike the 
practice in almost all other studies, Demsetz and Villalonga did include financial 
institutions in their sample. By employing ordinary least square (OLS), they found that 
ownership structure and firm performance are significantly related. However, in order 
to control for what they believed was the endogeneity of ownership structure, they 
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employed the two-stage least square estimation (2SLS) and found that the significance 
of the relationship disappeared.  
 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) concluded that whether ownership is a diffuse 
or a concentrated structure, ownership structure is endogenously influenced by existing 
or potential investors, which results in there being no association between ownership 
structure and firm performance. Even though the present study uses only the outsiders’ 
ownership structure as a proxy and not the insiders’ ownership structure as in Demsetz 
and Villalonga’s study, it employs the generalised method of moments (GMM), which 
is argued to be more efficient than the 2SLS (Miguel et al., 2005) in taking the 
endogeneity issue into account. 
 
Using sample firms from the Compustat, Himmelberg, Hubbard and Palia 
(1999) examined the determinants of managerial ownership as they argued that the 
endogeneity of managerial ownership is influenced by the unobserved firm 
heterogeneity. Further, they re-investigated the relationship between managerial 
ownership and firm performance. Himmelberg et al. used a balanced panel of 600 firms 
which were randomly selected for the period 1982 to 1984, then an unbalanced panel 
after that where the number of firms fell to 330 by 1992. To take into account both 
unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity issues, they employed the fixed effects 
model which includes instrumental variables. They found evidence that the endogeneity 
of managerial ownership is caused by unobserved heterogeneity rather than by reverse 
causality. They did not find a significant association between the changes in managerial 
ownership and firm performance. This study attempts to provide evidence that 
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researchers can rely on the generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation to take 
into account both unobserved heterogeneity and endogeneity issues. 
 
2.3 Literature on Interaction Studies 
A large body of literature has emphasised the significance of corporate 
governance mechanisms in solving or at least mitigating the agency problems in 
corporations. Nevertheless, those findings have failed to agree on whether these 
mechanisms function best as a substitute or complement each other (Pindado & de la 
Torre, 2006). In their conceptual paper, Ward et al. (2009) proposed that in addressing 
agency problems between shareholders and managers in the Anglo-Saxon system of 
corporate governance, monitoring and incentive alignment should be utilised as a 
governance bundle instead of in isolation. In addition, as a governance bundle, these 
corporate governance mechanisms are functions of firm performance, and firm 
performance is the key determinant of whether these mechanisms act as substitutes or 
complements within the bundle. This study expands on Ward et al.’s (2009) concept by 
exploring ownership concentration and debt as the corporate governance mechanisms 
that are investigated as a bundle in mitigating agency problems between large and small 
shareholders. Further, firm value is also treated as one of the corporate mechanisms in 
the governance bundle that might have the potential to overcome the agency problems 
when it is combined with ownership concentration and debt.  
 
Using 135 non-financial Spanish public listed firms for the period 1990 to 1999, 
Miguel et al. (2005) found that a complementary effect of insider ownership, debt and 
dividends was used to control agency problems in Spanish firms. They argued that this 
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was due to the lack or poor performance of alternative corporate governance 
mechanisms, for instance, legal protection of investors, market for corporate control 
and the board of directors. As such, insider ownership, debt and dividends could not be 
used as stand-alone mechanisms in Spanish firms but needed to be used as a group. 
However, this complementary effect does not exist when the controlling owners, who 
are the significant shareholders through their concentrated ownership, expropriate firm 
minority shareholders, and the managerial ownership of firm managers results in 
managerial entrenchment. Miguel et al. (2005) concluded that the expropriation act by 
ownership concentration and the entrenchment act by firm managers do have impacts 
on the substitutability or complementarity of corporate governance mechanisms. To 
expand on this conclusion, this study investigates the substitution and complementary 
effects on ownership concentration, debt and firm value by including the interaction 
variables of these corporate mechanisms in the sample firms in a country that has high 
investors’ protection (La Porta et al. 1998).  
 
Using the same dataset and within the same period of study in Miguel et al. 
(2005), Pindado & de la Torre (2006) found that ownership concentration and insider 
ownership are complementary mechanisms and that agency problems between large 
and minority shareholders, and between shareholders and firm managers, in Spanish 
firms cannot be resolved by using only one of the mechanisms. They also found that the 
monitoring role of large shareholders substitutes for the disciplinary function of debt. 
However, Pindado & de la Torre (2006) did not include the interaction variables of 
ownership concentration and debt and their interpretation was based on the insignificant 
effect of debt on insider ownership after the ownership concentration variable was 
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included in the model. Hence, this study investigates the interaction between ownership 
concentration and debt in order to identify the substitutability or complementarity of 
these mechanisms by creating an interaction variable between them. 
 
As part of his study, Setia-Atmaja (2009) examined whether ownership 
concentration has an impact on the internal corporate governance mechanisms proxied 
by the board and audit committee independence. Ownership concentration in his study 
is proxied by closely-held and widely-held firms. The former variable takes a binary 
that equals one if the firm has a blockholder with at least 20% of the firm’s shares and, 
if not, a binary of zero that represents the latter variable. Using 316 Australian publicly 
listed firms in the period 2000 to 2005 and random effects estimation, he found that 
closely-held firms have fewer independent directors on the board compared to widely-
held firms. Setia-Atmaja (2009) interprets this as the intention of ownership 
concentration either to have lower independent boards in order to expropriate firm 
minority shareholders or as a substitute for monitoring firm managers. This study 
expands the investigation of the substitution or complementarity of ownership 
concentration to the other corporate mechanisms of debt and firm value, by adding the 
interaction variables of ownership concentration and debt, and ownership concentration 
and firm value with different types of estimations. 
 
Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) investigated whether debt, dividends and board 
structure serve as corporate governance mechanisms that alleviate agency problems 
between controlling and minority shareholders or aggravate them in family controlled 
firms. They used 316 Australian publicly listed firms for the period 2000 to 2005 where 
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79 firms, 25% of the total sample, were categorised as family firms at 30 June 1998. 
They found that family firms use debt as well dividends to substitute for independent 
directors in controlling agency problems. Also, they found that family firms moderate 
the effectiveness of these mechanisms in controlling agency problems as the effects of 
debt, dividends and board size on firm performance are stronger in family firms than 
non-family firms, thus suggesting that investors perceive that the agency problems 
between controlling and minority shareholders in family firms are more rigorously 
controlled than the agency problems between shareholders and managers in non-family 
firms. This study examines the substitution or complementarity effects on debt and 
ownership concentration, as well as debt and firm value, by using only the largest 
Australian firms as the sample. Furthermore, this study employs the generalised method 
of moments (GMM) estimation instead of the three-stage least square estimation used 
by Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009). This is more consistent as GMM controls not only for 
endogeneity and simultaneity but also for the heterogeneity issue (Miguel et al., 2004, 
2005). 
  
Arslan and Karan (2006) examined the impact of the ownership and control 
structure on the corporate debt maturity of 134 industrial firms publicly listed on the 
Istanbul Stock Exchange for the period of 1997 to 2003. Ownership structure was 
proxied with concentration, which is defined as the sum of percentage of shares held by 
the largest three shareholders, while the control structure was proxied with the large 
shareholder, that is, the percentage of shares held by the first non-manager shareholder. 
They used the balance-sheet approach in determining the debt maturity that is denoted 
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by the ratio of long-term book debt to total book debt
3
. They stated that creditors view 
short-term debt as an effective corporate governance mechanism in mitigating agency 
problems between shareholders and managers. Hence, creditors prefer to lend short-
term debt rather than long-term debt to a firm that is considered to have a high agency 
problem. 
 
In their study, Arslan and Karan (2006) found that debt maturity is significantly 
positively affected by both concentration and large shareholder. They viewed this as 
creditors being willing to lend long-term debt to firms that have a high concentration of 
ownership and large shareholder, as creditors believe that concentration and large 
shareholder are effective corporate governance mechanisms that can moderate firms’ 
agency problems. Also, they viewed this as a method by which ownership and large 
shareholder avoid the risks of employing short-term debt, which are higher interest rate 
risk, refinancing risk and liquidity risk. This study views this finding as concentration 
and large shareholder being substitutes for short-term debt and complementary to long-
term debt, in their roles as monitoring mechanisms on firm managers. 
 
Furthermore, Arslan and Karan (2006) found in their study that the ratio of the 
market value of total assets to the book value of total assets,
4
 which is used as a proxy 
for growth opportunities, was negative and significantly affected debt maturity. They 
interpreted this as the high growth opportunities firms prefer for short-term debt to 
alleviate an underinvestment problem of the agency cost of debt, which is the conflict 
                                                 
3 Arslan & Karan (2006) categorised long-term debt as any debt with more than one-year maturity. 
4 It should be noted that this ratio can also proxy for firm value. 
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of interest between shareholders and debt holders. In order to test whether 
concentration and large shareholder are related to this underinvestment problem, the 
interaction of these variables with growth opportunities was regressed. They found that 
the significant negative effect on debt maturity remained, thus justifying the conclusion 
that ownership and the control structure choose short-term debt to reduce the 
underinvestment problem. As such, in the study, interactions are found between 
ownership structure, debt maturity and growth opportunities.  
 
More recently, Dang (2011) investigated the interactions between corporate 
financing decisions, which consist of debt and debt maturity structure, and investment 
decisions in the presence of growth opportunities
5
. He used 678 UK firms for the period 
1996 to 2003 and took into account the endogeneity and dynamic issues of the debt, 
debt maturity structure, and investment and growth opportunities by using instrumental 
variables (IV) and generalised method of moments (GMM) estimations
6
. Dang (2011) 
found that in controlling underinvestment problems, firms with high growth 
opportunities do not shorten their debt maturity in order to avoid the liquidity risk of 
holding too much short-term debt. However, he found that these firms do lower their 
debt level, which is consistent with Myers’ (1977) hypothesis. Further, he found a 
complementary effect between debt and debt maturity in controlling the liquidity risk of 
short-term debt instead of a substitution effect in controlling the underinvestment 
                                                 
5
 Dang (2011) defines growth opportunities as market value of equity plus book value of debt divided by 
total assets. 
6
 Dang (2011) employed the IV estimation which uses second-lagged debt, debt maturity, and investment 
as instruments, and GMM estimation, which uses from the third-lagged debt to the sixth-lagged debt, and 
from the third-lagged debt maturity and investment to the fifth-lagged debt maturity and investment as 
instruments.  
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problem. This is supported by the negative effect of debt on investment. As such, he 
concluded that due to the disciplinary function of debt in firms with limited growth 
opportunities, those firms actually experience overinvestment issues. Finally, Dang 
(2011) found that investment is not affected by debt maturity, and thus holding long-
term debt maturity restrains firms’ growth opportunities. Again, it was found that there 
is an interaction between debt financing decisions and growth opportunities.  
 
Kim and Lu (2010) examined the interactive effects between internal and 
external governance mechanisms on firm value and risk-taking. The former mechanism 
is managerial ownership proxied by CEO ownership, while the latter mechanism is 
product market competition proxied by industry concentration ratio. Kim and Lu 
integrated US firms’ data from ExecuComp, Compustat and CRSP to construct panel 
data for the period 1992 to 2006. Different regressions had different sample size as they 
depended on the availability of the data. 
 
Firm-fixed effects were controlled in Kim and Lu’s (2010) models. They found 
that when the external governance is weak, there is a significant non-linear relationship 
between CEO ownership and firm value. In particular, CEO ownership plays a 
significant role in mitigating the agency problem at its low levels, but tends to take 
inadequate risk at its high levels. However, the significance disappears when the 
external governance is strong, as strong external governance keeps CEOs responsible in 
roles that affect their performance. Thus, it is less likely that CEOs in strong external 
governance will either mitigate or aggravate firms’ agency problems. As a result, Kim 
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and Lu concluded that a substitution effect exists between CEO ownership and external 
governance.  
 
Kim and Lu (2010) also investigated the ways in which firm value is affected by 
CEO ownership. They examined the impact of CEO ownership on R&D investment, as 
R&D is a high risk investment due to the greater uncertainty of its return compared to 
other types of investment. They found similar interaction effects between CEO 
ownership and external governance where there is a significant non-linear association 
between CEO ownership and R&D when the external governance is weak. They 
concluded that when CEO ownership is at low level, CEOs put in more effort in order 
to receive incentives from R&D investment, thus increasing the level of investment in 
R&D. However, at high levels of ownership, CEOs tend to reduce the risk of R&D 
investment as its risk-reducing effect dominates its incentive effect. This results in a 
reduction of R&D investment as CEO ownership increases. The significant impact of 
CEO ownership on R&D investment also disappears with strong external governance, 
thus confirming Kim and Lu’s conclusion that CEO ownership and external governance 
are substitutes. Kim and Lu’s results are robust after taking into account CEO 
ownership and external governance endogeneity issues.  
 
2.4 Literature on Non-linearity Studies 
As was highlighted in Chapter 1, investors’ protection is found to be stronger in 
common law countries than in civil law countries (La Porta et al. 1998). López-de-
Foronda et al. (2007) concluded that managerial ownership and capital structure are the 
most effective control devices in common law countries. More recently, it has been 
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found that having a good legal system in terms of corporate governance, shareholder 
protection and monitoring mechanism in common law countries is an important 
determinant on making profits from corporate investment (Inci et al. 2009). Hence, as 
Australia is one of the common law countries, this study investigates whether 
ownership concentration and debt are effective corporate governance mechanisms in 
Australia. 
 
In investigating the relationship between ownership structure and firm value, 
several previous studies have focused on insider or managerial ownership as a proxy for 
the ownership structure. Among others are Mørck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988), 
McConnell and Servaes (1990), McConnell and Servaes (1995) and Short and Keasey 
(1999), who found a non-linear relationship between insider ownership and firm 
performance. However, Mørck et al. (1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990) totally 
ignored the endogeneity issue of the ownership structure.   
 
In investigating the non-linearity between employee ownership (proxied by 
largest shareholder and shareholders who owned at least 5% of a firm’s stock)7 and 
firm performance, Guedri and Hollandts (2008) found a positive  relationship between 
the largest shareholder and firm performance, whilst a negative relationship between 
the shareholders who owned at least 5% of a firm’s stock  and firm performance. These 
results support the hypothesis of the non-linear relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm performance. 
  
                                                 
7
 These two variables are used as control variables in the study. 
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To explore the effect of national differences, Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) 
examined the relationship between ownership concentration that is proxied by the 
percentage of outstanding shares held by the largest shareholder and firm performance 
in the US, the UK, Germany, France and Canada for the period 1986 to 1991. They did 
find differences across countries. A non-linear association was found in the US and 
Germany, but not in France, and an insignificant linear relationship was found between 
ownership concentration and performance in the UK and Canada. The significant non-
linear U-shaped relationship found in the US and Germany shows that positive and 
significant ownership concentration effects on performance are only present in firms 
with a high level of ownership concentration while at a low level of ownership 
concentration there is a significant negative effect on performance. Gedajlovic and 
Shapiro (1998) only used return on assets (ROA) as the measurement for firm 
performance. This thesis argues that different results might be found by using a market-
based measurement, for instance Tobin’s Q. Furthermore, as they only applied the 
ordinary least square (OLS) estimation to the models, the results might be biased due to 
the failure to treat the ownership concentration variable as endogenous. 
 
Using 5,829 Korean firms in the period 1993 to 1997, Joh (2003) found non-
linear associations between ownership concentration and profitability by using two 
types of specification: linear, quadratic, and cubic regressions; and piecewise linear 
splines of 0-5%, 5-25% and 25-100%. This finding contradicts those of Mørck et al. 
(1988) and McConnell and Servaes (1990), but is consistent with that of Gedajlovic and 
Shapiro (1998), whose study found a negative relationship between ownership 
concentration and profitability when ownership concentration is at its lowest level, 
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which is below 5%. This suggests that due to the poor corporate governance system in 
Korea, entrenched controlling shareholders and managers can still harm firm value 
even when just holding a small percentage of ownership. In addition, they also tend to 
expropriate firm resources at this low level of ownership concentration. 
  
More recently, Hu and Izumida (2008) also found a U-shaped association of 
ownership concentration and firm performance in a panel of 715 manufacturing firms 
listed on the Tokyo Stock Exchange for the period 1980 to 2005. In their study, they 
found that the expropriation effect of large shareholders occurred at the low level of 
ownership concentration and the effectiveness of the monitoring effect was observed at 
the higher level. According to Hu and Izumida (2008), the expropriation act occurs as a 
result of the benefits that are gained solely by large shareholders whereas the costs of 
the expropriation are distributed among firm shareholders. As a result, the higher the 
concentrated ownership of large shareholders, the less they expropriate in order to 
avoid increasing net cost. On the other hand, the costs of effective monitoring are borne 
solely by large shareholders while the benefits are shared by all firm shareholders. 
Thus, if the level of ownership concentration becomes higher, large shareholders are 
more motivated to practise an effective monitoring role in order to gain a net benefit. 
However, Hu and Izumida did not control for firm unobserved heterogeneity as firm 
fixed effects were not included in the estimation. 
 
Contrary to the previous studies, Miguel et al. (2004) found an inverse U-
shaped non-linear relation between ownership concentration and firm value. Their 
study used 135 non-financial Spanish listed firms for the period of 1990 to 1999. The 
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percentage of significant common shares held by shareholders was used as a proxy for 
ownership concentration and the market value shares to the replacement value of total 
assets was used as a proxy for firm value. The generalised method of moments (GMM)
8
 
was used to estimate the model, thus controlling unobserved heterogeneity and 
endogeneity. Miguel et al. found the monitoring effect at the low level of ownership 
concentration and the expropriation effect at the high level, where the inflection point is 
at 87%. They argued that this non-linearity is likely to occur in Spanish firms rather 
than those in the US, the UK, Germany and Japan, where mostly the relationship is 
linear. This difference is due to the differences in Spanish corporate governance. For 
instance, its ownership is more concentrated and the investors’ protection is much 
lower. As such, with a relatively high concentration of ownership and investors’ 
protection is much higher, according to La Porta et al. (1998), this present study 
investigates whether the largest Australian firms display a linear or non-linear 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm value. 
 
In a study conducted for the period 1992 to 2002 for 116 Australian firms, 
Henry (2008) found a non-linear relationship between external ownership and firm 
value, and found that institutional ownership was positively related to firm value.
9
 
Furthermore, he found that both of the ownership structures are substitute mechanisms 
for the internal governance structure in enhancing firm value. As an expansion of 
                                                 
8
 However, Miguel et al. (2004) do not specify either one-step or two-step and the difference or system 
GMM that has been used. 
9
 Henry (2008, p.920-21) used total percentage shareholding of all institutional shareholders within the 
top 20 shareholders as a proxy for institutional ownership, and the sum of all individual shareholdings 
greater than 5% of total company issued equity capital held by shareholders who are not company 
directors or institutional investors as a proxy for external ownership. 
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Henry’s study, this present study covers the years after the introduction of the 
Principles of Good Corporate Governance and Best Practice Recommendations by the 
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Corporate Governance Council in March 2003, with 
different measure of ownership structure. 
 
Sánchez-Ballesta and García-Meca (2007) conducted a meta-analysis study and 
found a non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm performance 
when the latter was proxied with a market-based valuation such as Tobin’s Q. The 
study supports the monitoring and expropriation hypotheses where ownership 
concentration might be an effective monitoring mechanism at a lower level, but not 
when the level is too high, when the market will react negatively due to the expectation 
of expropriation on minority shareholders. 
 
As was discussed in Section 2.3, the other part of Setia-Atmaja’s (2009) 
Australian’s study was his examination of whether ownership concentration and 
dividend payouts moderate the effects of the board and audit committee independence 
as the internal corporate governance mechanisms on firm value. Using the three-stage 
least square estimation, he found that the agency problems between controlling and 
minority shareholders within closely-held firms are more serious than the agency 
problems between shareholders and managers within widely-held firms. In addition, 
blockholders, through their concentrated ownership, tended to expropriate firm 
minority shareholders by paying low dividends. Setia-Atmaja (2009) concluded that 
board and audit committee independence play an important role in protecting minority 
shareholders from rent expropriation by blockholders in closely-held firms. In order to 
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investigate the other financing decision, this present study uses debt instead of dividend 
payouts to examine the tendency of ownership concentration to use the firm financing 
mechanism to counter the possibility of expropriation that it is suggested exists in 
Australian firms.  
 
Theoretically, Stulz (1990) and Harris and Raviv (1990) found that debt was 
positively correlated with firm value. This finding was supported by Berger et al. 
(1997) who stated that many corporate governance theories conclude that capital 
structure can play a role as a disciplinary mechanism, and thus it can be used to reduce 
agency costs and as a result increase firm value. It has been empirically proven by 
Simerly and Li (2000) and Berger and Patti (2006), among others, that there is a 
positive relationship between debt and firm performance. However, the use of debt not 
only serves to align the interests of managers and shareholders and/or large and small 
shareholders, but it may also increase the agency cost of debt as a result of conflict of 
interest between shareholders and debt holders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). In this case, 
debt will negatively affect firm value (McConnell & Servaes, 1995). This study 
examines these conflicting findings and whether there is a non-linear relationship 
between debt and firm value.  
 
Large shareholders through their concentration of ownership might expropriate 
small shareholders, which might influence firm capital structure decisions. As a result 
of an expropriation, ownership concentration might prefer a low debt level in order to 
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maximise the cash flow right
10
 or to avoid the disciplinary role of debt, and thus it can 
divert the free cash flow for perquisites (Jensen, 1986). On the other hand, 
expropriation might cause ownership concentration to increase the debt level in order to 
increase their voting power, to prevent any takeover attempt, or as a fake signalling 
mechanism to external investors that they are willing to be bonded with the fixed 
obligation of debt  (Du & Dai, 2005) and thus do not intend to expropriate. 
 
Berger et al. (1997) found that entrenched managers did have an impact on their 
capital structure decisions. The study was conducted on 452 industrial firms and 500 of 
the largest US public corporations in the period 1984 to 1991. Based on this finding, 
this thesis argues that if large shareholders expropriate minority shareholders through 
their concentrated ownership, it may influence firm capital structure decisions as well. 
 
Besides insider owners, external blockholders also have power over the 
decisions regarding a firm’s resources allocation (Brailsford, Oliver, & Pua, 2002). In 
their study, they used a sample of the top 500 firms listed on the Australian Stock 
Exchange for the period 1989 to 1995. Due to the small final sample size (49 firms), 
they employed modified examination deviations from industry benchmarks in an 
attempt to deal with the endogeneity problem. Even though they argued that their 
results are consistent, their methods in handling the endogeneity issue can still be 
questioned as they do not represent complete solutions. Furthermore, they do not 
include the quadratic and cubic functions of external block ownership, and so ignore 
the possibility of the non-linearity of ownership concentration on debt. In their study, 
                                                 
10
 Cash flow right is the right to claim for dividend. 
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Brailsford et al. found a significantly positive relationship between external block 
ownership and debt, suggesting that large shareholders are active monitors. 
 
In conducting a cross-sectional analysis, Sarkar and Sarkar (2008) found that as 
institutions become market oriented, debt does play a role as a disciplinary mechanism 
regardless of the ownership structure. Ownership concentration was also found not to 
be exploiting debt for expropriation. In investigating the hypothesis that debt might be 
exploited as a mechanism of expropriation on minority shareholders, they focused on 
the ownership concentration of controlling insiders through either pyramids or cross-
shareholdings. In contrast, this study investigates the hypothesis through the 
concentration of ownership of large shareholders. 
 
Expanding on their earlier study (Miguel et al. (2004)), which was discussed 
previously, Miguel et al. (2005) investigated how expropriation and entrenchment 
effects influence the relationships between debt, dividend, insider ownership and 
ownership concentration. The non-linearity effects of monitoring and expropriation by 
ownership concentration were controlled by including dummy variables of one when 
ownership concentration was below 87% (monitoring effect) and zero when ownership 
concentration was equal to or above 87% (expropriation effect)
11
. They found that 
ownership concentration is significant and negatively affects debt. They have two 
explanations for this finding. First, under the monitoring effect, it is suggested that 
ownership concentration and debt are substitutes. However, the expropriation effect 
                                                 
11
 It should be noted that the inflection point of 87% is obtained in the regression of ownership 
concentration on firm value in Miguel et al. (2004). 
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reveals that ownership concentration lowers the debt level in order to avoid the 
disciplinary role of debt and to reduce risks by not employing a high debt level.  
Because Miguel et al. (2005) did not use either the linear, quadratic, and cubic 
functions or the piecewise linear splines of ownership concentration, they failed to 
examine the possibility of the non-linearity between ownership concentration and debt.  
 
Hu and Izumida (2008) did include the linear and quadratic functions of 
ownership concentration and these functions were regressed with debt using Japanese 
panel data. They found a significant U-shaped association between ownership 
concentration and debt, namely, that debt decreases at a low level of ownership 
concentration and increases as ownership concentration level rises. Hu and Izumida 
(2008) interpreted this as the costs and benefits that large shareholders bear and gain 
respectively due to the expropriation and monitoring activities in the non-linear 
relationship found between ownership concentration and firm value. Thus, they 
concluded that large shareholders through their concentrated ownership do have an 
influence on firm debt financing decisions regardless of whether they expropriate 
minority shareholders or they act as an effective monitoring mechanism. Again, Hu and 
Izumida did not control for firm unobserved heterogeneity as firm fixed effects were 
not included in the estimation. 
 
Using 316 Australian publicly listed firms for the period 2000 to 2005, Setia-
Atmaja et al. (2009) found that there was no tendency for family firms to exploit debt 
as well as dividends in the expropriation act, as the controlling shareholders in the 
family firms reduced independent directors in the rent expropriation activities. In 
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addition, they found that family ownership and debt had an inverse U-shaped 
relationship at an inflection point of around 30%. Their model re-estimations confirmed 
that family firms do not exploit debt in the expropriation act. It should be noted that in 
these particular findings, Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) used random effects estimation. In 
an attempt to expand this area of research, this study uses generalised method of 
moments (GMM) estimation to investigate the non-linearity between ownership 
concentration and debt in the largest Australian firms, with an extension in the period of 
study, which is from 1997 to 2008.  
 
2.5 Conclusions  
It is widely suggested in the literature that good corporate governance practices 
carried out by corporate governance mechanisms have a positive effect on firm value 
(see, for instance, La Porta et al. 2002). However, many previous empirical studies 
(among others Cho, 1998; Miguel et al. 2004; Wintoki et al. 2007) have provided 
evidence that corporate governance is endogenous and that how a firm is valued by the 
market also affects firm corporate governance mechanisms. This thesis views firm 
value as one of the important corporate mechanisms because it has a hidden ability to 
overcome corporate issues, and hence it might be among the good corporate 
governance practices. 
  
The literature survey indicates that not only can corporate governance 
mechanisms affect firm value but the reverse can also occur. This study focuses on 
ownership concentration and debt to proxy for corporate governance mechanisms. 
These mechanisms are selected as they might also have a relationship that would be 
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interesting to explore. Further, the thesis considers previous theoretical and empirical 
studies pertaining to the causality relationship, interaction and non-linearity of these 
corporate mechanisms (that is, ownership concentration, debt and firm value) to 
identify the gaps that it is hoped this thesis can fill. 
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CHAPTER 3:   DATA, SUMMARY STATISTICS AND 
METHODOLOGY 
 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides the data set, the descriptive statistics of the data and the 
methodology used in the study to test the panel data. Section 3.2 presents the data used 
in the study. The descriptive statistics of the data used are then summarised in Section 
3.3. Methodology is presented in Section 3.4 and the chapter is summarised in Section 
3.5. 
 
3.2 Data 
In this section, the study explains the collection of the unfiltered data and how it 
is filtered. This is followed by an explanation of the variables selected for use in this 
study and how they are measured. 
 
3.2.1 Unfiltered Data  
The first type of data is the full data set, referred as the unfiltered data. The data 
used for this study consists of the largest Australian firms by year-end market 
capitalisation for the period 1997 to 2008. All the listed firms with their year-end 
market capitalisation throughout this period were obtained from FinAnalysis and 
DatAnalysis provided by Aspect Huntley. In accordance with the usual practice, firms 
in the financial sector are excluded from the study, as well as non-Australian firms that 
may have different ownership structures (see Mulherin, 2005).  
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Table 3.1 shows the number of companies and number of years in the data set. 
A total of 1,200 firm year observations were available for 220 firms for the unfiltered 
data set. 
 
Table 3.1 Structure of the sample  
 
Number of annual 
observations per company 
Number of companies Number of observations 
12 45 540 
11 5 55 
10 4 40 
9 8 72 
8 8 64 
7 10 70 
6 9 54 
5 7 35 
4 27 108 
3 19 57 
2 27 54 
1 51 51 
Total 220 1200 
 
Table 3.2 shows the distribution of the sample by sectors. The top three sectors 
that represent the largest Australian firms in 1997–2008 are materials, industrials and 
consumer discretionary. 
 
Table 3.2 Structure of the sample by sector 
 
Sector Number of companies 
Energy 24 
Materials 49 
Industrials 44 
Consumer discretionary 40 
Consumer staples 15 
Health care 18 
Information technology 15 
Telecommunication services 4 
Utilities 11 
Total 220 
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3.2.2 Filtered Data 
The second type of data is a filtered data set which is designed to reduce the 
effect of outliers in the unfiltered data. Details are provided in A3.1 in the Appendix. 
 
In this final sample, there is some missing data for the ownership concentration 
variables. This involved two firm year observations, or 0.16% of the total firm year 
observations, which resulted in the number of observations of 1,198 for these variables. 
Table 3.3 shows the number of observations used for every variable in this study. 
 
Table 3.3 The filtered sample 
 
Variable Number of observations 
Ownership concentration (Largest shareholder) 1198 
Ownership concentration (Largest 5 shareholders) 1198 
Debt ratio 1199 
Tobin’s Q 1199 
Return on assets 1199 
Investment 1198 
Change in assets turnover 1199 
Firm size 1199 
Firm age 1200 
 
3.2.3 Variables Selection 
3.2.3.1   Ownership Concentration 
This study defines ownership concentration as the total percentage of ordinary 
shares owned by the largest shareholders. Previous studies used data on the total 
percentage of the largest shareholders as a proxy for ownership concentration. Demsetz 
and Lehn (1985) used the largest five and largest twenty, La Porta et al. (1998) used the 
largest three, Demsetz and Villalonga (2001) used the largest five, and Hu and Izumida 
(2008) used  the largest five and largest ten. 
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This study uses data on the total percentage of ordinary shares owned by a 
firm’s largest shareholder (OC1) and the largest five shareholders (OC5)12, which are 
extracted from the list of the 20 largest shareholders. For the most recent years (2006–
2008), data on the 20 largest shareholders was obtained from the OSIRIS database, and 
for the remaining years the data was hand-collected from annual reports downloaded 
from OSIRIS, Aspect Huntley, Connect-4, the firms’ websites and the State Library of 
Victoria archive. 
 
It is found that throughout the study period, more than half of the 20 largest 
shareholders in the largest Australian firms are registered under a nominee company. In 
addition, in certain years, some largest Australian firms may have more than one same 
nominee company in their 20 largest shareholders. This demonstrates that the 
Australian equity market has a very high intensity of nominee ownership.   
 
A nominee company is a registered owner which holds shares of a particular 
firm in its own name on behalf of another party whom is known as the beneficial owner 
or the beneficiary. As a custodian of the shares, a nominee company is the owner in 
name only as the beneficiary is the one who is supposedly has effective ownership and 
control of the shares. Also, as the true owner of the shares, the beneficiary has the 
beneficial interest on the shares that is entitled to all income and capital gains of the 
shares. However, the true identity of the beneficiary remains unknown to the public 
                                                 
12
 These proxies are chosen due to the highly concentrated ownership experienced by the sample firms, 
which is further shown in the descriptive statistics in Section 3.2. The findings by using the other proxies 
of ownership concentration (the largest 10, 15 and 20 shareholders) are not included in this thesis as they 
are qualitatively the same as the findings by using the largest five shareholders. 
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investors as they do not have the legal right to know who is behind the nominee 
company. 
 
Under a custodial agreement, an arrangement is made between the nominee 
company and the beneficiary. Depending upon the terms of the contract of 
appointment, the beneficiary may authorise or permit certain power to be carried out by 
the nominee company, for instance, the voting power. As far as the company (the issuer 
of the shares) is concerned, the nominee company is entitled to vote as it is the 
registered owner of the shares. Hence, if the beneficiary is authorising or permitting the 
voting power, the nominee company will not vote unless it is directed by the 
beneficiary. Nevertheless, there is a possibility that the nominee company will exploit 
its position by voting in its own interest. 
                        
Previous studies found that the Australian capital market has high ownership 
concentration which is constituted by the firms’ largest shareholders (Setia-Atmaja, 
2009; Setia-Atmaja et al., 2009). In addition, it is also found that the Australian capital 
market shows abnormally high private benefits of control (Lamba & Stapledon, 2001) 
as opposed to the other common law countries such as the UK, Canada, New Zealand 
and South Africa which also exhibit high levels of protection to investors and high 
levels of ownership concentration (Nenova, 2003). It should be noted that private 
benefits of control is an example of expropriation activities by large shareholders such 
as misappropriating assets, opportunity to engage in self-dealing and in taking 
corporate opportunities at the expense of minority shareholders (Setia-Atmaja et al., 
2009). Both studies by Lamba and Stapledon (2001) and Nenova (2003) suggested that 
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there is a possibility that large shareholders in Australia through their concentrated 
ownership extract private benefits of control from minority shareholders. Earlier than 
these studies, Dignam and Galanis (1999) also suggested that significant blockholders 
engaged in private rent extraction in Australian corporate governance system.  
 
With the possibility that the nominee company might exploit its position, 
therefore, it can be suggested that as a registered large shareholder, a nominee company 
through its ownership concentration may have the opportunity to expropriate largest 
Australian firms’ small shareholders. The following article13 provides an excellent 
example of this issue. 
 
Who owns Qantas? 
By James Cogan 
31 October 2011 
 
Qantas CEO Alan Joyce has made repeated reference to the “96 percent 
support” he received from shareholders at the company’s annual general 
meeting on October 28—the day before he and the Qantas board grounded 
the airlines’ entire global fleet. He did not mention that the biggest 20 
shareholders control 80.3 percent of total voting shares, and that just the top 
four, a group of major global financial conglomerates, hold over 70 percent. 
Qantas is an example of how the most powerful financial interests exert 
sway over the commanding heights of the economy. Just 240 of the 
company’s 133,392 shareholders own 82.49 percent of the stock. Contrary 
to claims that some type of “shareholders democracy” exists, small 
investors have no say in the company’s direction or conduct. The largest 
Qantas shareholder—with 22.72 percent of the company—is J. P. Morgan 
Nominees Australia, a division of the global J. P. Morgan investment house. 
The second largest is HSBC Custody Nominees with 18.91 percent. Next is 
National Nominees with an 18.26 percent stake. The fourth largest is 
Citicorp Nominees. These four investment funds are also among the largest 
shareholders of Australia’s four major banks, the Commonwealth Bank, 
National Australia Bank, Westpac Bank and ANZ Bank, which in turn are 
large shareholders of the investment funds. J. P. Morgan, HSBC, National 
Nominees and Citicorp are also the top four shareholders of Australia’s two 
largest resource companies, BHP-Billiton and Rio Tinto. They appear 
                                                 
13
 http://www.wsws.org/articles/2011/oct2011/qown-o31.shtml 
60 
prominently in the top 20 list of shareholders of numerous companies, 
ranging from oil corporation Caltex to construction and property giants 
Leighton Holdings and Lend Lease. This web of interconnections 
guarantees that the executives of any company serve as the direct 
representatives of finance and carry out their dictates. They move 
seamlessly between different companies, serving the same essential 
masters. Qantas chairman Leigh Clifford, for example, was previously the 
CEO of Rio Tinto. The other board members include former executives of 
the banks, mining conglomerates, industrial companies and global equity 
funds, as well as retired military chief General Peter Cosgrove, who 
commanded the neo-colonial Australian intervention into East Timor in 
1999. 
  
3.2.3.2   Debt 
This study uses debt ratio (D) as a proxy for debt. Debt ratio is defined as book 
value of total debt scaled by book value of total assets. Data on total debt and total 
assets was downloaded from DataStream. Any missing data was hand-collected from 
annual reports, using the same definitions used in DataStream. Some of the previous 
studies that used this variable are Berger et al. (1997), Jiraporn and Gleason (2007), 
Driffield, Mahambare and Pal (2007) and Lemmon, Roberts and Zender (2008). 
 
3.2.3.3   Firm Value 
Hu and Izumida (2008) used Tobin’s Q (Q) to proxy firm value. This study also 
employs Tobin’s Q, which is measured by the sum of year-end market capitalisation 
and book value of total debt and book value of preferred shares scaled by book value of 
total assets. Total assets are used as the denominator, replacing the original 
denominator of replacement cost, due to no data on replacement cost being found in 
Australian firms (see Setia-Atmaja, 2009; Setia-Atmaja et al. 2009). 
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Year-end market capitalisation data was obtained from Aspect Huntley. Total 
debt, preferred shares and total assets were downloaded from DataStream. Any missing 
data was resolved using the procedure described in Section 3.2.3.2. 
 
3.2.3.4   Control Variables 
All control variables were also downloaded from DataStream and the method of 
finding any missing data as described in Section 3.2.3.2 was repeated. Table 3.4 shows 
the control variables and their descriptions used in this study. Discussion on the use of 
these variables is included in Section 3.3. 
 
Table 3.4 Control variables  
 
Control variable Description 
Investment (INV)  Capital expenditure scaled by book value of total assets  
Firm size (SI) The natural logarithm of book value of total assets 
Firm age (AGE)  The natural logarithm of the number of years since the 
firm’s incorporation 
Change in assets 
turnover (AT)  
Sales scaled by assets change; where it is defined as current 
value of sales/book value of total assets - lagged value of 
sales/book value of total assets 
Profitability (ROA)  Earnings before interest and tax scaled by book value of 
total assets 
Lagged 
(Profitability) 
(ROA(-1))  
Previous year’s profitability 
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3.2 Summary Statistics 
Table 3.5 presents the summary statistics of the variables used in this study for 
the largest Australian firms in the period 1997 to 2008. Due to missing variables and 
the outliers that have been removed, the number of observations of the variables ranges 
from 1198 to 1200. 
 
As can be seen in the table, the minimum and maximum values of the 
ownership concentration of the largest shareholder are 1.66% and 96.82% with a mean 
(median) of 23.11% (17.53%). This suggests that the largest shareholders in the largest 
Australian firms have a fairly concentrated ownership. Setia-Atmaja (2009) defines 
ownership concentration by categorising the sample firms as closely-held or widely-
held firms. Firms are categorised as closely-held if a firm has at least one shareholder 
who controls at least 20% of the firm’s equity. 
 
With regard to the ownership concentration of the largest five shareholders, the 
minimum and maximum values of this variable are 3.82% and 99.71% with a mean 
(median) of 50.48% (49.69%). This verifies that half of the total percentage of shares is 
already in the largest five shareholders’ hands. It also suggests that the largest five 
shareholders have a fairly concentrated structure of ownership. This was also indicated 
in Setia-Atmaja et al.’s (2009) study, where the mean of the Australian firms’ 
substantial shareholdings, which they defined as shareholders with at least 5% equity 
stake, was 44.6%. 
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The mean and median values of debt ratio are 0.26. This is virtually the same as 
found in other studies which used Australian firms as a sample such as Setia-Atmaja 
(2009) and Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009), where the mean of debt ratio is 0.22 and 0.227 
respectively. However, the debt ratio is relatively low compared to  other countries, for 
instance, Japan, where the mean debt ratio of Japanese firms is 0.5646 (Hu & Izumida, 
2008). This might be due to the dividend imputation taxation system that was 
introduced in Australia in 1987. One of the significant impacts of this system is that 
corporate debts are issued at a relatively low levels (Davis, 2011; Henry, 2010). 
Further, the debt ratio has a minimum of 0.00 and maximum of 2.20. This is relatively 
the same as the minimum and maximum values of debt ratio of 0.0006 and 2.6740 
found by Henry (2010), who used 120 of the largest 300 Australian firms for the period 
of study from 1992 to 2002. 
 
As for Tobin’s Q, the mean (median) of this variable is 2.40 (1.32) with the 
minimum and maximum values of 0.26 and 59.63. Applying the essential 
interpretation, the mean of Tobin’s Q found in this study indicates that, on average, the 
market value of the largest Australian firms is 2.4 greater than the value of the firms’ 
total assets. With a slightly different estimation conducted on 434 listed Australian 
firms in 2000, Davidson, Goodwin-Stewart and Kent (2005) found that the mean 
(median) of the firms’ market to book ratio14 was 3.820 (1.485) with the minimum and 
maximum values of -17.160 and 287.980. 
 
                                                 
14
 The measurement used is market capitalisation scaled by the book value of shareholders’ equity. 
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The mean (median) for the other control variables used in this study are:  
investment 0.07 (0.05), firm size 13.94 (13.98), firm actual age 40.20 (28.00), change 
in assets turnover 0.97 (0.70) and ROA 0.10 (0.09).
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Table 3.5 Descriptive statistics 
 
The table reports the descriptive statistics that show the mean, median, minimum, maximum, standard deviation (SD) and the 
number of observations of the variables used in this study. 
 Mean Median Minimum Maximum SD Number of observations 
Largest shareholder (%) 23.11 17.53 1.66 96.82 16.06 1198 
Largest 5 shareholders (%) 50.48 49.69 3.82 99.71 18.84 1198 
Debt ratio  0.26 0.26 0.00 2.20 0.20 1199 
Tobin’s Q 2.40 1.32 0.26 59.63 4.13 1199 
Investment 0.07 0.05 0.00 0.59 0.08 1198 
Total assets (A$ million) 3,489 1,183  0.046 114,919 7,699 1199 
Firm actual age 40.20 28.00 0.00 171.00 34.99 1200 
Change in assets turnover 0.97 0.70 -0.002 9.39 1.03 1199 
ROA 0.10 0.09 -1.29 1.02 0.14 1199 
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3.4 Methodology 
In this section, the study first presents the estimation models used to conduct the 
causality, interaction and non-linear tests. The hypotheses on the relationships between 
the variables included in the models are also explained
15
. This is followed by an 
explanation of the estimation methods used in conducting the tests. 
 
3.4.1 Estimation Models 
3.4.1.1   Causality Test 
This study applies the causality test for panel data developed by Nair-Reichert 
and Weinhold (2001), which allows a multivariate causality test. The aim is to examine 
the causality among the variables of interest – ownership concentration, debt and firm 
value – as well as the direction of the causality if it does exist. Hence, only these 
variables are included in the model. As such, the following three equations are 
estimated: 
 
ittititiit XLDLOCLQLQ   1,21,11,11           (3.1) 
ittititiit YLQLOCLDLD   1,21,11,22           (3.2) 
ittititiit ZLQLDLOCLOC   1,21,11,33           (3.3) 
where i  and t  denote firm and year respectively. LOC  is the logarithmic 
transformation of the ownership concentration of the largest shareholder and the largest 
five shareholders (OC1 and OC5), in order to transform the bounded ownership 
variable (0 to 100) into an unbounded. Following Demsetz and Lehn (1985), LOC  = 
                                                 
15
 See sub-section 3.2.3 for the definitions of the variables. 
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Ln(OC/(100 – OC)). LQ and LD are natural logarithms of Tobin’s Q (Q) and debt ratio 
(D) respectively. This is to correct the skewed distribution of the variables. itX , itY  and 
itZ  are the error terms. Firm-specific effects i  and time-specific effects t  are used to 
control the unobservable heterogeneity and the effects of time-specific shocks, such as 
macroeconomic shocks, respectively. Hence, the error terms itX , itY  and itZ  are 
transformed into itti   , where it  is the random disturbance. 
 
In model 3.1, ownership concentration is hypothesised to causally affect firm 
value. The monitoring hypothesis suggests that large shareholders through their 
concentrated ownership might monitor firm managers effectively and thus mitigate the 
agency problem I between shareholders and managers. Therefore, a positive 
relationship between lagged ownership concentration and firm value is expected. On 
the other hand, the expropriation hypothesis suggests that large shareholders might use 
the firm’s resources for their own benefit at the expense of firm small shareholders and 
create the agency problem II between large and small shareholders. Thus, an inverse 
relationship between these two variables is anticipated. Further, in this model, debt can 
causatively affect firm value. The free cash flow hypothesis suggests that debt can play 
a role as an effective disciplinary mechanism (Jensen, 1986). Therefore, a positive 
relationship between lagged debt and firm value is expected. On the other hand, the 
agency cost of debt suggests that debt financing might result in an increase in the 
agency problem between shareholders and debt holders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
Thus, an inverse relationship between these two variables is anticipated. 
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In model 3.2, ownership concentration can cause debt. The direction of the 
causality (if any) depends on whether ownership concentration plays its role as an 
effective monitoring mechanism or expropriates firm small shareholders. Under the 
monitoring effect, if ownership concentration complements debt as the corporate 
governance mechanism, a positive relationship is expected between lagged ownership 
concentration and debt (Friend & Lang, 1988). On the other hand, if ownership 
concentration substitutes debt, an inverse relationship between these two variables is 
anticipated (Hu & Izumida, 2008; Miguel et al. 2005). However, under the 
expropriation effect, the control preference hypothesis suggests that large shareholders 
through their concentrated ownership intend to maintain their large fraction of 
ownership in an attempt to avoid the firm from being taken over, thus issuing more debt 
to finance firm investment. In addition, ownership concentration might give a fake 
signalling mechanism to external investors, either that they do not mind being bonded 
with the fixed obligations carried by debt (Du & Dai, 2005), or that their intention is to 
mitigate the possibility of agency costs (Hu & Izumida, 2008). In these situations, a 
positive relationship is also expected between lagged ownership concentration and debt. 
On the other hand, the free cash flow hypothesis suggests that as debt can play a role as 
a disciplinary device, the agency problem can be reduced by reducing the agency cost 
of free cash flow (Jensen, 1986). Thus, an inverse relationship is also expected between 
these variables as ownership concentration wants to benefit from the free cash flow for 
its perquisites
16
. Further in this model, firm value can cause debt. Rajan and Zingales 
(1995) suggest that highly valued firms can easily obtain debt financing from creditors. 
 
                                                 
16
 One of the ways to have a free cash flow in a firm is by employing a low debt level.  
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Therefore, a positive relationship between lagged firm value and debt is anticipated. On 
the other hand, a firm experiencing high value which represents a high growth 
opportunity may not want to jeopardise that. Also, due to the agency cost of debt, the 
firm would want to mitigate the underinvestment problems (Myers, 1977). Hence, an 
inverse relationship between these two variables is expected. 
 
In model 3.3, debt can cause ownership concentration. Again, the direction of 
the causality (if any) depends on whether ownership concentration plays a role as an 
effective monitoring mechanism or expropriates firm minority shareholders. Under the 
monitoring effect, if debt complements ownership concentration as a corporate 
governance device, a positive relationship is expected between lagged debt and 
ownership concentration. On the other hand, if debt substitutes ownership 
concentration, an inverse relationship between these two variables is anticipated (Hu & 
Izumida, 2008). However, under the expropriation effect, ownership concentration uses 
debt as a signal that the firm is doing well (Leland & Pyle, 1977) and that large owners 
do not mind increasing their holding positions in the firm. Therefore, a positive 
relationship is also expected between lagged debt and ownership concentration. 
However, the risk-based argument suggests that ownership concentration wants to limit 
its risks as shareholders due to the high level of debt (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985). Thus, an 
inverse relationship is also expected between these two variables. Further, in this 
model, firm value can cause ownership concentration. The control preference 
hypothesis suggests that ownership concentration retains its majority shares when a 
firm is valued relatively high by the market. This is due to the possibility of issuing 
fewer shares to external investors in order to finance firm investment when the market 
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price is higher (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny 2000). As such, a 
positive relationship between lagged firm value and ownership concentration is 
anticipated. On the other hand, the opportunity cost hypothesis suggests that ownership 
concentration intends to sell its shares when the firm value is high (Thomsen et al. 
2006). Thus, an inverse relationship between these two variables is expected.  
 
Due to the short time series involved in this study, a lag length of one is chosen. 
Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001) used 25 years in their panel but still considered it a 
short time series. This study conducts this test even though it covers only a 12-year 
period. Thomsen et al. (2006) conducted a Granger causality test for a 10-year period of 
study. However, for robustness, a lag length of two is also tested in this study. 
 
3.4.1.2   Interaction Test 
To examine the interactions between ownership concentration and debt, 
ownership concentration and firm value, and debt and firm value, and how these 
interactions affect firm value, debt and ownership concentration respectively, the 
following equations are estimated: 
 
  itititititititit AGESIINVDDOCOCQ 6543210    
ititit XROAAT  87        (3.4) 
 
  itititititititit ATSIINVQQOCOCD 6543210    
  itit YROA  17        (3.5) 
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  itititititititit AGESIINVQQDDOC 6543210    
  itit ZAT  7        (3.6) 
where i  and t  denote firm and year respectively. Q, D and OC are Tobin’s Q, debt ratio 
and ownership concentration respectively. These are the variables of interest in this 
test
17
. INV, SI, AGE, AT, ROA and ROA(-1) are investment, firm size, firm age, change 
in assets turnover, profitability and lagged profitability respectively. These are the 
control variables. itX , itY  and itZ  are the error terms. Firm-specific effects i  are used 
to control the unobservable heterogeneity. Time-specific effects t  control for the 
effect of unobservable time-specific shocks that affect all firms in a particular year, 
such as macroeconomics changes. Hence, the error terms itX , itY  and itZ  are 
transformed into itti   , where it  is the random disturbance. 
 
Model 3.4 is the regression for firm value. The explanatory variables of interest 
are ownership concentration, debt and the interaction between these variables. 
Ownership concentration might have dual effects on firm value, either serving as an 
effective monitoring mechanism on managers (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Shleifer & 
Vishny, 1986), or tending to expropriate on small shareholders (Shleifer & Vishny, 
1997). The former will result in a positive effect on firm value, while the latter will 
have a negative impact. Debt might have a positive effect on firm value if it serves as a 
disciplinary device in mitigating ownership concentration’s perquisite of free cash flow. 
                                                 
17
 In this interaction test models, these variables of interest are not defined as their natural logarithm in 
contrast with the causality test models in order to be consistent with Hu and Izumida (2008). In their 
study, they defined the variables of interest by their natural logarithm in the causality models but not in 
the simultaneous equation models.  
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As such, debt can also play a role as an effective monitoring mechanism (Jensen, 1986). 
On the other hand, if debt is seen to increase the agency cost of debt, it will result in a 
negative effect on firm value (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). The individual effects of both 
ownership concentration and debt will determine the interaction effects of these 
variables on firm value. If the coefficient of the interaction effect is positive, it suggests 
that these variables are complementary to each other and if it is negative, they are 
substitutes. 
 
The control variables included in model 3.4 are investment, size, age, change in 
assets turnover and profitability. Investment could also represent the production 
capability of a firm. Hence, investors might anticipate good future prospects for the 
firm, thus enhancing firm value (Hu & Izumida, 2008). Size might negatively affect 
firm value as, if size is too large, there is a possibility that the firm has a high agency 
cost and difficulties in monitoring, which would reduce firm value. This hypothesis 
follows Himmelberg et al. (1999). Age is expected to have a negative effect on firm 
value, as young firms are seen to have better growth prospects (Ritter, 1991). Firm 
value can be positively influenced by change in assets turnover as a high turnover of 
assets indicates that the firm is efficient in generating income (Thomsen et al. 2006). 
Similarly, profitability is also expected to have a positive effect on firm value (Beiner, 
Drobetz, Schmid & Zimmermann, cited in Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009)) . Lagged 
profitability is not included in this model to maintain consistency with Setia-Atmaja et 
al. (2009).  
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The determinants of debt are identified in Model 3.5. Ownership concentration, 
firm value and the interaction between these two variables are the explanatory variables 
of interest. A negative (positive) effect of ownership concentration on debt is expected 
if ownership concentration plays its role as an effective monitoring mechanism, thus 
using debt as its substitute (complement) in order to control for agency costs. These 
hypotheses follow Friend and Lang (1988), Miguel et al. (2005) and Hu and Izumida 
(2008). On the other hand, if ownership concentration expropriates the minority 
shareholders, it will result in a negative effect on debt due to the intention to use free 
cash flow for its perquisite, as the disciplinary effect of debt become weaker (Jensen, 
1986). In addition, a positive effect on debt can be a signal that ownership 
concentration tends to expropriate the small shareholders in order to maintain the large 
shareholders’ percentage of ownership in the firm or it can be a defensive tactic against 
a takeover attempt. Also, it might be a fake signalling message to external investors 
either to show that they do not mind being bonded with fixed obligations carried by 
debt (Du & Dai, 2005), or that their intention is to mitigate the possibility of agency 
costs (Hu & Izumida, 2008). Firm value can also be a sign of corporate growth 
opportunity. Hence, firm value and debt could be negatively related as growing firms 
might avoid high debt level due to the higher probability of financial distress risk that 
might also put their growth opportunities at risk. In addition, the negative effect of firm 
value on debt might be due to the agency cost of debt and the firm wanting to mitigate 
the underinvestment problem (Myers, 1977). On the other hand, firm value can 
positively affect debt as high valued firms can easily obtain debt financing from 
creditors (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). The interaction effect of ownership concentration 
and firm value on debt is determined through their individual effects. If the coefficient 
74 
of the interaction effect is positive, it suggests that these variables are complementary 
to each other and if it is negative, they are substitutes. 
 
The control variables for model 3.5 are investment, size, change in assets 
turnover and lagged profitability. Investment can have dual effects on debt through its 
impact on firm value (Hu & Izumida, 2008), where if the firm has an internal excess of 
funds, debt will negatively influenced by investment. On the other hand, if the firm 
faces a shortage of internal funds, investments will positively affect debt. Firm size and 
debt are expected to be positively related as a larger firm has a lower probability of 
financial distress due to the tendency to be more diversified (Setia-Atmaja et al. 2009). 
Change in assets turnover can positively affect debt due to the effectiveness of a firm’s 
assets in generating income that could influence the need for external finance (Thomsen 
et al. 2006). This model includes the lagged profitability (and not the profitability, that 
is, the current year’s profitability), as the need to use debt/external financing depends 
on the accumulation of retained earnings which are brought forward from the past 
profitability of the firm (Du & Dai, 2005, p.64). A firm that has made a good profit in 
the previous year might easily get access to the capital market, thus debt should be 
positively influenced by the previous year’s profitability. However, taking into account 
the pecking-order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984), the previous year’s 
profitability and debt should be negatively related as the higher the previous year’s 
profitability, the more retained earnings the firm will have and thus the less it will rely 
on debt. Age is not included in this model to maintain consistency with Du and Dai 
(2005), Hu and Izumida (2008) and Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009).    
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Model 3.6 incorporates ownership concentration as the dependent variable. The 
regressors of interest are debt, firm value and the interaction between debt and firm 
value. On the one hand, if large shareholders are monitoring managers effectively, debt 
should negatively affect ownership concentration due to the possibility that debt can be 
the alternative to large shareholders in monitoring managers (Hu & Izumida, 2008). In 
addition, in this context, debt might positively affect ownership concentration as these 
two variables are complementary to each other. On the other hand, if large shareholders 
are expropriating firm small shareholders, a negative effect of debt on ownership 
concentration might be exhibited, as large shareholders want to limit their risk of 
holding a large fraction of shares due to the high level of debt. This hypothesis follows 
the risk-based argument in Demsetz and Lehn (1985). Further, debt might positively 
affect ownership concentration when large shareholders, who tend to expropriate, 
increase their holding positions if the firm increases its debt level as a signal that the 
firm is doing well (Leland & Pyle, 1977). Firm value and ownership concentration are 
expected to be positively related if large shareholders retain their majority shares by 
issuing fewer shares to external investors when the firm is valued relatively high by the 
market (La Porta et al. 2000). Contrarily, a negatively association is expected if large 
shareholders intend to sell a fraction of their shares when the firm value is high 
(Thomsen et al. 2006). The individual effects of both debt and firm value will 
determine the interaction effect of these variables on ownership concentration. If the 
coefficient of the interaction effect is positive, it suggests that these variables are 
complementary to each other and if it is negative, they are substitutes.  
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In model 3.6, investment, size, age and change in assets turnover are included as 
control variables. Investment is expected to have dual effects on ownership 
concentration. On the one hand, a positive relationship may be exhibited as large 
shareholders increase their holding positions as the investment level increases in order 
to increase their levels of monitoring on managers, as higher investment leads to higher 
opportunities for managerial discretion (Pindado & de la Torre, 2006). On the other 
hand, a negative relationship may result as large shareholders tend to diversify their 
portfolios, as higher investment leads to higher risk as well (Hu & Izumida, 2008). The 
firm size is expected to be negatively related to ownership concentration, as wealth 
distribution among shareholders will be smaller as the firm becomes larger (Demsetz & 
Lehn, 1985). Older firms might be more complicated and difficult to manage (Hermalin 
& Weisbach, 1998). Based on this hypothesis, firm age and ownership concentration 
are expected to be positively related. Change in assets turnover, used to measure the 
changes in capital intensity, can have a positive effect on ownership concentration. This 
is because, in order to overcome high monitoring costs as a result of the high changes in 
capital intensity, ownership concentration is needed (Thomsen et al. 2006). Profitability 
and lagged profitability are not included in this model to maintain consistency with 
Miguel et al. (2005) and Pindado and de la Torre (2006).  
 
3.4.1.3   Non-linear Test 
The following equations are estimated in order to investigate: (1) The non-linear 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm value, and the impact of this 
relationship on the non-linearity between ownership concentration and debt, and (2) 
The non-linear relationship between debt and firm value. 
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itititititititit ATAGESIINVDOCOCQ 76543
2
210    
itit XROA  8        (3.7) 
 
itititititititit ATSIINVQOCOCOCD 7654
3
3
2
210    
itit YROA  )1(8        (3.8) 
 
itititititititit AGESIINVOCDDDQ 7654
3
3
2
210    
ititit XROAAT  98        (3.9) 
where i  and t  denote firm and year, respectively. The following are the variables of 
interest in this test: Q, D and OC are Tobin’s Q, debt ratio and ownership concentration 
respectively. The following are the control variables: INV, SI, AGE, AT, ROA and 
ROA(-1) are investment, firm size, firm age, change in assets turnover, profitability and 
lagged profitability respectively. itX , itY  and itZ  are the error terms. Firm-specific 
effects i  and time-specific effects t  are used to control the unobservable firm-
specific and time-specific, respectively. Hence, the error terms itX , itY  and itZ  are 
transformed into itti   , where it  is the random disturbance. 
 
First, in order to investigate the possibility of a non-linear relationship between 
ownership concentration and firm value, the specification tries to fit a quadratic 
ownership concentration (OC and OC
2
) curve to the data in model 3.7. Second, further 
investigation is then conducted to examine its impact on the non-linearity between 
ownership concentration and debt. Therefore, the specification tries to fit a cubic 
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ownership concentration (OC, OC
2
 and OC
3
) curve to the data in model 3.8. Third, to 
test whether there is a non-linear relationship between debt and firm value, the 
specification tries to fit a cubic debt (D, D
2
 and D
3
) curve to the data in model 3.9. 
Chen, Ho, Lee and Shrestha (cited in Hu & Izumida (2008, p.347)) state that the main 
advantage of the quadratic/cubic model over the piecewise linear model is that the 
turning point(s) is/are determined endogenously. Other explanatory variables of interest 
as well as the control variables in all three models are defined in Section 3.4.1.2. 
 
Table 3.6 summarises the definitions of the variables and the relevant 
hypothesised signs in the estimation models involved in this study. 
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Table 3.6 Variable definitions and expected signs 
 
Variable Definition Firm value (Q) Debt (D) Ownership 
concentration 
(OC) 
Firm value (Q) The sum of year-end market capitalisation and book 
value of total debt and book value of preferred shares 
scaled by book value of total assets  
 +/- +/- 
Debt (D) Book value of total debt scaled by book value of total 
assets 
+/-  +/- 
Ownership concentration (OC)  The percentage of ordinary shares own by firm largest 
shareholder and largest five shareholders 
+/- +/-  
Investment (INV) Capital expenditure scaled by book value of total assets + +/- +/- 
Firm size (SI) The natural logarithm of book value of total assets - + - 
Firm age (AGE) The natural logarithm of the number of years since the 
firm’s incorporation 
-  + 
Change in assets turnover (AT) Current value of sales scaled by book value of total 
assets minus lagged value of sales scaled by book value 
of total assets 
+ + + 
Profitability (ROA) Earnings before interest and tax scaled by book value of 
total assets 
+   
Lagged (Profitability) (ROA(-1)) Previous year’s profitability  +/-  
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3.4.2 Estimation Methods 
3.4.2.1   Fixed Effects (FE) 
As firms are heterogeneous, the first estimation, two-way FE estimation, is 
employed to control for the heterogeneity across firms and over time; thus it eliminates 
the unobserved heterogeneity. One of the research questions of the thesis is whether the 
relationships between corporate governance and performance in the largest Australian 
firms are also influenced by the dynamic endogeneity issue. Thus, FE is employed to 
find whether the sample firms used in the study suffer from biased estimates generated 
by FE as a result of ignoring the dynamic endogeneity, as has been argued in previous 
studies such as Wintoki et al. (2007). If  consistency of the results is found in both 
estimations, the dynamic endogeneity issue that is raised by Wintoki et al. (2007) can 
be argued. In addition, the Huber-White correction of robust standard errors is used in 
this estimation to account for panel-specific autocorrelation and heteroskedasticity.   
 
3.4.2.2   Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) 
This study applies short and wide panel data (small T and large N). All models 
involved in the estimation capture firm-specific effects that do not vary from year to 
year. Since firms are heterogeneous, there is a possibility of not being able to obtain or 
measure some variables that also affect firms. Hence, it is important in such panel data 
to eliminate unobserved heterogeneity as it will lead to biased results. Other main 
assumptions developed in this study are that although the inclusion of the dependent 
variable on the right-hand side of the regression yields it to be endogeneous, all 
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explanatory variables in all models are not strictly exogenous
18
 and they are 
simultaneously determined. Even though simultaneous-equations estimators are more 
efficient than GMM, they are not consistent as they do not control for unobserved 
heterogeneity. This necessitates employing a consistent estimation that is able to 
control for unobserved heterogeneity, dynamic endogeneity and simultaneity (Miguel et 
al. 2005; Wintoki et al. 2007). Thus, the primary method used in this study is justified, 
that is, the system generalised method of moment (GMM) estimator with first 
differences developed by Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998).  
 
System GMM has two types of estimators: one-step and two-step estimators. A 
two-step estimator is always more efficient (Bond, Hoeffler, & Temple, 2001; 
Roodman, 2009). As such, the study employs this estimator. It is more efficient since it 
uses lagged twice or more as instruments for all the endogeneous variables in all 
models (Miguel et al. 2005). However, it might cause instrument proliferation, where 
the estimator generates numerous instruments that overfit endogenous variables 
(Roodman, 2009). In order to limit the number of instruments generated, this study 
applies the ‘collapsing’ technique. This instrument set is tested for validity by 
conducting an analysis based on the Hansen test (Hansen, 1982) of the full instrument 
set and the Difference-in-Hansen test of a subset of instruments for over-identifying 
                                                 
18
 This study conducts the tests for the endogeneity by using the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test. Since 
there are inconsistencies in the results where some variables are found to be endogenous in certain 
models but turn out to be exogenous in other models, the decision to treat the variables as endogenous in 
the main models is based on the theories and previous studies. For instance, Wintoki et al. (2007) and 
Chen (2008) consider all the regressors as endogenous, which include market-to-book value, firm age, 
size, and capital expenditure ratio which is equivalent to the investment variable used in this study. 
However, for robustness, all regressions use GMM estimation and consider only variables of interest as 
endogenous while all control variables are considered as exogenous, as in Hu and Izumida (2008). 
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restrictions (H0 = Valid instruments)
19
. As such, both tests require the failure to reject 
the null hypothesis. 
 
As the estimator assumes that there is no serial correlation in the error term, it , 
tests for serial correlation are conducted where the residuals in the first differences 
(AR1) should be correlated, but in the second differences (AR2) there should be no 
serial correlation (Arellano & Bond, 1991). This study uses the Windmeijer (2005) 
correction of robust standard errors to account for panel-specific autocorrelation and 
heteroskedasticity. 
 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter presents the data set and methodology used for analysis in this 
study of the period from 1997 to 2008. The largest Australian firms are selected as they 
represent approximately 51% of the Australian market value. In addition, institutional 
investors in Australia are keen to invest in larger firms (Henry, 2008).  
 
This study uses an unbalanced panel data set as some firms are not included in 
the largest 100 by year-end market capitalisation in certain years. Hence, this study 
employs a rotating panel as some firms are dropped and others are added during the 12-
year period of the study. 
 
                                                 
19
 As recommended by Roodman (2009), this study also reports on the number of instruments generated 
in all regressions, even though there is no clear-cut figure on the ultimate number of instruments that 
should be accepted, only a rule of thumb that the number of instruments should be less than the number 
of groups.   
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Two estimations, generalised method of moments (GMM) and fixed effects 
(FE), are chosen to test the models, as the former estimation controls the unobserved 
heterogeneity, dynamic endogeneity and simultaneity, while the latter estimation 
controls only the unobserved heterogeneity. As such, one of the main objectives of this 
thesis is to investigate whether employing FE results in a biased estimation due to the 
dynamic endogeneity issue. 
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CHAPTER 4:   CAUSALITY RESULTS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The overall aim of this study is to investigate the causal relationship between: 
(1) ownership concentration and firm value, (2) ownership concentration and debt, and 
(3) debt and firm value. Conceptually, causality can run: (1) from ownership 
concentration to firm value and/or from firm value to ownership concentration, (2) from 
ownership concentration to debt and/or from debt to ownership concentration, and (3) 
from debt to firm value and/or from firm value to debt. This study uses the definition of 
causality that the value of the cause variable should precede the value of the effect 
variable. Therefore, the goal of this part of the study is to answer the first research 
question of whether there are any causal relationships between ownership 
concentration, debt and firm value, as well as the fourth research question of whether 
the causal relationships of these corporate mechanisms are influenced by the dynamic 
endogeneity issue.  
 
The causality test for panel data has received much attention as researchers 
suggest that its accuracy is higher than the test based on time series. However, the 
majority of the models developed for the causality test for panel data are designed for 
bivariate equations. As such, this study uses the model developed by Nair-Reichert and 
Weinhold (2001) which can be used to test for the multivariate equation. Most 
importantly, this study is the first to employ the model in the field of corporate 
governance. The only modification is to include firm-specific effects, time-specific 
effects and random disturbance in the error terms. Further, Nair-Reichert and Weinhold 
(2001) used Mixed Fixed and Random (MFR) estimation methods, whereas this study 
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applies the two-way fixed effects (FE) and the two-step system generalised method of 
moments (GMM) estimation methods, with the major findings derived from the latter. 
 
The results of the GMM estimation show that firm value causes ownership 
concentration in a negative direction, but ownership concentration does not cause firm 
value. This contradicts the results of Thomsen et al. (2006) and Hu and Izumida (2008), 
who found that causality runs from ownership concentration to firm value. Also, these 
results show that debt causes firm value in a negative direction as well, but firm value 
does not cause debt. As for the causality between ownership concentration and debt, the 
results show that there is no causal relationship between these two corporate 
governance mechanisms. However, further investigation by using the high level of 
largest shareholder sub-sample reveals that ownership concentration does cause debt in 
a negative direction.  
 
Ownership concentration is found to be endogenous as reverse causality is 
found from firm value to ownership concentration. However, on the whole, the results 
of both FE and GMM estimations reveal consistency, suggesting that dynamic 
endogeneity is not an issue in the causal relationships between ownership 
concentration, debt and firm value in the largest Australian firms. 
 
The rest of the chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 shows the unit root 
tests conducted. Section 3 presents the empirical results and a discussion. Section 4 
concludes the chapter. 
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4.2 Unit Root Tests 
Before investigating the causal relationship between ownership concentration, 
debt and firm value, the study first conducted unit root tests to examine the stationary 
of the variables illustrated in this section. This test is important because the regressions 
of non-stationary variables on each other in the causality test may lead to spurious 
causality results. If this is the case, it would probably result in misleading inferences 
about the estimated parameters and the degree of their associations.   
 
The study employs four types of unit root test for panel data: (1) Levin, Lin and 
Chu (2002), (2) Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003), (3) augmented Dicky-Fuller and (4) 
Phillips-Perron
20
. The basic equation that underlies these tests is:  
 
ittiiiit uyy  1,        (4.1) 
 
where: (1) ittiiiit uyy  1, ;  
(2) 1 ii  ; 
(3)  Nii ,...,1  is fixed unknown constant; and  
(4)  2,0..~ uit diiu  . 
 
The null hypothesis in all tests is that a series is non-stationary if 0:0 iH   for 
all i. In the Levin, Lin and Chu test, which assumes that all series are stationary with 
                                                 
20
 Hu and Izumida (2008) also use these tests. 
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the same mean-reversion parameter, the alternative hypothesis is 0:1   iH  for 
each firm i. In the Im, Pesaran and Shin, Augmented Dicky-Fuller and Phillips-Perron 
tests that assume mean-reversion parameters to be probably different across firms, the 
alternative hypothesis is 0:1 iH   for at least one firm i. Therefore, rejection of the 
unit root hypothesis is necessary to support the stationariness of the series.  
 
Table 4.1 presents the results of the unit root tests. It shows that, in all tests, all 
variables are significant at the 1% level of significance, hence strongly rejecting the 
null hypothesis of unit root. This indicates that the logarithmic transformation of OC1 
and OC5, the natural logarithms of debt ratio and Tobin’s Q are stationary.   
 
It should also be noted that multicollinearity tests show that these three 
variables of interest do not have a serious multicollinearity problem when the VIFs are 
lower than 10. 
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Table 4.1 Panel unit root tests 
 
The table presents the results of the unit root tests for panel data. The basic model that underlies these tests is: ittiiiit uyy  1,  
where ittiiiit uyy  1, , 1 ii  ,  Nii ,...,1  is fixed unknown constant and  2,0..~ uit diiu  . The null hypothesis for all the tests is 
that the series is non-stationary. LOC1 and LOC5 are logarithmic transformation of OC1 and OC5 respectively, that is LOC = Ln(OC/(100 – 
OC)), whereas LQ and LD are natural logarithms of Tobin’s Q and debt ratio respectively. The number of cross sections is 100 firms and the lag 
length 1 is chosen.  
 
Method/Variable LOC1 LOC5 LD LQ 
 Statistic Probability Statistic Probability Statistic Probability Statistic Probability 
Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process)         
Levin, Lin and Chu t* -14.0254 0.0000 -15.8541 0.0000 -20.7083 0.0000 -16.5556 0.0000 
Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit root process)         
Im, Pesaran and Shin W-stat -6.10057 0.0000 -6.08027 0.0000 -6.76377 0.0000 -6.89339 0.0000 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller – Fisher Chi-square  345.112 0.0000 323.171 0.0000 383.439 0.0000 357.488 0.0000 
Phillips-Perron – Fisher Chi-square 351.159 0.0000 316.887 0.0000 372.705 0.0000 369.267 0.0000 
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4.3 Empirical Results and Discussion 
In this section, the study first presents the results and discussion of the causality 
tests generated from the FE estimation, followed by the results and discussion by using 
the GMM estimation. The results and discussion of further studies of this test by using 
the sub-samples of ownership concentration are then presented. Results and discussion 
for the robustness test finish this section.  
 
4.3.1 FE Estimation 
The study first conducts the causality tests by using the FE estimation presented 
in this section. Table 4.2 shows the results of the tests where Panel A is the regressions 
with LOC1 the proxy for the ownership concentration. Panel B is the regressions when 
ownership concentration is proxied by LOC5. 
 
Table 4.2 presents the results of the causality test by using FE estimation for the 
following models: 
Model 1: ittititiit XLDLOCLQLQ   1,21,11,11   
Model 2: ittititiit YLQLOCLDLD   1,21,11,22   
Model 3: ittititiit ZLQLDLOCLOC   1,21,11,33   
where i  and t  denote firm and year respectively. LOC  is logarithmic transformation of 
OC1 and OC5 that is LOC = Ln(OC/(100 – OC)), whereas LQ and LD are natural 
logarithms of Tobin’s Q and debt ratio respectively. itX , itY  and itZ  are the error terms 
which have been transformed into itti    where i , t  and it  are the firm-
specific effects, time-specific effects and random disturbance respectively. Robust t-
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statistics are presented in parentheses. Constant terms are not reported for convenience. 
*, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Table 4.2 Causality test 1: FE estimation 
 
 Panel A Panel B 
Model 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Variable LQ LD LOC1 LQ LD LOC5 
              
LQ(-1) 0.53*** 0.15 -0.13** 0.53*** 0.15 -0.13*** 
 [9.58] [1.45] [-2.56] [9.65] [1.46] [-2.86] 
LD(-1) -0.056*** 0.43*** 0.025 -0.056*** 0.42*** 0.034** 
 [-2.67] [4.82] [1.46] [-2.70] [4.88] [2.60] 
LOC1(-1) 0.0037 0.050 0.57***    
 [0.15] [0.82] [9.95]    
LOC5(-1)     -0.0011 0.084 0.59*** 
     [-0.029] [1.21] [17.73] 
        
Observations 896 886 896 896 886 896 
R-squared 0.34 0.21 0.40 0.34 0.21 0.50 
F statistics 17.24 5.68 16.42 18.15 5.62 47.58 
[P-value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Time effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
 
       
In Table 4.2, the coefficients of lagged Tobin’s Q in model 1 in both Panel A 
and Panel B ( 1 = 0.53), lagged debt ratio in model 2 ( 2 = 0.43 in Panel A and 0.42 in 
Panel B), and lagged ownership concentration in model 3 ( 3 = 0.57 for LOC1 and 0.59 
for LOC5) are significant at the 1% level of significance. This indicates that the lagged 
values of these variables are followed by their current values. In other words, the 
current year levels of ownership concentration, debt and firm value are highly 
correlated with their previous year levels. 
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Model 1 shows that the coefficients of lagged ownership concentration 1 = 
0.0037 for LOC1 and -0.0011 for LOC5 are not significant. This indicates that the 
previous year level of ownership concentration is not followed by the current year value 
of the firm. Thus, the findings fail to find evidence on causality running from 
ownership concentration to firm value. Further, in the same model, it is found that the 
coefficient of lagged debt ratio 2 = -0.056 is statistically significant at the 1% level in 
both regressions in Panel A and Panel B. This indicates that the previous year level of 
debt is followed by the current year value of firm. As such, it suggests that the causality 
runs from debt to firm value in a negative direction. 
 
In model 2, the coefficients of the lagged ownership concentration 1 = 0.050 
for LOC1 and 0.084 for LOC5 are not significant, which indicates that the previous 
year level of ownership concentration is not followed by the current year level of debt. 
This suggests that causality does not run from ownership concentration to debt. Also, 
the same model shows that the coefficient of lagged Tobin’s Q 2 = 0.15 is not 
significant in both regressions in Panel A and Panel B. It indicates that the previous 
year level of firm is not followed by the current year level of debt, and thus fails to find 
evidence that causality runs from firm value to debt.  
 
Model 3 shows the coefficients of lagged debt ratio 1 = 0.025 and 0.034 for 
regressions in Panel A and Panel B respectively. In the former regression, the 
coefficient of the lagged debt ratio is not significant, thus indicating that the previous 
year level of debt is not followed by the current year level of the largest shareholder’s 
ownership concentration. However, the latter regression reveals that the coefficient of 
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the lagged debt ratio is statistically significant at the 5% level. This indicates that the 
previous year level of debt is followed by the current year level of the largest five 
shareholders’ ownership concentration. As such, the finding suggests that causality runs 
from debt to the largest five shareholders’ ownership concentration in a positive 
direction. 
 
Further, model 3 shows that the coefficients of lagged firm value 2 = -0.13 in 
both regressions in Panel A and Panel B are used as the proxies for ownership 
concentration. Both coefficients are significant at the 5% and 1% levels of significance. 
This indicates that the previous year level of firm value is followed by the current year 
level of ownership concentration. Thus, it suggests that causality runs from firm value 
to ownership concentration in a negative direction. 
 
To conclude, the findings of the causality tests using the FE estimation suggest 
that causality runs from debt to firm value in a negative direction, but it does not run 
from firm value to debt. Also, the findings suggest that causality runs from firm value 
to ownership concentration in a negative direction, but not the other way around. 
Finally, the findings suggest that causality runs from debt to the largest five 
shareholders’ ownership concentration in a positive direction, but not to the largest 
shareholder’s ownership concentration. Also, no causality is suggested to run from 
ownership concentration to debt. However, these findings might be biased as the 
estimation does not take into account the dynamic endogeneity issue. In addition, 
inconsistencies might have been generated due to the presence of the lagged dependent 
variable when estimating data with large numbers of firms and relatively few years (Hu 
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& Izumida, 2008). For this reason, the study conducts causality tests by using the GMM 
estimation which is presented next. 
 
4.3.2 GMM Estimation 
This section examines the causal relationship between ownership concentration, 
debt and firm value by using the GMM estimation. This is the primary estimation 
method employs in this study as it takes into account the dynamic endogeneity issue 
which is argued to have an influence on the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm value. Table 4.3 shows the findings of the tests where the 
regressions with LOC1 as the ownership concentration proxy are in Panel A and the 
regressions when ownership concentration is proxied by LOC5 are in Panel B.  
 
Table 4.3 presents the results of the causality test by using GMM estimation for 
the following models: 
Model 1: ittititiit XLDLOCLQLQ   1,21,11,11   
Model 2: ittititiit YLQLOCLDLD   1,21,11,22   
Model 3: ittititiit ZLQLDLOCLOC   1,21,11,33   
where i  and t  denote firm and year respectively. LOC  is logarithmic transformation of 
OC1 and OC5 that is LOC = Ln(OC/(100 – OC)), whereas LQ and LD are natural 
logarithms of Tobin’s Q and debt ratio respectively. itX , itY  and itZ  are the error terms 
which have been transformed into itti    where i , t  and it  are the firm-
specific effects, time-specific effects and random disturbance respectively. All variables 
on the right-hand side (LQ, LD and LOC) are treated as endogenous variables. Robust t-
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statistics are presented in parentheses. Constant terms are omitted for convenience. *, 
** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
 
Table 4.3 Causality test 1: GMM estimation 
 
 Panel A Panel B 
Model 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Variable LQ LD LOC1 LQ LD LOC5 
              
LQ(-1) 0.87*** -0.16 -0.13* 0.85*** -0.22 -0.12** 
 [7.23] [-1.10] [-1.70] [7.17] [-1.28] [-2.00] 
LD(-1) -0.074** 0.51*** -0.019 -0.062* 0.48*** -0.034 
 [-2.03] [3.93] [-0.47] [-1.77] [3.19] [-1.26] 
LOC1(-1) -0.017 -0.20 0.63***    
 [-0.23] [-1.60] [6.06]    
LOC5(-1)     0.017 -0.15 0.68*** 
     [0.23] [-1.32] [8.35] 
        
Observations 896 886 896 896 886 896 
Number of instruments 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Number of groups 158 157 159 158 157 159 
AR(1) -4.47 -2.98 -3.54 -4.35 -2.71 -3.12 
[P-value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
AR(2) -0.61 -0.95 -1.26 -0.58 -0.90 0.49 
[P-value] [0.54] [0.34] [0.21] [0.56] [0.37] [0.63] 
Hansen test 27.62 36.12 23.25 37.41 37.77 21.27 
[P-value] [0.59] [0.20] [0.81] [0.17] [0.16] [0.88] 
Difference-in-Hansen test 22.42 28.52 17.74 34.40 32.07 20.72 
[P-value] [0.72] [0.39] [0.91] [0.16] [0.23] [0.79] 
F statistics 75.38 143.45 218.01 65.61 153.36 41.14 
[P-value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Time effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
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As expected, the coefficients of lagged Tobin’s Q in model 1 ( 1 = 0.87 in Panel 
A and 0.85 in Panel B), lagged debt ratio in model 2 ( 2 = 0.51 in Panel A and 0.48 in 
Panel B), and lagged ownership concentration in model 3 ( 3 = 0.63 for LOC1 and 0.68 
for LOC5) are highly significant with their current values at 1% level of significance. 
This indicates that the lagged values of these variables are followed by their current 
values, where the current year levels of Tobin’s Q, debt ratio and ownership 
concentration are highly affected by their previous year levels. This could be one of the 
reliable indicators for firm managers, shareholders and investors to predict the next year 
level of these variables. 
 
In model 1, it is found that the lagged ownership concentration does not 
significantly affect the current level of Tobin’s Q, where the coefficients of the former 
are 1  = -0.017 and 0.017 in Panel A and Panel B respectively. This finding indicates 
that the previous year level of ownership concentration is not followed by the current 
year value of the firm. This suggests that the market does not respond when there is an 
increase or decrease in the level of ownership concentration. Thomsen et al. (2006) also 
found no significant effect of blockholder ownership on firm value in the US and the 
UK by using sub-samples of high and low initial levels of ownership. However, they 
did find a significant and negative effect of blockholder ownership on firm value in 
continental Europe. Hu and Izumida (2008) found that causality runs from ownership 
concentration to firm value but in a positive direction. Thus, these two studies suggest 
that ownership does have an influence on firm value in continental Europe and Japan, 
but this is not the case in the largest Australian firms.   
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One possible explanation is that since Australia is a common law country with 
high investors’ protection (La Porta et al. 1998), investors are not concerned whether 
large shareholders through their concentrated ownership play a role as an effective 
monitor on firm managers in order to align the interest of shareholders as firm owners 
with the interest of managers as firm agents. Investors might rely on and highly trust 
the market system for their protection, and hence they do not have to respond to 
changes in ownership concentration. This non-responding action is reflected in the non-
changes in firm value. Another explanation may be that the market does not 
systematically change if ownership concentration changes are due to the stability of 
ownership holdings by large shareholders where large shareholders do not trade their 
shares as frequently as small investors. Hence, large shareholders will hold a certain 
percentage of ownership for some time (Gedajlovic & Shapiro, 1998), which results in 
no changes in firm value.   
 
Further, in model 1, a significant negative effect of lagged debt ratio on Tobin’s 
Q is found, where 2  = -0.074 and -0.062 are statistically significant at 5% and 10% 
levels in Panel A and Panel B respectively. This indicates that the previous year level of 
debt is followed by the current year value of the firm. Thus, it suggests that causality 
runs from debt to firm value in a negative direction, and that a higher debt level will 
lead to a reduction in firm value. There are two possible explanations for this finding. 
First, the increase in debt may increase the agency cost of debt financing as a result of 
conflict of interest between shareholders and debt holders (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
As such, the agency cost of debt will reduce firm value. Contrary to this, the lower the 
debt level, the lower the agency cost of debt and the higher the firm value would be. 
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Second, debt might increase the probability of bankruptcy and thus it would decrease 
firm value. On the other hand, if a firm maintains a lower debt level, the firm will be 
highly valued by investors, who will assume that there is a lower possibility of the firm 
facing financial distress.  
 
This result is consistent with the findings of Hu and Izumida (2008) who found 
a negative impact of debt on firm value in their Japanese panel data by using the two-
stage least square model. Firm value could also proxy for growth opportunity. As this 
study uses the largest 100 firms, and it is found that the sample firms are valued 
relatively high by investors
21
, the findings are also consistent with the findings of 
McConnell and Servaes (1995) who found a negative relationship between debt and 
firm value in high growth firms.  
 
Model 2 shows that the coefficients of lagged ownership concentration are 1  = 
-0.20 and -0.15, while the coefficients of lagged Tobin’s Q are 2  = -0.16 and -0.22 in 
the regressions in Panel A and Panel B respectively. As there is no evidence of the 
significance of these variables coefficients, it cannot be concluded that the previous 
year level of ownership concentration and the previous year value of the firm affected 
the current year level of debt. This suggests that causality does not run from ownership 
concentration to debt as well as from firm value to debt. The failure to reject the null 
hypothesis that ownership concentration does not causes debt, in this case in a negative 
way, suggests that large shareholders through their concentrated ownership do not play 
                                                 
21
 Refer to Table 3.5 in Chapter 3 where the mean value of Tobin’s Q is 2.397. 
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an effective role as a monitoring mechanism, and thus do not need debt to substitute 
this ineffective role. On the other hand, if expropriation on minority shareholders by 
large shareholders is the case, the insignificance of the finding suggests that ownership 
concentration is not concerned with the disciplinary effect that might be performed by 
debt. These findings support the insignificant positive relationship between LOC5 with 
Tobin’s Q and the insignificant negative association between LOC1 and Tobin’s Q as 
shown in model 1.  
 
In the meantime, the failure to reject the null hypothesis that firm value does not 
cause debt suggests that the financing decisions of the largest Australian firms, 
particularly in deciding on debt issues, are not influenced by the value of the firm. As 
the sample firms represent the largest corporations, the insignificant association from 
firm value to debt suggests that the probability of being faced with financial distress 
risk as a result of issuing debt is not a concern for these firms. 
 
Model 3 reveals that 1  = -0.019 and -0.034 represent the coefficients of lagged 
debt ratio associated with the current levels of LOC1 and LOC5 respectively. However, 
there is no evidence to support the association between the lagged debt ratio and the 
current level of ownership concentration as the coefficient of debt ratio is insignificant. 
This indicates that the previous year level of debt is not followed by the current year 
level of ownership concentration. Hence, it suggests that causality does not run from 
debt to ownership concentration. The negative insignificant effect of debt on ownership 
concentration implies that large shareholders do not respond when there is an increased 
or decreased in debt level. 
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Additionally, in model 3, the coefficients of lagged Tobin’s Q exhibit 2  = -
0.13 and -0.12 in Panel A and Panel B respectively. The significance of these 
coefficients at the 10% level when Tobin’s Q is regressed with LOC1 and at the 5% 
level when it is regressed with LOC5 indicates that the previous year value of firm is 
followed by the current year level of ownership concentration. This suggests that 
causality runs from firm value to ownership concentration when large shareholders alter 
their holding positions as firm value changes. This is opposite to what was found by 
Thomsen et al. (2006) and Hu and Izumida (2008). Furthermore, the alteration is 
suggested to be in a negative direction of the change in firm value. This suggests that as 
firm value can also be a sign of corporate growth opportunity, large shareholders take 
the advantage of liquidating part of their ownerships in order to diversify their total 
wealth (Loderer & Martin, 1997) in order to rebalance their portfolio as a result of an 
increase in firm share prices. Also, it suggests that when firms were doing well, large 
shareholders choose to hold fewer shares, which is consistent with the hypothesis in 
Demsetz and Villalonga (2001, p. 228) which stated that, ‘perhaps selling shares during 
good times in the expectation that today’s good performance will be followed by poorer 
performance’. On the other hand, if firms were badly performed today, large 
shareholders increase their ownership with the expectation that firm will be doing well 
in the future. Furthermore, if large shareholders are traditional risk aversion type of 
investors, they might purchase additional shares at lower and risk-compensating prices 
(Demsetz & Lehn, 1985).  As such, this finding is consistent with the findings of 
Loderer and Martin (1997) and Cho (1998) who found that shareholders in the US 
(another example of a common law country) might alter their fraction of ownership by 
evaluating the value of the firm.  
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In conclusion, causality tests by using the GMM estimation do find a couple of 
causal relationships between ownership concentration, debt and firm value. It is found 
that debt causes firm value in a negative direction, but firm value does not cause debt. 
However, it is also found that firm value does cause ownership concentration in a 
negative direction, but ownership concentration does not cause firm value. As for the 
causality between ownership concentration and debt, it is found that no causal 
relationship exists between these two variables as the GMM estimation fails to discover 
any significant evidence in all regressions. 
 
Ownership concentration is found to be endogenous as reverse causality is 
found from firm value to ownership concentration. However, with regard to the 
objective of this study, which is to find out whether the dynamic endogeneity issue is 
an important consideration in the relationship between corporate governance and firm 
value in the largest Australian firms, it is found that after controlling for dynamic 
endogeneity, the findings, for which both FE and GMM estimations are used, reveal 
consistency. This suggests that dynamic endogeneity is not an issue as the findings 
continue to be valid even after taking into account this effect in the GMM estimation.    
 
Overall, causality has been found run from firm value and debt, but not from 
ownership concentration. The study therefore conducts further investigation to find 
whether there is a possibility that ownership concentration could also cause firm value 
and debt. To verify this, causality tests using the sub-samples of ownership 
concentration are carried out.  
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4.3.3 Sub-samples of Ownership Concentration 
In the previous sections, the study successfully shows that causal relationships 
run from firm value to ownership concentration and from debt to firm value. However, 
it fails to discover any causal relationships that run from ownership concentration to 
either debt or firm value. In this section, the study further investigates the causal 
relationship between ownership concentration, debt and firm value by using sub-
samples of ownership concentration in order to examine the possibility that the causal 
relationship that runs from ownership concentration might be influenced by its level. 
 
The division of sub-samples is based on the level of ownership concentration: 
high level of ownership concentration and low level of ownership concentration. The 
level of ownership concentration is determined by using its median percentage. For 
ownership concentration which is proxied by LOC1, the high level of ownership 
concentration is OC1 that is above 17.53%, and the low level of ownership 
concentration is OC1 that is 17.53% and below. Further, for the ownership 
concentration which is proxied by LOC5, the high level of ownership concentration is 
OC5 that is above 49.69%, and the low level of ownership concentration is OC5 that is 
49.69% and below. The results are presented in tables 4.4, 4.5, 4.6 and 4.7. 
 
Table 4.4 presents the results of the causality test by using FE estimation and 
the ownership concentration variable is proxied by the LOC1 for the following models: 
Model 1: ittititiit XLDLOCLQLQ   1,21,11,11   
Model 2: ittititiit YLQLOCLDLD   1,21,11,22   
Model 3: ittititiit ZLQLDLOCLOC   1,21,11,33   
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where i  and t  denote firm and year respectively. LOC  is logarithmic transformation of 
OC1 that is LOC = Ln(OC/(100 – OC)), whereas LQ and LD are natural logarithms of 
Tobin’s Q and debt ratio respectively. itX , itY  and itZ  are the error terms which have 
been transformed into itti    where i , t  and it  are the firm-specific effects, 
time-specific effects and random disturbance respectively. Robust t-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. Constant terms are not reported for convenience. *, ** and 
*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
 
Table 4.4 Causality test 2: FE estimation 
 
 HIGH LEVEL OF OC1 LOW LEVEL OF OC1 
Model 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Variable LQ LD LOC1 LQ LD LOC1 
              
LQ(-1) 0.45*** 0.067 -0.18*** 0.46*** 0.28* -0.014 
 [4.18] [0.32] [-2.70] [7.53] [1.90] [-0.21] 
LD(-1) -0.055 0.38*** -0.003 -0.030 0.51*** 0.004 
 [-1.63] [4.28] [-0.13] [-1.35] [4.34] [0.26] 
LOC1(-1) -0.021 -0.13 0.49*** 0.012 0.34 0.41*** 
 [-0.79] [-1.00] [3.77] [0.20] [1.66] [4.37] 
        
Observations 373 366 373 415 412 416 
R-squared 0.37 0.17 0.45 0.33 0.38 0.29 
F statistics 7.40 4.57 13.62 14.16 8.22 8.88 
[P-value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Time effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
    
Table 4.4 presents the results for the causal relationships between ownership 
concentration, debt and firm value where ownership concentration is proxied by LOC1. 
The first three columns provide the results for the high level of OC1 and the last three 
columns provide the results for the low level of OC1. 
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The coefficients of lagged Tobin’s Q in model 1 ( 1 = 0.45 and 0.46), lagged 
debt ratio in model 2 ( 2 = 0.38 and 0.51) and lagged OC1 in model 3 ( 3 = 0.49 and 
0.41) are significant with their current values at the 1% level of significance. This 
indicates that the current year values of these variables are highly correlated with their 
previous year values. 
 
In model 1, the coefficients of lagged OC1 are 1 = -0.021 and 0.012. It is found 
that these coefficients are not significant, which indicates that the previous year level of 
ownership concentration is not followed by the current year value of firm. As such, it is 
suggested that this model also fails to find evidence of causality that runs from the 
largest shareholder’s ownership concentration to firm value in this model. In the same 
model, the coefficients of lagged debt ratio are 2 = -0.055 and -0.030 and these 
coefficients are found to be insignificant as well. This indicates that the previous year 
level of debt is not followed by the current value of firm, which suggests that causality 
does not run from debt to firm value in this sub-sample. Hence, it is not consistent with 
the results previously found in the whole sample of ownership concentration, where it 
is suggested that causality runs from debt to firm value by using the same FE estimation 
method. 
 
Model 2 shows the coefficients of lagged OC1 as 1 = -0.13 and 0.34. The 
insignificance of these coefficients indicates that the previous year level of ownership 
concentration is not followed by the current year level of debt. Thus, this model also 
fails to find causality that runs from the largest shareholder’s ownership concentration 
to debt. In the same model, it is found that the coefficients of lagged firm value are 2 = 
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0.067 and 0.28 in the regressions of sub-sample high level of OC1 and low level of 
OC1 respectively. The former sub-sample shows that the coefficient is not significant 
whereas the latter sub-sample shows that it is significant at the 10% level. This 
indicates that in the sub-sample of high level of OC1, the previous year value of firm is 
not followed by the current level of debt. In contrast, the sub-sample of low level of 
OC1 indicates that the previous year value of firm is followed by the current level of 
debt. This suggests that causality runs from firm value to debt, which was not suggested 
in the results previously found in the whole sample of ownership concentration. 
 
Model 3 shows that the coefficients of lagged debt ratio 1 = -0.003 and 0.004 
are insignificant, which indicates that the previous year level of debt is not followed by 
the current year level of ownership concentration. This suggests that causality does not 
run from debt to largest shareholder’s ownership concentration, which is consistent 
with the previous finding when using the whole sample of ownership concentration, 
where there was no evidence that causality runs from debt to ownership concentration 
proxied by OC1. The same model reveals the coefficients of lagged firm value are 2 = 
-0.18 and -0.014 in the sub-sample of high level of OC1 and low level of OC1 
respectively. These coefficients are statistically significant at the 1% level in the high 
level of OC1 sub-sample, which indicates that the previous year value of firm is 
followed by the current year level of ownership concentration. This is consistent with 
the results previously found in the whole sample of ownership concentration, where it 
was suggested that causality runs from firm value to ownership concentration. To the 
contrary, in the sub-sample of low level of OC1, the insignificance of its coefficient 
indicates that the previous year value of firm is not followed by the current year level of 
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ownership concentration. Thus, it is suggested that causality does not run from firm 
value to largest shareholder’s ownership concentration when it is at its low level. 
 
Overall, the results of the regressions in the sub-sample of ownership 
concentration by using LOC1 as a proxy also fail to find evidence of causality that runs 
from ownership concentration to either debt or firm value. The next table presents the 
results in the sub-sample which uses LOC5 as the proxy for the ownership 
concentration and employs the FE estimation method.  
 
Table 4.5 presents the results of the causality test by using FE estimation and 
the ownership concentration variable is proxied by the OC5 for the following models: 
 
Model 1: ittititiit XLDLOCLQLQ   1,21,11,11   
Model 2: ittititiit YLQLOCLDLD   1,21,11,22   
Model 3: ittititiit ZLQLDLOCLOC   1,21,11,33   
where i  and t  denote firm and year respectively. LOC  is logarithmic transformation of 
OC5 that is LOC = Ln(OC/(100 – OC)), whereas LQ and LD are natural logarithms of 
Tobin’s Q and debt ratio respectively. itX , itY  and itZ  are the error terms which have 
been transformed into itti    where i , t  and it  are the firm-specific effects, 
time-specific effects and random disturbance respectively. Robust t-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. Constant terms are not reported for convenience. *, ** and 
*** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 4.5 Causality test 3: FE estimation 
 
 HIGH LEVEL OF OC5 LOW LEVEL OF OC5 
Model 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Variable LQ LD LOC5 LQ LD LOC5 
              
LQ(-1) 0.53*** 0.041 -0.11** 0.48*** 0.39** -0.047 
 [5.48] [0.27] [-2.28] [8.47] [2.07] [-0.89] 
LD(-1) -0.072** 0.41*** 0.021 -0.031 0.39*** 0.016* 
 [-2.13] [4.16] [1.15] [-1.34] [2.79] [1.72] 
LOC5(-1) -0.0005 -0.058 0.54*** -0.021 0.38* 0.55*** 
 [-0.0091] [-0.57] [10.08] [-0.34] [1.90] [13.57] 
        
Observations 399 392 399 424 421 425 
R-squared 0.37 0.18 0.43 0.27 0.30 0.52 
F statistics 11.04 4.86 19.68 15.64 5.25 32.05 
[P-value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Time effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
       
 
Table 4.5 presents the results for the causal relationships between ownership 
concentration, debt and firm value where ownership concentration is proxied by LOC5. 
The first three columns provide the results for the high level of OC5 and the last three 
columns provide the results for the low level of OC5. 
 
The coefficients of lagged Tobin’s Q in model 1 ( 1 = 0.53 and 0.48), lagged 
debt ratio in model 2 ( 2 = 0.41 and 0.39) and lagged OC5 in model 3 ( 3 = 0.54 and 
0.55) are significant with their current values at the 1% level of significance. This 
indicates that the current year values of these variables are highly correlated with their 
previous year values. 
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Model 1 shows that the coefficients of lagged OC5 are 1 = -0.0005 and -0.021. 
These coefficients are not significant, which indicates that the previous year level of 
ownership concentration is not followed by the current value of the firm. Thus, this 
model fails to find causality that runs from the largest five shareholders’ ownership 
concentration to firm value, which is consistent with the previous finding using the 
whole sample of ownership concentration. In the same model, the coefficients of lagged 
debt ratio are 2 = -0.072 and -0.031 in the regressions that use the sub-sample of high 
level of OC5 and low level of OC5 respectively. The coefficient of the former sub-
sample is significant at the 5% level. This indicates that the previous year level of debt 
is followed by the current year value of the firm. It suggests that causality runs from 
debt to firm value in a negative direction, thus supporting the previous findings using 
the whole sample of ownership concentration. 
 
Model 2 exhibits that the coefficients of lagged OC5 are 1 = -0.058 and 0.38 in 
the sub-sample of high level of OC5 and low level of OC5 respectively. The coefficient 
of the latter sub-sample is significant at the 10% level of significance. This indicates 
that the previous year level of ownership concentration is followed by the current year 
level of debt. This suggests that the causality runs from the largest five shareholders’ 
ownership concentration to debt in a positive direction. Thus, the study provides 
evidence that the level of the largest five shareholders’ ownership concentration does 
influence the causal relationship between ownership concentration and debt. This was 
not found previously when using the whole sample of ownership concentration or the 
sub-sample of the largest shareholder’s ownership concentration. 
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In the same model 2, the coefficients of the lagged Tobin’s Q are 2 = 0.041 
and 0.39 in the sub-sample of high level of OC5 and low level of OC5 respectively. 
The coefficient of the latter is found to be significant at the 5% level, which indicates 
that the previous year value of the firm is followed by the current year level of debt. 
This suggests that causality runs from firm value to debt in a positive direction in the 
sub-sample of the low level of the largest five shareholders’ ownership concentration. 
This finding is not consistent with the previous finding using the whole sample of 
ownership concentration, but it does support the finding in the regression using the sub-
sample of low level of the largest shareholder’s ownership concentration. 
 
Model 3 shows that the coefficients of the lagged debt ratio are 1 = 0.021 and 
0.016 in the sub-sample of high level of OC5 and low level of OC5 respectively. The 
coefficient of the latter exhibits that it is significant at the 10% level, thus indicating 
that the previous year level of debt is followed by the current year level of ownership 
concentration. This suggests that causality runs from debt to the largest five 
shareholders’ ownership concentration in a positive direction. It supports the previous 
finding using the whole sample of ownership concentration, which also found that 
causality runs from debt to the largest five shareholders’ ownership concentration that 
was regressed using the same FE estimation method. 
 
In the same model 3, the coefficients of the lagged Tobin’s Q are 2 = -0.11 and 
-0.047 in the sub-sample of high level of OC5 and low level of OC5 respectively. The 
coefficient of the former shows it is significant at the 5% level of significance. This 
indicates that the previous year value of the firm is followed by the current year level of 
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ownership concentration. As such, it suggests that causality runs from firm value to the 
largest five shareholders’ ownership concentration in a negative direction. This finding 
supports the previous results which used the whole sample of ownership concentration 
as well as the sub-sample of high level of the largest shareholder’s ownership 
concentration. 
 
Overall, the regressions using the sub-sample of ownership concentration which 
is proxied by LOC5 find evidence that suggests causality does run from ownership 
concentration to debt. One of the findings also supports the previous finding using the 
sub-sample of ownership concentration proxied by LOC1 that suggested that causality 
runs from firm value to debt. In addition, the findings support the previous findings 
which used the whole sample of ownership concentration. It supports that causality runs 
from debt to firm value, from firm value to ownership concentration and from debt to 
ownership concentration.  
 
However, the FE estimation used in these causality tests does not take into 
account the dynamic endogeneity issue. The tests are therefore further investigated to 
find the causal relationship between ownership concentration, debt and firm value of 
the ownership concentration sub-samples by using the GMM estimation. This is 
presented in the next tables. 
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Table 4.6 presents the results of the causality test by using GMM estimation and 
the ownership concentration variable is proxied by the OC1 for the following models: 
 
Model 1: ittititiit XLDLOCLQLQ   1,21,11,11   
Model 2: ittititiit YLQLOCLDLD   1,21,11,22   
Model 3: ittititiit ZLQLDLOCLOC   1,21,11,33   
where i  and t  denote firm and year respectively. LOC  is logarithmic transformation of 
OC1 that is LOC = Ln(OC/(100 – OC)), whereas LQ and LD are natural logarithms of 
Tobin’s Q and debt ratio respectively. itX , itY  and itZ  are the error terms which have 
been transformed into itti    where i , t  and it  are the firm-specific effects, 
time-specific effects and random disturbance respectively. All variables on the right-
hand side (LQ, LD and LOC) are treated as endogenous variables. Robust t-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. Constant terms are omitted for convenience. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
111 
Table 4.6 Causality test 2: GMM estimation 
 
 HIGH LEVEL OF OC1 LOW LEVEL OF OC1 
Model 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Variable LQ LD LOC1 LQ LD LOC1 
              
LQ(-1) 0.59* -0.17 0.043 0.69*** 0.19 -0.027 
 [1.91] [-0.69] [0.48] [5.57] [0.77] [-0.28] 
LD(-1) -0.008 0.46*** -0.015 -0.046 0.70*** -0.027 
 [-0.33] [5.63] [-0.24] [-1.06] [3.46] [-0.53] 
LOC1(-1) -0.022 -0.49** 0.84*** -0.078 0.65 0.24 
 [-0.18] [-1.99] [6.88] [-0.65] [1.55] [1.25] 
        
Observations 373 366 373 415 412 416 
Number of instruments 44 44 41 44 44 44 
Number of groups 90 90 90 92 91 93 
AR(1) -1.78 -2.83 -2.10 -2.55 -2.00 -1.78 
[P-value] [0.08] [0.00] [0.04] [0.01] [0.05] [0.08] 
AR(2) 0.58 0.45 -0.63 -0.54 -0.51 0.54 
[P-value] [0.56] [0.65] [0.53] [0.59] [0.61] [0.59] 
Hansen test 27.59 25.88 29.17 33.33 26.93 35.09 
[P-value] [0.59] [0.68] [0.35] [0.31] [0.63] [0.24] 
Difference-in-Hansen test 16.62 23.95 25.12 32.00 21.82 28.20 
[P-value] [0.94] [0.63] [0.40] [0.23] [0.75] [0.40] 
F statistics 24.87 57.75 148.16 52.93 96.40 424.10 
[P-value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Time effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
       
 
Table 4.6 presents the causal relationship between ownership concentration, 
debt and firm value where ownership concentration is proxied by LOC1. The first three 
columns provide the results for the high level of OC1 and the last three columns 
provide the results for the low level of OC1. 
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The coefficients of the lagged Tobin’s Q in model 1 ( 1 = 0.59 and 0.69), lagged 
debt ratio in model 2 ( 2 = 0.46 and 0.70) and lagged OC1 in model 3 ( 3 = 0.84) are 
significant with their current values at the 1% and 10% levels of significance. This 
indicates that the previous year values of these variables are followed by their current 
year values. The exception is the coefficient of the lagged OC1 ( 3 = 0.24) in the sub-
sample of low OC1, which is found to be insignificant. This indicates that the current 
year level of OC1 at its low level is not affected by its previous year level. 
 
Model 1 exhibits the coefficients of the lagged OC1 1 = -0.022 and -0.078. The 
coefficients are not significant, which indicates that the previous year level of 
ownership concentration is not followed by the current year value of the firm. 
Therefore, this model once more fails to find evidence that causality runs from 
ownership concentration to firm value and supports the previous findings which used 
the whole sample of ownership concentration. The coefficients of the lagged debt ratio 
in the same model, 2 = -0.008 and -0.046, are also not significant. It indicates that the 
previous year level of debt is not followed by the current value of the firm. As such, 
this model does not support the causality that was found to run from debt to firm value 
in a negative direction when using the whole sample of ownership concentration. 
 
Model 2 shows that the coefficients of the lagged OC1 are 1 = -0.49 and 0.65 
with the sub-sample of high level of OC1 and low level of OC1 respectively. The 
coefficient of the former shows it is significant at the 5% level of significance. This 
indicates that the previous year level of the largest shareholder’s ownership 
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concentration is followed by the current year level of debt; hence this provides evidence 
that the causal relationship runs from ownership concentration to debt in a negative 
direction, which was not found previously when using the whole sample of ownership 
concentration. 
 
On the one hand, this result suggests that if the previous year level of the largest 
shareholder is high, the current level of debt is reduced. This can be explained in two 
perspectives. First, if the largest shareholder monitors firm managers effectively, debt is 
used as a monitoring mechanism substitution for the mitigating agency problem 
between shareholders and managers. Second, if the largest shareholder expropriates 
firm small shareholders, debt level is reduced in order to avoid its disciplinary 
mechanism, in accordance with the free cash flow hypothesis. 
 
On the other hand, the negative causality relationship suggests that if the 
previous year level of the largest shareholder is low, the current level of debt is 
increased. This can also be explained in two perspectives. First, as before, the largest 
shareholder uses debt as a monitoring mechanism substitution if he plays that role 
effectively. Second, if expropriation is the case, the largest shareholder purposely 
increases debt level in order to maintain his fraction of ownership (the control 
preference hypothesis), either in an attempt to avoid being taken over or as a fake 
signalling mechanism to external investors that he is willing to be bonded with the 
fixed obligations carried by debt financing. 
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In the same model 2, the coefficients of the lagged Tobin’s Q 2 = -0.17 and 
0.19 show the insignificance of these coefficients. This indicates that the previous year 
value of the firm is not followed by the current year level of debt. As such, this finding 
does not provide evidence that causality runs from firm value to debt and it supports the 
previous findings which used the whole sample of ownership concentration. 
 
Model 3 shows that the coefficients of the lagged debt ratio are 1 = -0.015 and 
-0.027 and these coefficients are found to be insignificant. This indicates that the 
previous year level of debt is not followed by the current year level of ownership 
concentration. This finding thus confirms that causality does not run from debt to 
ownership concentration, which was found previously when using the whole sample of 
ownership concentration. In the same model, the coefficients of the lagged Tobin’s Q 
2 = 0.043 and -0.027 show that these coefficients are not significant. This indicates 
that the previous year value of the firm is not followed by the current year level of 
ownership concentration. It reveals that there is no causality that runs from firm value 
to ownership concentration and it does not support the previous findings in the whole 
sample of ownership concentration.  
 
Overall, the sub-samples of high and low levels of OC1 results show that there 
is a causal relationship that runs from ownership concentration where it is found that 
ownership concentration causes debt. However, these results do not support the causal 
relationships that run from firm value to ownership concentration and from debt to firm 
value, as was found previously when using the whole sample. This supports the 
argument that the sub-samples of ownership concentration might have an impact on the 
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causal relationship between ownership concentration, debt and firm value. The next 
table presents the results of the causal relationship of the sub-samples of high and low 
levels of OC5 by using GMM estimation.  
 
Table 4.7 presents the results of the causality test by using GMM estimation. 
The ownership concentration variable is proxied by the OC5 for the following models: 
 
Model 1: ittititiit XLDLOCLQLQ   1,21,11,11   
Model 2: ittititiit YLQLOCLDLD   1,21,11,22   
Model 3: ittititiit ZLQLDLOCLOC   1,21,11,33   
where i  and t  denote firm and year respectively. LOC  is logarithmic transformation of 
OC5 that is LOC = Ln(OC/(100 – OC)), whereas LQ and LD are natural logarithms of 
Tobin’s Q and debt ratio respectively. itX , itY  and itZ  are the error terms which have 
been transformed into itti    where i , t  and it  are the firm-specific effects, 
time-specific effects and random disturbance respectively. All variables on the right-
hand side (LQ, LD and LOC) are treated as endogenous variables. Robust t-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. Constant terms are omitted for convenience. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 4.7 Causality test 3: GMM estimation 
 
 HIGH LEVEL OF OC5 LOW LEVEL OF OC5 
Model 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Variable LQ LD LOC5 LQ LD LOC5 
              
LQ(-1) 0.90*** -0.27 -0.055 0.88*** 0.047 -0.14** 
 [5.93] [-1.02] [-0.40] [7.57] [0.16] [-2.09] 
LD(-1) -0.039 0.51*** -0.016 -0.13** 0.60*** -0.018 
 [-0.80] [5.95] [-0.42] [-2.50] [2.72] [-0.47] 
LOC5(-1) 0.13 0.01 0.42** -0.085 0.41 0.58*** 
 [0.93] [0.06] [2.49] [-0.89] [1.48] [5.95] 
        
Observations 399 392 399 424 421 425 
Number of instruments 44 44 44 44 44 44 
Number of groups 86 86 86 93 92 94 
AR(1) -2.79 -2.41 -1.77 -2.92 -1.89 -2.78 
[P-value] [0.01] [0.02] [0.08] [0.00] [0.06] [0.01] 
AR(2) 1.13 0.26 1.24 0.02 -0.64 -0.40 
[P-value] [0.26] [0.80] [0.21] [0.98] [0.52] [0.69] 
Hansen test 26.57 34.16 38.31 31.55 27.63 36.77 
[P-value] [0.65] [0.28] [0.14] [0.39] [0.59] [0.18] 
Difference-in-Hansen test 20.92 27.66 33.37 30.00 22.92 33.45 
[P-value] [0.79] [0.43] [0.19] [0.31] [0.69] [0.18] 
F statistics 84.10 90.54 33.78 41.79 113.54 82.46 
[P-value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Time effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
       
 
Table 4.7 presents the causal relationship between ownership concentration, 
debt and firm value where ownership concentration is proxied by OC5. The first three 
columns provide the results for the high level of OC5 and the last three columns 
provide the results for the low level of OC5. 
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The coefficients of the lagged Tobin’s Q in model 1 ( 1 = 0.90 and 0.88), lagged 
debt ratio in model 2 ( 2 = 0.51 and 0.60) and lagged OC5 in model 3 ( 3 = 0.42 and 
0.58) are significant with their current values at the 1% and 5% levels of significance. 
This indicates that the previous year values of these variables are followed by their 
current year values. 
 
In model 1, the coefficients of the lagged OC5 1 = 0.13 and -0.085 show that 
they are not significant. This indicates that the previous year level of the largest five 
shareholders’ ownership concentration is not followed by the current year value of the 
firm. Thus, it does not provide evidence that ownership concentration causes firm value 
and it supports the previous findings which used the whole sample of ownership 
concentration. 
 
In the same model 1, the coefficients of the lagged debt ratio are 2 = -0.039 
and -0.13 in the sub-sample of high level of OC5 and low level of OC5. The coefficient 
of the latter is found to be significant at the 5% level, thus indicating that the previous 
year level of debt is followed by the current year value of the firm. This regression does 
support the findings in the whole sample of ownership concentration that causality does 
run from debt to firm value in a negative direction. There are two possible explanations 
for this finding. First, the increase of debt may increase the agency cost of debt 
financing as a result of the conflict of interest between shareholders and debt holders 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). As such, the agency cost of debt will destroy firm value. 
Contrary to this, the lower the debt level, the lower the agency cost of debt and the 
higher the firm value would be. Second, debt might increase the probability of 
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bankruptcy, and thus it would decrease firm value. On the other hand, if a firm 
continues to employ a lower debt level, the firm will be highly valued by investors who 
will assume that there is a lower possibility of this firm facing financial distress. 
 
Model 2 reveals that the coefficients of the lagged OC5 are 1 = 0.01 and 0.41. 
These coefficients are not significant, which indicates that the previous year level of the 
largest five shareholders’ ownership concentration is not followed by the current year 
level of debt. Hence, it shows evidence that there is no causal relationship that runs 
from ownership concentration to debt and it supports the previous findings which used 
the whole sample of ownership concentration. In the same model, the coefficients of the 
lagged Tobin’s Q 2 = -0.27 and 0.047 show that they are not significant. This indicates 
that the previous year value of the firm is not followed by the current year level of debt. 
As such, this finding supports that firm value does not cause debt, which was also 
found previously in the regressions that used the whole sample of ownership 
concentration. 
 
Model 3 exhibits that the coefficients of the lagged debt ratio 1 = -0.016 and -
0.018 are not significant. It indicates that the previous year level of debt is not followed 
by the current year level of the largest five shareholders’ ownership concentration. 
Hence, it supports the finding that causality does not run from debt to ownership 
concentration, which was also found in the regression that used the whole sample of 
ownership concentration. 
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In the same model 3, the coefficients of the lagged firm value are 2 = -0.055 
and -0.14 in the sub-samples of high level of OC5 and low level of OC5 respectively. 
The coefficient of the latter sub-sample is significant at the 5% level of significance. 
This indicates that the previous year value of the firm is followed by the current year 
level of the largest five shareholders’ ownership concentration. It supports the previous 
finding when using the whole sample of ownership concentration that the causal 
relationship runs from firm value to ownership concentration in a negative direction. 
This suggests that as firm value can also be a sign of corporate growth opportunity, 
large shareholders take the advantage of liquidating part of their ownerships in order to 
diversify their total wealth (Loderer & Martin, 1997) in order to rebalance their 
shareholders’ portfolio as a result of the rising in the firm share prices. Also, it suggests 
that when firms were doing well, large shareholders choose to hold fewer shares, which 
is consistent with the hypothesis in Demsetz and Villalonga (2001, p. 228) which stated 
that, ‘perhaps selling shares during good times in the expectation that today’s good 
performance will be followed by poorer performance’. On the other hand, if firms were 
badly performed today, large shareholders increase their ownership with the 
expectation that firm will be doing well in the future. Furthermore, if large shareholders 
are the normal risk aversion type of investors, they might purchase additional shares at 
lower and risk-compensating prices (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985).  As such, this finding is 
consistent with the findings of Loderer and Martin (1997) and Cho (1998), who found 
that shareholders in the US, another common law country, might alter their fraction of 
ownership by evaluating the previous value of a firm. 
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Overall, in the sub-sample of high and low levels of OC5 by using the GMM 
estimation, the results support all the findings in the models that used the whole sample 
of ownership concentration. It is found that causality runs from debt to firm value and 
from firm value to ownership concentration. This is consistent in the sense that no 
evidence is found that ownership concentration causes either debt or firm value.  
 
With GMM estimation as the primary estimation used in the investigation of the 
sub-samples of ownership concentration reported in this section, it can be concluded 
that the level of ownership concentration does have an impact on the causal relationship 
between ownership concentration, debt and firm value. In the sub-samples of OC1, the 
causal relationship runs from ownership concentration to debt in the sub-sample of a 
high level of OC1. However, there is no causal relationship found from firm value to 
ownership concentration and from debt to firm value; hence this does not support the 
findings when using the whole sample. Further, in the sub-samples of OC5, the finding 
is consistent with the findings when using the whole sample, where no causal 
relationships are found from ownership concentration to either debt or firm value. 
However, the findings support the causal relationships from debt to firm value and from 
firm value to ownership concentration in the sub-sample of low level of OC5. 
 
As for the dynamic endogeneity issue, ownership concentration and debt are 
found to be endogenous as these two corporate governance mechanisms are affected by 
the cause variables in a couple of regressions in the GMM estimation method. 
However, on the whole, after comparing the results shown in both FE and GMM 
estimations, it can be concluded that dynamic endogeneity is not a serious issue in the 
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sub-samples of ownership concentration as the overall findings show little 
inconsistency between both estimations.  
 
4.3.4 Robustness Test: GMM Estimation 
In this section, a robustness test is conducted in order to examine the causality 
relationship in models 1, 2 and 3 when lagged two of the explanatory variables is 
applied in the estimation. This is to confirm that lagged one fits the models better than 
lagged two. Results are shown in Table 4.8. Panel A uses OC1 as the ownership 
concentration proxy and Panel B uses OC5 as the proxy. 
 
Table 4.8 presents the results of the causality test by using GMM estimation for 
the following models: 
Model 1: ittititiit XLDLOCLQLQ   2,22,12,11   
Model 2: ittititiit YLQLOCLDLD   2,22,12,22   
Model 3: ittititiit ZLQLDLOCLOC   2,22,12,33   
where i  and t  denote firm and year respectively. LOC  is logarithmic transformation of 
OC1 and OC5 that is LOC = Ln(OC/(100 – OC)), whereas LQ and LD are natural 
logarithms of Tobin’s Q and debt ratio respectively. itX , itY  and itZ  are the error terms 
which have been transformed into itti    where i , t  and it  are the firm-
specific effects, time-specific effects and random disturbance respectively. All variables 
on the right-hand side (LQ, LD and LOC) are treated as endogenous variables. Robust t-
statistics are presented in parentheses. Constant terms are omitted for convenience. *, 
** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 4.8 Robustness test 1: GMM estimation 
 
 Panel A Panel B 
Model 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Variable LQ LD LOC1 LQ LD LOC5 
              
LQ(-1) 0.79*** -0.004 -0.047 0.79*** -0.17 -0.093 
 [7.14] [-0.022] [-0.51] [6.95] [-1.09] [-1.33] 
LQ(-2) -0.076 0.19 -0.034 -0.100 0.24 -0.052 
 [-1.09] [1.33] [-0.56] [-1.41] [1.62] [-0.91] 
LD(-1) -0.055 0.53*** -0.005 -0.054 0.51*** -0.004 
 [-1.48] [4.97] [-0.12] [-1.65] [4.81] [-0.13] 
LD(-2) -0.017 -0.055 0.022 -0.023 -0.041 -0.025 
 [-0.56] [-0.53] [0.91] [-0.73] [-0.44] [-1.19] 
LOC1(-1) -0.068 0.084 0.70***    
 [-0.88] [0.50] [5.56]    
LOC1(-2) 0.015 -0.061 -0.025    
 [0.40] [-0.93] [-0.49]    
LOC5(-1)     -0.059 0.25 0.72*** 
     [-0.82] [1.45] [7.65] 
LOC5(-2)     0.014 -0.042 0.022 
     [0.34] [-0.52] [0.40] 
        
Observations 723 714 722 723 714 722 
Number of instruments 43 43 43 43 43 43 
Number of groups 128 127 128 128 127 128 
AR(1) -4.42 -2.79 -3.17 -4.33 -2.60 -3.71 
[P-value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
AR(2) -0.02 -0.41 -0.73 0.11 -0.49 -0.35 
[P-value] [0.98] [0.68] [0.47] [0.91] [0.63] [0.72] 
Hansen test 16.08 35.43 21.52 25.63 32.90 20.53 
[P-value] [0.95] [0.13] [0.76] [0.54] [0.20] [0.81] 
Difference-in-Hansen test 16.04 28.85 16.83 25.24 25.33 19.51 
[P-value] [0.89] [0.23] [0.86] [0.39] [0.39] [0.72] 
F statistics 60.31 120.89 239.29 57.25 83.07 34.4 
[P-value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Time effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
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Table 4.8 shows the results of the robustness causality tests by using GMM 
estimation, the primary estimation method applied in the study. GMM re-estimation of 
causality tests using lagged two of the regressors shows that lagged two used in these 
models is not robust as a substitute for lagged one. This can be seen through the 
insignificant of the coefficients of lagged two Tobin’s Q in model 1 ( 1  = -0.076 and -
0.100), lagged two debt ratio in model 2 ( 2  = -0.055 and -0.041) and lagged two 
ownership concentration in model 3 ( 3  = -0.025 for LOC1 and 0.022 for LOC5) when 
they are regressed with their current values. On the other hand, lagged one coefficient 
of these variables is still significant when associated with their current values. 
Generally the results for Table 4.8 indicate that lagged one variables have stronger 
explanatory power.    
 
The overall results show that the coefficient of each of the explanatory variables 
is not significantly associated with the dependent variables when lagged two of the 
explanatory variables is used in the regressions. This suggests that the previous year 
level of the cause variables is not followed by the current year level of the effect 
variables. As such, no causal relationships between ownership concentration, debt and 
firm value is found when lagged two of the right-hand side variables is employed. To 
conclude, this section reveals that the causality tests which employ GMM estimation 
with lagged two of the explanatory or causes variables are not robust and that lagged 
one used previously fits the models better.  
 
124 
4.4 Conclusion 
In this chapter, the study has successfully shown that causality runs from firm 
value to ownership concentration and from debt to firm value, both in a negative 
direction. The sub-samples of high and low levels of ownership concentration reveal 
that the levels of ownership concentration do effect the causal relationships between 
these three corporate mechanisms, the main one being that causality also runs from 
ownership concentration to debt in a negative direction. Furthermore, the tests indicate 
that lagged one of the cause variables is better in explaining the causality models than 
lagged two. 
 
The two corporate governance mechanisms, ownership concentration and debt, 
are found to be endogenous, as reverse causality is found when these two mechanisms 
are the effect variables. However, on the whole, the findings in the causality test for 
panel data for which both FE and GMM estimations are used reveal consistency. Thus, 
the findings suggest that dynamic endogeneity is not an issue, as the findings continue 
to be valid even after taking these effects into account in the GMM estimation.  
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CHAPTER 5:   INTERACTION RESULTS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The causality test for panel data reported in Chapter 4 is a special test isolated 
from the test reported in this chapter and the next test reported in the following chapter. 
The reason for this is that the right-hand side of the regressions use lagged variables of 
interest in order to meet the requirement of causality that the previous year level of 
explanatory variables should take effect before the current year level of dependent 
variables (Thomsen et al. 2006). Furthermore, all the models in the previous test are 
estimated without control variables. 
 
Extensive literature has noted the significance of corporate governance 
mechanisms in solving or at least mitigating agency problems in corporations. It has 
been suggested that these mechanisms function best as a group rather than as a stand-
alone mechanism (Ward et al. 2009). The researcher should be able to identify whether 
these mechanisms as a group are substitute for or complementary with each other 
(Brown et al. 2011; Ward et al. 2009) by investigating the interaction effects between 
them. However, most previous studies have made conclusions regarding the interaction 
effects based on the relationship between the explanatory and dependent variables 
shown in the models regardless of the types of estimations used (see for instance Dang, 
2011; Setia-Atmaja, 2009; Setia-Atmaja et al. 2009). As Bhagat, Bolton and Romano 
(2010, p.104) note, ‘Researchers have undertaken little modelling of corporate 
governance and no satisfactory theory exists of when or whether different aspects of 
good governance should be understood to be substitutes or complements’. Further, 
whilst there are many corporate governance studies incorporating interaction, there are 
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no studies in the literature investigating the link between them in these studies. This 
study therefore seeks to contribute to the literature by including the interaction 
variables between ownership concentration and firm value, ownership concentration 
and debt, and debt and firm value in order to find whether they function best as a group, 
as well as to identify their interaction effects in order to determine the substitutability or 
complementarity of them. 
 
This study applies the two-way fixed effects (FE) and the two-step system 
generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation methods with major findings 
coming from the latter. The study fails to find evidence that ownership concentration 
and firm value, ownership concentration and debt, and debt and firm value should be 
employed as a group in order to be effective corporate mechanisms. This study finds no 
evidence to support the existence of interaction effects between these mechanisms, and 
thus fails to find the substitutability or complementarity of them. However, it is found 
that the ownership concentration of the largest five shareholders uses debt as a 
substitute monitoring mechanism when it functions as a stand-alone mechanism. 
 
Dynamic endogeneity is found to be an issue for ownership concentration and 
firm value when these corporate mechanisms function as stand-alone mechanisms, as 
the significance of these variables found in the FE estimation vanishes in the GMM 
estimation. However, an objective of this study is to investigate the effectiveness of 
using these corporate mechanisms as a group, and the interaction results show 
consistency in both FE and GMM estimations. As such, it can be concluded that the 
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interaction effects of these corporate mechanisms are not influenced by the dynamic 
endogeneity issue.  
 
In this chapter the study proceeds to aim at answering the second research 
question proposed in Chapter 1 as to whether ownership concentration, debt and firm 
value should be utilised as a group in order to ensure their effectiveness as corporate 
mechanisms. This entails the following questions: (1) Are there any interaction effects 
between ownership concentration and debt, ownership concentration and firm value, 
and debt and firm value towards firm value, debt, and ownership concentration 
respectively? (2) If interaction effects do exist, are they substitute or complementary 
with each other?  In this chapter the study also addresses the fourth research question as 
to whether the interaction effects of these corporate mechanisms are influenced by the 
dynamic endogeneity issue.   
 
The remainder of this chapter is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the 
empirical results and discussion. Concluding remarks are presented in Section 3.      
 
5.2 Empirical Results and Discussions 
In this section, the study presents the regressions results for the interaction test 
by using the FE estimation, followed by the GMM estimation. This section also 
presents the re-estimation regressions results of the GMM method in order to check the 
robustness of the results found previously. Details are as follows.   
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5.2.1 FE Estimation 
FE estimation is employed to find the results of the interaction tests where 
ownership concentration, debt and firm value are tested as a group. Their effects as 
stand-alone mechanisms are also tested. Even though this estimation does not take 
account of the dynamic endogeneity issue, the results are needed so as to compare them 
with the results of the interaction tests using the GMM estimation. A conclusion can 
then be made on whether dynamic endogeneity is an issue or not in influencing the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm value. The 
regressions results are shown in table 5.1.  
 
Table 5.1 presents the results of the interaction test by using FE estimation for 
the following models: 
Model 1: 
  ititititititititititit XROAATAGESIINVDDOCOCQ  876543210 
 
Model 2: 
    itititititititititit YROAATSIINVQQOCOCD  176543210 
 
Model 3: 
  itititititititititit ZATAGESIINVQQDDOC  76543210   
where i  and t  denote firm and year respectively. The variables of interest are Q, D and 
OC which denote Tobin’s Q, debt ratio and ownership concentration respectively. 
Control variables are INV, SI, AGE, AT, ROA and ROA(-1) which denote investment, 
firm size, firm age, change in assets turnover, profitability and lagged profitability 
respectively. itX , itY  and itZ  are the error terms which have been transformed into 
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itti    where i , t  and it  are the firm-specific effects, time-specific effects 
and random disturbance respectively. Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
Constant terms are not reported for convenience. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively.  
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Table 5.1 Interaction test: FE estimation 
 
 Panel A Panel B 
Model 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Variable Q D OC1 Q D OC5 
Q  -0.031* -0.00074  -0.022* -0.002 
  [-1.73] [-0.87]  [-1.85] [-1.11] 
D 0.45  -0.034 -0.49  0.012 
 [0.54]  [-0.56] [-0.37]  [0.27] 
OC1 -1.22 -0.29*      
 [-1.42] [-1.67]      
OC5     -1.64* -0.075  
     [-1.67] [-0.88]  
Q*D   -0.004   -0.005 
   [-0.66]   [-1.30] 
Q*OC1  0.12      
  [1.60]      
D*OC1 2.66       
 [1.03]       
Q*OC5      0.035  
      [1.65]  
D*OC5     3.00   
     [1.23]   
INV 2.50* 0.26 -0.091* 2.44* 0.27 -0.067 
 [1.78] [1.53] [-1.76] [1.73] [1.49] [-1.18] 
SI -0.88*** 0.061*** -0.009 -0.87*** 0.060*** -0.009 
 [-4.66] [3.10] [-1.06] [-4.59] [3.06] [-0.83] 
AGE 0.32  -0.013 0.29  0.003 
 [1.46]  [-0.50] [1.27]  [0.10] 
AT 0.11 -0.009 0.008 0.11 -0.01 0.018** 
 [1.39] [-0.53] [1.04] [1.34] [-0.61] [2.43] 
ROA 1.15    1.18   
 [1.27]    [1.34]   
ROA(-1)  -0.13*    -0.13*  
  [-1.79]    [-1.76]  
Observations 1,189 941 1,191 1,189 941 1,191 
R-squared 0.09 0.17 0.03 0.09 0.14 0.17 
F statistics 3.92 6.73 1.86 3.91 6.65 4.51 
[P-value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Time effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
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Table 5.1 presents the findings using FE estimation. Panel A states the 
regression estimates obtained by using OC1 as a measure of ownership concentration 
and Panel B states the estimates using OC5 as a measure of ownership concentration.  
 
Model 1 shows that the coefficients of ownership concentration are 1 = -1.22 
and -1.64 when regressed on firm value in Panel A and Panel B respectively. These 
coefficients reveal that ownership concentration is negatively related to firm value. 
However, the coefficient of OC1 is not significant while the coefficient of OC5 is 
significant at the 10% level. This indicates that only OC5 is significantly negatively 
related to firm value. This suggests that as a stand-alone mechanism, the largest five 
shareholders might expropriate firm small shareholders, thus creating agency problem 
II between large and small shareholders that harms firm value
22
. The possibility of the 
expropriation by large shareholders on small shareholders is consistent with the 
hypothesis of Shleifer and Vishny (1997).  
 
The other variable of interest in this model is the debt ratio. Its coefficients are 
3 = 0.45 and -0.49 when regressed on firm value in Panel A and Panel B respectively. 
These indicate that firm value is positively related to debt in the model that includes 
OC1 and negatively related to debt in the model that includes OC5. However, there is 
no evidence that debt is associated with firm value as the coefficients of debt are not 
significant. This suggests that, as a stand-alone mechanism, debt neither significantly 
                                                 
22
 The largest five shareholders might expropriate small shareholders by using their voting powers in 
influencing firm board of directors to make decisions that benefit them at the expense of small 
shareholders (Zattoni & Judge, 2012). 
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plays a role as a disciplinary mechanism nor contributes to an increase in the agency 
cost of debt financing.  
 
When tested as a group, the interaction coefficient of OC1 and debt ratio is 2 = 
2.66 and that of OC5 and debt ratio is 2 = 3.00. These indicate that as corporate 
governance mechanisms, ownership concentration and debt are complementary to each 
other. Nevertheless, the evidence is far from being conclusive as the coefficients are 
insignificant. 
 
As for the control variables, Model 1 shows that the coefficients of investment 
are 4 = 2.50 and 2.44 in the equations in Panel A and Panel B respectively. These 
coefficients are significant at the 10% level. This indicates that investment is 
significantly positively associated with firm value, which is consistent with the 
hypothesis that investment and firm value are positively associated (Hu & Izumida, 
2008). Thus, the result suggests that investment is seen as the capability of the largest 
Australian firms to have likely good future prospects for their products. Therefore, 
investors value these firms relatively high. As for the firm size, its coefficients are 5 = 
-0.88 and -0.87 in the equations in Panel A and Panel B respectively. The coefficients 
of size are significant at the 1% level, which indicates that size is significantly 
negatively related to firm value. Hence, the result is consistent with the hypothesis of 
Himmelberg et al. (1999) which suggests that the size of the largest Australian firms is 
perceived as having a high agency cost and thus is difficult to monitor. 
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For the other control variables in model 1, in Panel A, the coefficient of firm 
age is 6 = 0.32, the coefficient of assets turnover is 7 = 0.11 and the coefficient of 
return on assets is 8 = 1.15. In Panel B, the coefficient of firm age is 6 = 0.29, the 
coefficient of change in assets turnover is 7 = 0.11 and the coefficient of return on 
assets is 8 = 1.18. All these coefficients are not significant, thus suggesting that firm 
age, change in assets turnover and return on assets are not the determinants of firm 
value.  
 
Model 2 shows that the coefficients of ownership concentration are 1 = -0.29 
and -0.075 when regressed on debt ratio in Panel A and Panel B respectively. These 
coefficients reveal that ownership concentration is negatively related to debt. However, 
the coefficient of OC5 is not significant while the coefficient of OC1 is significant at 
the 10% level. This indicates that only OC1 is significantly negatively related to debt. 
This suggests that as a stand-alone mechanism, the largest shareholder might exploit 
debt in the expropriation act by purposely reducing debt level. Therefore, the largest 
shareholder can avoid the disciplinary function of debt and can use free cash flow as a 
result of the low debt level for his own perquisites, which is consistent with the 
hypothesis of Jensen (1986). This suggestion is based on the finding in model 2 where 
OC1 is negatively associated with firm value, yet it is insignificant for providing 
evidence that OC1 does expropriate firm small shareholders. 
 
The other variable of interest in this model is Tobin’s Q. Its coefficients are 3 = 
-0.031 and -0.022 when regressed on debt ratio in Panel A and Panel B respectively. 
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This indicates that firm value is significantly negatively related to debt as the 
coefficients are significant at the 10% level. The negative relationships are consistent 
with the hypothesis, thus suggesting that, as a stand-alone mechanism, firm value is 
negatively associated with debt, as the largest Australian firms avoid a high debt level 
due to the agency cost of debt and due to firms wanting to mitigate underinvestment 
problems (Myers, 1977).  
 
Tested as a group, the coefficients of the interaction effects are 2  = 0.12 and 
0.035 between OC1 and OC5 respectively with Tobin’s Q. This indicates that 
ownership concentration and firm value are complementary to each other as corporate 
governance mechanisms. But again, there is no evidence of significance to support this. 
 
As for the control variables in model 2, the coefficients of investment are 4 = 
0.26 and 0.27 in the equations in panel A and Panel B respectively. This indicates that 
investment is positively related to debt but the insignificance of the coefficients fails to 
provide evidence on this relationship. The coefficients of the size are 5 = 0.061 and 
0.060 in Panel A and Panel B respectively. These coefficients are significant at the 1% 
level, which indicates that size is significantly positively associated with debt. 
Therefore, the finding is consistent with the hypothesis of Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009). It 
suggests that the largest Australian firms have a lower probability of financial distress 
due to their tendency to be more diversified, and thus they do not mind having a high 
level of debt. 
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For the other control variables in model 2, the coefficients of the change in 
assets turnover are 6 = -0.009 and -0.01 in the equations in Panel A and Panel B 
respectively. This indicates that change in assets turnover and debt is negatively related. 
However, there does not appear to be evidence to support the significance of this 
relationship. Further, the coefficient for the lagged return on assets is 7 = -0.13 in both 
equations in Panel A and Panel B. The significance of this coefficient at the 10% level 
indicates that previous year’s profitability is significant and negatively related to debt. 
Thus, it suggests that the largest Australian firms’ capital financing follows the 
pecking-order theory (Myers, 1984; Myers & Majluf, 1984) that due to high 
profitability in the previous year, the firm will have more retained earnings, and thus 
rely less on debt. 
 
Model 3 exhibits that the coefficients of debt ratio are 1 = -0.034 and 0.012 
when regressed on ownership concentration in Panel A and Panel B respectively. This 
indicates that debt and OC1 are negatively related while debt and OC5 are positively 
related. Yet this finding does not support the significance of the relationships. It 
suggests that, as a stand-alone mechanism, debt is not related to ownership 
concentration. 
 
The coefficients of the other variable of interest in model 3, Tobin’s Q, are 3 = 
-0.00074 and -0.002 when regressed on ownership concentration in Panel A and Panel 
B respectively. This indicates that firm value is positively related to OC1 and 
negatively related to OC5. However, the insignificance of the coefficients fails to 
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provide evidence on these relationships. Again, the finding suggests that, as a stand-
alone mechanism, firm value is not associated with ownership concentration. 
 
As a group, the coefficients of the interaction between debt ratio and Tobin’s Q 
are 2 = -0.004 and -0.005 in the equations in Panel A and Panel B respectively. The 
negative coefficients indicate that these two corporate mechanisms are substitutes. 
Nevertheless, the results are inconclusive as the coefficients are not significant. 
 
For the control variables in model 3 in Panel A, the coefficient of investment is 
4  = -0.091, the coefficient of size is 5 = -0.009, the coefficient of age is 6 = -0.013 
and the coefficient of change in assets turnover is 7 = 0.008. In the equations in Panel 
B, the coefficient of investment is 4  = -0.067, the coefficient of size is 5 = -0.009, 
the coefficient of age is 6 = 0.003 and the coefficient of change in assets turnover is 
7 = 0.018. Significance of the coefficients is found, first, in the relationship between 
investment and OC1 and second, between change in assets turnover and OC5. The 
former indicates that investment is significantly negatively related to ownership 
concentration, which suggests that in the largest Australian firms, the largest 
shareholder tends to diversify his  portfolio as higher investment leads to higher risk 
(Hu & Izumida, 2008). The latter finding is consistent with the hypothesis which 
indicates that change in assets turnover is significantly positively associated with 
ownership concentration. It suggests that the largest five shareholders are used to 
overcome high monitoring costs as a result of the high changes in capital intensity, 
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which is contrary to what was found by Thomsen et al. (2006), who used samples of the 
US and the UK firms. 
 
In conclusion, the findings of the interaction tests using the FE estimation 
suggest that, as stand-alone mechanisms, firm value is negatively associated with debt, 
the ownership concentration of the largest shareholder is negatively related to debt, and 
the ownership concentration of the largest five shareholders is negatively related to firm 
value. The findings fail to find these three corporate mechanisms effective when 
functioning as a group, and thus do not support the conclusion by Ward et al. (2009). 
As a result, these interaction tests fail to find whether these mechanisms are substitutes 
or complements with each other. Overall, as the FE estimation does not take the 
dynamic endogeneity issue into account, the study on the interaction test needs to 
undergo another estimation using the GMM. The results of this estimation are presented 
next.  
 
5.2.2 GMM Estimation 
In this section, the GMM estimation is employed to find the results of the 
interaction tests where ownership concentration, debt and firm value are tested as a 
group. Their effects as stand-alone mechanisms are also tested. This estimation is 
important as it meets one of the main aims of this thesis, that is, to take account of the 
dynamic endogeneity issue. The results shown by using this estimation are compared 
with the results shown by using the FE estimation. As such, a conclusion can be made 
on whether dynamic endogeneity is an issue or not in influencing the relationship 
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between corporate governance mechanisms and firm value in this test. The regressions 
results are shown in table 5.2.  
 
Table 5.2 presents the results of the interaction test by using GMM estimation 
for the following models: 
Model 1: 
  ititititititititititit XROAATAGESIINVDDOCOCQ  876543210 
  
Model 2: 
    itititititititititit YROAATSIINVQQOCOCD  176543210 
 
Model 3: 
  itititititititititit ZATAGESIINVQQDDOC  76543210   
where i  and t  denote firm and year respectively. The variables of interest are Q, D and 
OC which denote Tobin’s Q, debt ratio and ownership concentration respectively. 
Control variables are INV, SI, AGE, AT, ROA and ROA(-1) which denote investment, 
firm size, firm age, change in assets turnover, profitability and lagged profitability 
respectively. itX , itY  and itZ  are the error terms which have been transformed into 
itti    where i , t  and it  are the firm-specific effects, time-specific effects 
and random disturbance respectively. All variables on the right-hand side are treated as 
endogenous variables except lagged profitability (ROA(-1)) that is treated as exogenous 
in model 2. Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. Constant terms are omitted 
for convenience. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
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Table 5.2 Interaction test: GMM estimation 
 
 Panel A Panel B 
Model 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Variable Q D OC1 Q D OC5 
        
Q  -0.010 0.000  -0.008 0.000 
  [-0.62] [0.14]  [-0.92] [0.21] 
D -2.58  -0.028 -1.26  0.024 
 [-1.20]  [-0.55] [-0.18]  [0.37] 
OC1 -5.04 -0.29      
 [-1.50] [-1.63]      
OC5     0.029 -0.25*  
     [0.0062] [-1.91]  
Q*D   0.002   -0.003 
   [0.56]   [-0.47] 
Q*OC1  0.037      
  [0.70]      
D*OC1 10.7       
 [1.43]       
Q*OC5      0.013  
      [1.25]  
D*OC5     5.66   
     [0.54]   
INV 4.47 0.48* 0.047 6.70 0.44 0.059 
 [0.76] [1.66] [0.53] [1.04] [1.32] [0.48] 
SI -1.32 0.004 -0.002 -1.15 0.017 0.006 
 [-1.34] [0.13] [-0.21] [-1.65] [1.09] [0.57] 
AGE 0.022  -0.002 0.059  -0.003 
 [0.098]  [-0.34] [0.16]  [-0.54] 
AT -0.28 -0.01 0.002 -0.33 -0.007 0.004 
 [-0.61] [-0.34] [0.15] [-0.42] [-0.53] [0.32] 
ROA 7.57    8.12   
 [0.77]    [1.01]   
ROA(-1)  0.024    0.032  
  [0.45]    [0.62]  
        
Observations 940 940 940 940 940 940 
Number of instruments 110 89 99 110 89 99 
Number of groups 165 165 165 165 165 165 
AR(1) -1.67 -3.71 -3.47 -1.80 -3.72 -5.01 
[P-value] [0.09] [0.00] [0.00] [0.07] [0.00] [0.00] 
AR(2) -0.82 0.93 -0.71 -0.73 0.71 0.29 
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[P-value] [0.41] [0.35] [0.48] [0.46] [0.48] [0.77] 
Hansen test 97.13 68.64 85.97 92.46 60.30 80.13 
[P-value] [0.28] [0.52] [0.30] [0.41] [0.79] [0.48] 
Difference-in-Hansen test 84.75 58.95 71.86 86.51 52.16 75.47 
[P-value] [0.36] [0.62] [0.48] [0.32] [0.83] [0.37] 
F statistics 16.95 218.06 433.96 21.87 196.23 1880.58 
[P-value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Time effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
 
 
Table 5.2 presents the findings of the test using GMM estimation. Panel A 
encloses the regression estimates obtained by using OC1 as the measure of ownership 
concentration, and Panel B states the estimates using OC5 as the measure of ownership 
concentration. 
 
In model 1 of Panel A, the coefficients are: OC1 1 = -5.04, interaction of OC1 
and debt ratio 2 = 10.7, debt ratio 3 = -2.58, investment 4 = 4.47, size 5 = -1.32, 
age 6 = 0.022, change in assets turnover 7 = -0.28 and return on assets 8 = 7.57. In 
Panel B, the coefficients are: OC5 1 = 0.029, interaction of OC5 and debt ratio 2 = 
5.66, debt ratio 3 = -1.26, investment 4 = 6.70, size 5 = -1.15, age 6 = 0.059, 
change in assets turnover 7 = -0.33 and return on assets 8 = 8.12. The insignificance 
of ownership concentration and debt ratio coefficients suggest that, as stand-alone 
mechanisms, they are not significantly associated with firm value. Also, when they are 
tested as a group, the study fails to find evidence that they function best as a group and 
thus fails to identify whether they are substitutes or complements with each other. Also, 
all the control variables coefficients are not significant, thus suggesting that they are not 
the determinants of firm value. 
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The equation in model 2 of Panel A shows that the coefficients are: OC1 1 = -
0.29, interaction of OC1 and Tobin’s Q 2 = 0.037, Tobin’s Q 3 = -0.010, investment 
4 = 0.48, size 5 = 0.004, change in assets turnover 6 = -0.01 and lagged return on 
assets 7 = 0.024. In the equation in Panel B, the coefficients are: OC5 1 = -0.25, 
interaction of OC5 and Tobin’s Q 2 = 0.013, Tobin’s Q 3 = -0.008, investment 4 = 
0.44, size 5 = 0.017, change in assets turnover 6 = -0.007 and lagged return on assets 
7 = 0.032. It is found that the coefficients of OC1 and Tobin’s Q are not significant, 
which suggests that, as stand-alone mechanisms, they are not significantly related to 
debt. However, the significance of OC5 coefficient at the 10% level indicates that it is 
significantly negatively associated with debt. It suggests that, as stand-alone 
mechanisms, the largest five shareholders and debt are substitutes in monitoring firm 
managers in order to control for agency costs. This suggestion is made based on the 
positive effect of OC5 on firm value in model 2, although there is no evidence of a 
significance relationship between them. Nevertheless, there is also no evidence that the 
largest shareholder and debt, as well as the largest five shareholders and debt, function 
effectively as a group. Therefore, their substitutability or complementarity is not 
identified.  
 
As for the other control variables in model 2, again, the coefficients are all 
insignificant, suggesting that they are not determinants of debt. The exception is 
investment. The significance of the coefficient of investment at the 10% level in the 
equation in Panel A indicates that it is significantly positively associated with debt. 
This suggests that the largest Australian firms use more debt as investment increases in 
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order to cover the shortage of internal funds. This might be related to models 1 and 2 
where the coefficient signs show that there is a possibility that the largest shareholder 
expropriates small shareholders ( 1  = -5.04) and tends to exploit debt in the 
expropriation act ( 1  = -0.29). However, due to the insignificance of the coefficients, 
there is insufficient evidence to suggest that this is the case.  
 
In model 3 of Panel A, the coefficients are: debt ratio 1 = -0.028, interaction of 
debt ratio and Tobin’s Q 2 = 0.002, Tobin’s Q 3 = 0.000, investment 4 = 0.047, size 
5 = -0.002, age 6 = -0.002 and change in assets turnover 7 = 0.002. In Panel B, the 
coefficients are: debt ratio 1 = 0.024, interaction of debt ratio and Tobin’s Q 2 = -
0.003, Tobin’s Q 3 = 0.000, investment 4 = 0.059, size 5 = 0.006, age 6 = -0.003 
and change in assets turnover 7 = 0.004. The insignificance of debt ratio and Tobin’s 
Q coefficients suggests that, as stand-alone mechanisms, they are not significantly 
related to ownership concentration. The insignificance of the coefficient of the 
interaction variable between these two suggests that they do not function effectively as 
a group. As such, this study fails to find whether they are substitutes or complements. 
All the other control variable coefficients in this model are not significant, thus 
suggesting that they are not the determinants of ownership concentration.  
 
In conclusion, the findings of the interaction tests using the GMM estimation 
are similar to the previous conclusion made for the findings by using the FE estimation. 
This suggests that, as a stand-alone mechanism, only the largest five shareholders and 
debt are negatively associated. Again, the findings fail to find evidence that the three 
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corporate mechanisms function best as a group. Therefore, the findings do not support 
the conclusion of Ward et al. (2009), and the tests fail to find the substitutability or 
complementarity of these mechanisms.     
 
In answering the question of whether dynamic endogeneity influences the 
relationship between corporate governance and firm value in the largest Australian 
firms, it is found that, after controlling for dynamic endogeneity, the significant 
variables found in the FE estimation vanish after the models are run using the GMM 
estimation. These results challenge the FE estimation used earlier in the chapter. The 
main aim of this interaction test is to investigate the efficiency of using two of the 
corporate mechanisms as a group in order to investigate the substitutability or 
complementarity of these variables in relation to the other corporate mechanisms. It is 
found that in both FE and GMM estimations, the interaction effects of each of the two 
corporate mechanisms are insignificant, which suggests that the interaction effects may 
not be determined by dynamic endogeneity. 
 
5.2.3 Robustness Test: GMM Estimation 
The robustness test is conducted to examine whether there is a variation if all 
control variables are considered as exogenous in the GMM estimation. Thus, models 1, 
2 and 3 are re-estimated and the results are shown in Table 5.3. OC1 is used as a proxy 
for ownership concentration and the findings are represented in Panel A. Panel B shows 
the results where OC5 is used as the proxy.  
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Table 5.3 presents the results of the interaction test by using GMM estimation 
for the following models: 
 
Model 1: 
  ititititititititititit XROAATAGESIINVDDOCOCQ  876543210 
 
Model 2: 
    itititititititititit YROAATSIINVQQOCOCD  176543210 
 
Model 3: 
  itititititititititit ZATAGESIINVQQDDOC  76543210   
where i  and t  denote firm and year respectively. The variables of interest are Q, D and 
OC which denote Tobin’s Q, debt ratio and ownership concentration respectively. 
Control variables are INV, SI, AGE, AT, ROA and ROA(-1) which denote investment, 
firm size, firm age, change in assets turnover, profitability and lagged profitability 
respectively. itX , itY  and itZ  are the error terms which have been transformed into 
itti    where i , t  and it  are the firm-specific effects, time-specific effects 
and random disturbance respectively. All variables of interest (Q, D, OC1, OC5) and 
the interaction variables (Q*D, Q*OC1, D*OC1, Q*OC5, D*OC5) are treated as 
endogenous variables whilst all control variables (INV, SI, AGE, AT, ROA, ROA(-1)) 
are treated as exogenous variables. Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
Constant terms are omitted for convenience. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 5.3 Robustness test 2: GMM estimation  
 
 Panel A Panel B 
Model 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Variable Q D OC1 Q D OC5 
              
Q  0.000 0.001  0.008 0.000 
  [0.005] [1.27]  [0.68] [0.41] 
D -7.58**  -0.057 -17.7  0.058 
 [-2.05]  [-0.83] [-1.65]  [0.68] 
OC1 -8.83*** -0.23     
 [-2.70] [-1.30]     
OC5    -10.1** -0.023  
    [-2.03] [-0.17]  
Q*D   0.005   -0.005 
   [0.85]   [-0.72] 
Q*OC1  0.001     
  [0.016]     
D*OC1 20.3**      
 [2.18]      
Q*OC5     -0.011  
     [-0.67]  
D*OC5    24.6*   
    [1.77]   
INV -0.24 0.17 -0.034 -0.75 0.18* -0.059 
 [-0.14] [1.56] [-1.03] [-0.41] [1.85] [-1.38] 
SI -0.12 0.006 0.005 0.014 0.007 0.000 
 [-0.74] [0.99] [1.19] [0.078] [1.30] [0.022] 
AGE 0.027  -0.000 -0.14  0.001 
 [0.23]  [-0.013] [-0.63]  [0.27] 
AT -0.064 -0.012* -0.001 -0.13 -0.012* -0.002 
 [-0.43] [-1.67] [-0.30] [-0.62] [-1.83] [-0.54] 
ROA -1.31   -1.37   
 [-1.39]   [-1.31]   
ROA(-1)  0.010   0.013  
  [0.16]   [0.23]  
       
Observations 940 940 940 940 940 940 
Number of instruments 60 59 59 60 59 59 
Number of groups 165 165 165 165 165 165 
AR(1) -2.04 -3.6 -3.52 -2.26 -3.92 -4.94 
[P-value] [0.04] [0.00] [0.00] [0.02] [0.00] [0.00] 
AR(2) -1.01 0.92 -0.62 -0.14 0.75 -0.02 
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[P-value] [0.31] [0.36] [0.53] [0.89] [0.45] [0.98] 
Hansen test 35.93 44.21 33.30 35.80 48.41 43.69 
[P-value] [0.65] [0.30] [0.76] [0.66] [0.17] [0.32] 
Difference-in-Hansen test 30.54 41.46 29.66 32.46 40.15 42.41 
[P-value] [0.73] [0.25] [0.76] [0.64] [0.29] [0.21] 
F statistics 27.65 306.17 468.68 34.78 525.02 1509.52 
[P-value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Time effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
 
 
In this robustness test, little variation is found when the stand-alone variable of 
interest and the interaction between the variables are treated as endogenous while all 
other control variables are treated as exogenous. The main variation is found in model 
1. In Panel A, the stand-alone effects of OC1 and debt are negatively associated with 
firm value where the coefficient 1 = -8.83 is significant at the 1% level and the 
coefficient 3 = -7.58 is significant at the 5% level. This suggests that the largest 
shareholder does expropriate firm small shareholders and debt fails to play a role as an 
effective disciplinary device. However, the interaction between these variables exhibits 
that, as a group, they might be an effective complement that enhances firm value, as the 
coefficient 2 = 20.3 is significant at the 5% level. From an agency theory perspective, 
the result supports the view that largest shareholder and debt are interdependent and it 
suggests that a complementary relationship exists between these two corporate 
governance mechanisms that can be viewed from two perspectives. Firstly, the higher 
the concentrated ownership of largest shareholder, the higher level of debt that he 
employs as a signal of his intention to mitigate the possibility of agency problems 
related to free cash flow (Jensen, 1986), thus showing that he does not intended to 
expropriate small shareholders. Second, the higher the debt level, the higher portion of 
ownership that largest shareholder is willing to hold as a signal that the firm is doing 
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well (Leland & Pyle, 1977). As a result, the market puts a high value on the firm. 
However, based on this interaction test, the complimentary relationship between largest 
shareholder and debt is either due to the monitoring effect or expropriation effect of the 
former corporate governance mechanism is not clear. Hence, the third test, the non-
linear test was conducted as an attempt to find whether large shareholders through their 
ownership concentration plays their role as an effective monitoring mechanism or not 
and how does it affects on the debt level selection.    
 
In model 1, in Panel B, the coefficient of OC5, 1 = -10.1, is significant at the 
5% level and negatively related to firm value, thus supporting the finding that the 
largest five shareholders may also expropriate small shareholders. Although there is no 
evidence that debt is related to firm value, as its coefficient 3 = -17.7 is not significant, 
the interaction between these variables is consistent with the previous equation that, as 
a group, they complement each other effectively, and that could cause an increase to 
firm value where the coefficient 2 = 24.6 is significant at the 10% level. 
 
In model 2, a variation is found on the stand-alone effect of OC5, even though 
its coefficient remains negative, 1 = -0.023. This variable was previously found to be 
significant (see Table 5.2) and is now found to be insignificant. As for investment that 
was previously found to significantly positively associated with debt in the equation in 
Panel A, the relationship is now found to be insignificant with its coefficient 4 = 0.17. 
Contrarily, significance is found in the equation in Panel B where its coefficient 4 = 
0.18 is significant at the 10% level. Also, a variation is found on change in assets 
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turnover where its coefficient 6 = -0.012 in both equations is significant at the 10% 
level. Finally, there is no variation found in model 3, as the results are consistent with 
the previous findings. 
 
In conclusion, with the exceptions discussed above, there is little variation in the 
interaction test using GMM estimation after all the control variables are treated as 
exogenous and all the variables of interest are treated as endogenous. Therefore, it can 
be suggested that the findings in the main test are robust, as the results are not sensitive 
to whether control variables are considered endogenous or exogenous. 
 
5.2.4 Multicollinearity Issue 
It should be noted that the following variables generate multicollinearity issues 
as the VIFs are higher than 10: 
a) Model 1: Debt ratio, and interaction variable of debt ratio and OC5 
b) Model 2: Tobin’s Q, and interaction variable of Tobin’s Q and OC1 
c) Model 2: Tobin’s Q, and interaction variable of Tobin’s Q and OC5 
 
To overcome the issue of multicollinearity by dropping one of the variables in 
each model cannot be done, as the main objective of this test is to examine the 
interaction effects between the variables. However, in an attempt to overcome the 
multicollinearity issue, the ‘centring’ method is conducted. In this method, the mean of 
each variable is computed, and the value of the variable is then replaced with the value 
of the difference between it and the mean. Finally, the models are re-estimated. The 
149 
results are qualitatively the same as in the main model and are shown in A5.1 and A5.2 
in the Appendix. 
 
5.3 Conclusion 
This chapter reports on the investigation of the interaction between ownership 
concentration and firm value, ownership concentration and debt, and debt and firm 
value, as well as their effects on debt, firm value and ownership concentration 
respectively. In addition, the stand-alone effect of each variable is also tested. This fills 
a gap in the literature by constructing the interaction variable in the models being 
investigated. Therefore, the study is able to answer the question as to whether these 
corporate mechanisms should be utilised as a group to ensure their effectiveness, thus 
identifying their substitutability or complementarity. 
 
The results generally fail to find significance of the interaction effects of the 
variables. As such, the findings for this test do not support the conclusion of Ward et al. 
(2009), who suggest that corporate mechanisms should be employed as a group in order 
to be effective.  
 
After controlling for dynamic endogeneity, the significance of firm value and 
ownership concentration found in the FE estimation when they are tested as stand-alone 
mechanisms vanishes after using the GMM estimation. This suggests that dynamic 
endogeneity does affect these variables when they are tested in isolation. However, the 
aim of this part of the study is to investigate the effectiveness of using two of the 
corporate mechanisms as a group in order to determine the substitutability or 
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complementarity of these variables in relation to the other corporate mechanisms. It is 
found that in both FE and GMM estimations, all the interaction effects are not 
significant, which suggests that the interaction effects may not be determined by 
dynamic endogeneity. Finally, in the robustness test, these findings are largely 
supported regardless of whether the control variables are treated as endogenous or 
exogenous. 
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CHAPTER 6:   NON-LINEAR RESULTS 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Inconclusive findings reported in Chapter 5 are that OC1 is negatively 
insignificantly related to firm value and OC5 is positively insignificantly related to firm 
value, in the GMM estimation. On the other hand, OC5 is found to have significantly 
positively association with firm value in the FE estimation. There are mixed positive 
and negative insignificant findings in the relationship between debt and firm value in 
both estimations. These findings cast doubt on whether ownership concentration and 
debt have a linear relationship with firm value, due to the possibility that they might 
play several roles as corporate governance mechanisms at one time. In other words, 
ownership concentration and debt are associated with firm value in a non-linear way. 
 
There are mixed results in the non-linear relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm value. Some reveal that firm value decreases as ownership 
concentration increases and, at a certain point, firm value increases with the increment 
of ownership concentration. This is known as ‘U-shaped’ non-linearity, as found, for 
instance, by Gedajlovic and Shapiro (1998) and Hu and Izumida (2008). On the other 
hand, other studies have found the reverse, where ownership concentration and firm 
value increase together and, at a certain inflection point, as the former increases, the 
latter decreases. This is known as ‘inverse U-shaped’ non-linearity (example Miguel et 
al. 2004). Therefore, it is a goal of this study to find whether ownership concentration 
and firm value are also non-linearly related in the largest Australian firms and, if they 
are, which shape this relationship is associated with. This finding will assist in 
answering the question of whether large shareholders, through their concentration of 
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ownership, play a role as an effective monitoring mechanism on firm managers in 
mitigating the Type I agency problem between shareholders and managers, and/or 
whether they are expropriating firm small shareholders, thus creating the Type II 
agency problem between large/controlling shareholders and small/non-controlling 
shareholders. 
 
The literature on the non-linearity between ownership concentration and debt 
also shows mixed results. A U-shaped non-linear relationship between ownership 
concentration and debt was found, for instance, by Hu and Izumida (2008). The 
relationship reported was that as ownership concentration increases, debt decreases and, 
at a certain inflection point, debt increases with an increase in ownership concentration. 
However, Setia-Atmaja et al. (2009) found the opposite, that is an inverse U-shaped 
association between these two, where ownership concentration and debt increase 
together at first, and at a certain inflection point as ownership concentration increases, 
debt decreases. Another objective of this study is therefore to find whether ownership 
concentration and debt are also non-linearly associated in the largest Australian firms. 
If this is the case, this study could potentially identify the shape of the non-linear 
relationship or that the non-linearity of ownership concentration involves not only its 
quadratic function but also its cubic function. Therefore, the study will be able to 
answer the question: if it is shown that ownership concentration is an effective 
monitoring mechanism and/or expropriates its small shareholders, how do these acts 
impact on firm debt selection?  
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Previous studies on the linear relationship between debt and firm value are 
widely documented. One clue that pushes this study to investigate the possibility of the 
non-linearity between debt and firm value is the dual effects that debt might have on 
firm value. On the one hand, debt may positively relate to firm value due to its 
effectiveness as a disciplinary mechanism in mitigating a Type II agency problem 
between large/controlling shareholders and small/non-controlling shareholders. On the 
other hand, debt may negatively related to firm value due to either failing to be an 
effective disciplinary mechanism or increasing the agency cost of debt financing 
between shareholders and debt holders. Therefore, this study aims to find (if any) what 
kind of non-linear relationship between debt and firm value might be exhibited in the 
largest Australian firms. 
 
This study applies the two-way fixed effects (FE) and the two-step system of 
generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation methods, with the major findings of 
the study resulting from the latter. In the non-linear test between ownership 
concentration and firm value, the GMM estimation supports the findings by Hu and 
Izumida (2008) that ownership concentration of the largest shareholder has a U-shaped 
non-linear association with firm value. This study found that the inflection point of the 
ownership concentration is at 46%.  
 
The non-linear relationship between ownership concentration and firm value has 
an effect on the non-linearity between ownership concentration and debt. It is found 
that ownership concentration of the largest shareholder and debt are also non-linearly 
associated, thus supporting the free cash flow and the control preference hypotheses. 
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Also, this study finds evidence that, at its cubic function, largest shareholder uses debt 
as a substitute for monitoring firm managers. Two inflection points of ownership 
concentration are found: 23% and 44%. 
 
In the same model where the largest shareholder is used as a proxy for 
ownership concentration, this study finds that debt and firm value are non-linearly 
associated. It is found that debt fails to play its role as a disciplinary mechanism at a 
low level but tends to be effective at a high level. However, too high a debt level results 
in an agency cost of debt financing. This study finds two inflection points of debt: 29% 
and 159%. 
 
Finally, on the whole, dynamic endogeneity affects the non-linearity of OC1 
only as its insignificant coefficients in the FE estimation become significant in the 
GMM estimation. The non-linearity of OC5 and debt are found to be consistent in both 
the FE and the GMM estimations, which suggests that they are not affected by the 
dynamic endogeneity issue.  
 
The aim of the study reported in this chapter is to answer the third research 
question of whether ownership concentration and firm value have a non-linear 
relationship and, if they do, how this relationship affects the non-linearity between 
ownership concentration and debt. Further, this study seeks an answer to whether debt 
and firm value are also non-linearly related and an answer to the fourth research 
question of whether these non-linear relationships are influenced by the dynamic 
endogeneity issue. 
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Section 2 of this chapter presents empirical results and discussion. Concluding 
remarks in Section 3 finish the chapter.  
  
6.2 Empirical Results and Discussion 
This section presents the empirical results and discussion for the non-linear 
tests, first using the FE estimation then using the GMM estimation. The analysis for the 
robustness test finishes the section. 
 
6.2.1 FE Estimation 
The study first conducts the non-linear tests by using the FE estimation as 
presented in this section. Table 6.1 presents the findings of the test that are estimated 
using the FE estimation. Panel A states the regression estimates obtained by using OC1 
as a measure of ownership concentration and Panel B states the estimates using OC5 as 
a measure of ownership concentration. 
 
Table 6.1 presents the results of the non-linear test by using FE estimation for 
the following models: 
 
Model 1: 
itititititititititit XROAATAGESIINVDOCOCQ  876543
2
210 
 
Model 2: 
  itititititititititit YROAATSIINVQOCOCOCD  187654
3
3
2
210 
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Model 3: 
ititititititititititit XROAATAGESIINVOCDDDQ  987654
3
3
2
210 
 
where i  and t  denote firm and year respectively. The variables of interest are Q, D and 
OC which denote Tobin’s Q, debt ratio and ownership concentration respectively. 
Control variables are INV, SI, AGE, AT, ROA and ROA(-1) which denote investment, 
firm size, firm age, change in assets turnover, profitability and lagged profitability 
respectively. itX  and itY  are the error terms which have been transformed into 
itti    where i , t  and it  are the firm-specific effects, time-specific effects 
and random disturbance respectively. Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
Constant terms are not reported for convenience. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 6.1 Non-linear test: FE estimation 
 
 Panel A Panel B 
Model 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Variable Q D Q Q D Q 
              
OC1 -0.66 0.30 -0.43    
 [-0.45] [0.45] [-0.87]    
OC1
2
 0.091 -0.29     
 [0.053] [-0.12]     
OC1
3
  -0.55     
  [-0.25]     
OC5     -0.34 0.059 -0.70 
     [-0.19] [0.078] [-1.01] 
OC5
2
     -0.60 0.23  
     [-0.34] [0.14]  
OC5
3
      -0.39  
      [-0.36]  
D 1.25**  -2.58** 1.26**  -2.50* 
 [2.08]  [-2.05] [2.15]  [-1.96] 
D
2
   5.69**   5.57** 
   [2.55]   [2.48] 
D
3
   -1.51*   -1.48* 
   [-1.89]   [-1.84] 
Q  0.00   0.002  
  [0.40]   [0.50]  
INV 2.46* 0.23 2.44* 2.45* 0.25 2.44* 
 [1.73] [1.37] [1.74] [1.71] [1.35] [1.74] 
SI -0.90*** 0.065*** -0.81*** -0.91*** 0.064*** -0.81*** 
 [-4.74] [3.81] [-4.21] [-4.78] [3.48] [-4.20] 
AGE 0.34  0.25 0.34  0.26 
 [1.55]  [1.11] [1.55]  [1.14] 
AT 0.10 -0.009 0.060 0.11 -0.007 0.069 
 [1.32] [-0.60] [0.62] [1.37] [-0.46] [0.67] 
ROA 1.17  1.25 1.18  1.25 
 [1.29]  [1.51] [1.31]  [1.52] 
ROA(-1)  -0.13*   -0.12  
  [-1.88]   [-1.61]  
        
Observations 1,189 941 1,189 1,189 941 1,189 
R-squared 0.09 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.10 
F statistics 4.08 6.12 4.39 3.93 5.97 4.39 
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[P-value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Time effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
 
 
As can be seen in table 6.1, model 1 shows that the coefficients of the linear and 
quadratic functions of ownership concentration when regressed on firm value in Panel 
A are 1 = -0.66 and 2 = 0.091 respectively. In the same model, the coefficients of the 
linear and quadratic functions of ownership concentration in Panel B are 1 = -0.34 and 
2 = -0.60 respectively. This suggests that OC1 is a non-linear function of Tobin’s Q, 
as the coefficient of the linear function of OC1 shows a negative sign, whereas the 
coefficient of the quadratic function shows a positive sign. However, there is no firm 
evidence that OC1 is non-linearly related with Tobin’s Q, as both linear and quadratic 
functions of OC1 are not significant. As for the OC5, there is also no evidence that 
OC5 and Tobin’s Q have a non-linear relationship, due to the coefficients of both linear 
and quadratic functions of OC5 being negative and not significant. 
 
The other variable of interest in this model, debt ratio, shows that its coefficients 
are 3 = 1.25 and 1.26 in the equations in Panel A and Panel B respectively. The 
significance of the debt ratio coefficient at the 5% level indicates that debt has a 
positive and significant relationship with Tobin’s Q. This suggests that debt plays an 
effective role as a disciplinary mechanism in mitigating agency problem II between 
large and small shareholders. 
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In model 2, the equation in Panel A shows that the coefficients of linear, 
quadratic and cubic functions for OC1 when regressed on debt ratio are 1 = 0.30, 2 = 
-0.29 and 3 = -0.55 respectively. Panel B exhibits the coefficients of the linear, 
quadratic and cubic functions of OC5 as 1 = 0.059, 2 = 0.23 and 3 = -0.39 
respectively. This indicates that ownership concentration might be non-linearly 
associated with debt but it may contain only the linear and quadratic functions of the 
former. There is a possibility that the coefficients of ownership concentration are not 
significant due to the inclusion of its cubic function. 
 
The other variable of interest in this model, Tobin’s Q, exhibits its coefficient as 
4 = 0.00 and 0.002 in the equations in Panel A and Panel B respectively. The 
insignificance of the Tobin’s Q coefficient indicates that firm value is not the 
determinant of debt. As firm value may also represent the growth opportunities of a 
firm, this suggests that the largest Australian firms’ debt financing decisions are not 
influenced by their growth opportunities. 
 
Model 3 in table 6.1 shows that the coefficients of the linear, quadratic and 
cubic functions of the debt ratio when regressed on firm value are 1 = -2.58, 2 = 5.69 
and 3 = -1.51 respectively in Panel A. In Panel B, the coefficients of the linear, 
quadratic and cubic functions of the debt ratio are 1 = -2.50, 2 = 5.57 and 3 = -1.48 
respectively. All these coefficients are significant at either the 5% and 1% levels of 
significance. This indicates that the debt ratio and Tobin’s Q are non-linearly 
associated. It suggests that, first, at a low level of debt, firm value decreases as debt 
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increases and second, firm value then increases together with debt at a high level of 
debt. Third, firm value decreases again as debt increases at its highest level. This non-
linear relationship between debt and firm value therefore suggests that, at a low level, 
debt does not efficiently play a role as a disciplinary mechanism in mitigating agency 
problem II between large and small shareholders, and thus it harms firm value. When 
the debt level increases, it turns to be an effective device, thus mitigating agency 
problem II. As a result, large and small shareholders have the same objective – that is, 
to maximise the value of their shares. However, when debt becomes higher, it increases 
the agency cost of debt financing between shareholders and debt holders. 
 
The other variable of interest in model 3, the ownership concentration, shows 
that its coefficients are 4 = -0.43 and -0.70 in the equations in Panel A and Panel B 
respectively. The insignificance of the coefficients indicates that ownership 
concentration is not associated with Tobin’s Q. Hence, it fails to provide evidence that 
ownership concentration might expropriate firm small shareholders that harm firm 
value. 
 
As for the control variables, model 1 reveals that the coefficients of investment 
are 4 = 2.46 and 2.45; in model 2, the coefficients of investment are 5 = 0.23 and 
0.25; and in model 3, the coefficients of investment are 5 = 2.44 and 2.44. The first 
coefficients of investment are in the equations in Panel A while the next two 
coefficients of investment are in the equations in Panel B. Models 1 and 3 show that 
investment is positively related to Tobin’s Q and is significant at the 10% level. This 
suggests that investors anticipate good future prospects for the largest Australian firms 
161 
due to the firms’ production capability. However, in model 2, investment is found not 
to be associated with debt ratio as its coefficient is not significant. This suggests that in 
the largest Australian firms, neither excess nor shortage of internal funds has an 
influence on debt financing decisions. This might be due to firms relying on other 
sources of financing in funding their investments. 
 
The other control variable in all the models is firm size. In models 1, 2 and 3, 
the coefficients of firm size are 5 = -0.90, 6 = 0.065 and 6 = -0.81 respectively for 
the equations in Panel A. For the equations in Panel B, the coefficients of firm size are 
5 = -0.91, 6 = 0.064 and 6 = -0.81 in models 1, 2 and 3 respectively. These 
coefficients are significant at the 1% level in all models. Hence, this indicates that firm 
size is negatively related to Tobin’s Q and positively related to debt ratio. This suggests 
that the larger the firm size, the higher the agency cost as well as the greater the 
difficulties of monitoring either firm managers or large shareholders, depending on 
which type of agency problem the firm is facing. As the study uses Australian firms 
which are large in size, this finding supports the hypothesis. The positively significantly 
association between firm size and debt ratio also supports the hypothesis that the larger 
the firm, the lower its probability of facing financial distress. This makes it easier for 
the largest Australian firms to obtain funds through debt financing. 
 
In the equations in Panel A, the coefficients of firm age are 6 = 0.34 and 7 = 
0.25 in models 1 and 3 respectively; the coefficients of assets turnover are 7 = 0.10, 
7 = -0.009 and 8 = 0.060 in models 1, 2 and 3 respectively; the coefficients of return 
162 
on assets are 8 = 1.17 and 9 = 1.25 in models 1 and 3 respectively; and the coefficient 
of lagged return on assets is 8 = -0.13 in model 2. In the equations in Panel B, the 
coefficients of firm age are 6 = 0.34 and 7 = 0.26 in models 1 and 3 respectively; the 
coefficients of change in assets turnover are 7 = 0.11, 7 = -0.007 and 8 = 0.069 in 
models 1, 2 and 3 respectively; the coefficients of return on assets are 8 = 1.18 and 9
= 1.25 in models 1 and 3 respectively; and the coefficient of lagged return on assets is 
8 = -0.12 in model 2. All these coefficients are not significant, thus suggesting that 
firm age, change in assets turnover and return on assets are not the determinants of firm 
value, and change in assets turnover and lagged return on assets are not the 
determinants of debt. The exception is the lagged return on assets, which is found to be 
significant at the 10% level in model 2 of Panel A. This indicates that the previous year 
profitability is negatively related to debt. This finding supports the pecking-order 
hypothesis, which suggests that if firms gained higher profit in the previous year, they 
rely less on debt financing as they use funds from retained earnings. 
 
In conclusion, the findings of the non-linear tests by using the FE estimation 
suggest that there is no evidence that ownership concentration is non-linearly related 
with firm value and debt. However, it is found that debt has a non-linear relationship 
with firm value. Overall, as the results shown by using the FE estimation do not take 
the dynamic endogeneity issue into account, the study on the non-linear test needs to 
undergo another estimation, which is the GMM. The results of this estimation are 
presented next. 
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6.2.2 GMM Estimation 
This section investigates the non-linear relationship between ownership 
concentration on the one hand and firm value and debt on the other hand, as well as 
between debt and firm value, by using the GMM estimation. This is the primary 
estimation method employed in this study as it takes into account the dynamic 
endogeneity issue which, it is argued, influences the relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm value.  Results using GMM estimation are shown in 
Table 6.2. Findings where OC1 is used as a proxy for ownership concentration are 
presented in Panel A, while Panel B displays OC5 as the proxy. 
 
Table 6.2 presents the results of the non-linear test by using GMM estimation 
for the following models: 
 
Model 1: 
itititititititititit XROAATAGESIINVDOCOCQ  876543
2
210 
 
Model 2: 
  itititititititititit YROAATSIINVQOCOCOCD  187654
3
3
2
210 
 
Model 3: 
ititititititititititit XROAATAGESIINVOCDDDQ  987654
3
3
2
210 
 
where i  and t  denote firm and year respectively. The variables of interest are Q, D and 
OC which denote Tobin’s Q, debt ratio and ownership concentration respectively. 
Control variables are INV, SI, AGE, AT, ROA and ROA(-1) which denote investment, 
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firm size, firm age, change in assets turnover, profitability and lagged profitability 
respectively. itX  and itY  are the error terms which have been transformed into 
itti    where i , t  and it  are the firm-specific effects, time-specific effects 
and random disturbance respectively. All variables on the right-hand side are treated as 
endogenous variables except lagged profitability (ROA(-1)) that is treated as exogenous 
in model 2. Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. Constant terms are omitted 
for convenience. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels 
respectively. 
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Table 6.2 Non-linear test: GMM estimation 
 
 Panel A Panel B 
Model 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Variable Q D Q Q D Q 
              
OC1 -10.6* -1.32* -2.09    
 [-1.83] [-1.78] [-1.40]    
OC1
2
 11.5* 4.40*     
 [1.69] [1.84]     
OC1
3
  -4.36*     
  [-1.80]     
OC5     -12.7 0.53 0.94 
     [-1.00] [0.47] [0.48] 
OC5
2
     12.9 -1.25  
     [0.85] [-0.51]  
OC5
3
      0.61  
      [0.38]  
D 1.21  -7.16* 1.34  -6.79 
 [0.62]  [-1.88] [0.67]  [-1.54] 
D
2
   14.7**   13.8** 
   [2.10]   [2.03] 
D
3
   -5.22**   -4.91** 
   [-2.15]   [-2.12] 
Q  -0.00016   0.00  
  [-0.065]   [0.57]  
INV 4.23 0.61* -0.94 2.08 0.21 -2.12 
 [0.77] [1.87] [-0.28] [0.43] [0.66] [-0.84] 
SI -1.18 -0.002 -1.15 -0.82 0.009 -0.95*** 
 [-1.62] [-0.083] [-1.61] [-1.54] [0.54] [-2.72] 
AGE 0.057  0.18 0.064  0.18 
 [0.30]  [0.77] [0.40]  [0.78] 
AT -0.20 -0.006 -0.48 -0.24 -0.006 -0.53 
 [-0.38] [-0.41] [-0.92] [-0.40] [-0.67] [-0.71] 
ROA 8.07  5.89 7.64  5.47 
 [0.86]  [0.91] [0.88]  [0.87] 
ROA(-1)  -0.001   0.048  
  [-0.022]   [0.90]  
        
Observations 940 940 940 940 940 940 
Number of instruments 110 100 121 110 100 121 
Number of groups 165 165 165 165 165 165 
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AR(1) -1.70 -3.39 -1.67 -1.79 -3.66 -1.72 
[P-value] [0.09] [0.00] [0.09] [0.07] [0.00] [0.08] 
AR(2) -1.09 1.23 -1.27 -1.32 0.70 -1.49 
[P-value] [0.27] [0.22] [0.21] [0.19] [0.48] [0.14] 
Hansen test 84.33 81.84 93.92 87.80 77.27 101.09 
[P-value] [0.65] [0.42] [0.65] [0.55] [0.57] [0.45] 
Difference-in-Hansen test 72.05 68.94 80.78 80.00 68.03 89.91 
[P-value] [0.75] [0.58] [0.75] [0.51] [0.61] [0.48] 
F statistics 22.75 232.51 52.07 29.80 171.40 59.78 
[P-value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Time effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
 
 
In model 1, it is found that OC1 and OC5 have a non-linear association with 
Tobin’s Q. In Panel A, the coefficients of the linear and quadratic functions of OC1 are 
1 = -10.6 and 2 = 11.5 respectively. In the equation in Panel B, the coefficients of the 
linear and quadratic functions of OC5 are 1 = -12.7 and 2 = 12.9 respectively. 
However, the significance of the coefficients is only found in the equation in Panel A, 
where they are significant at the 10% level. There is no evidence of significance in the 
equation in Panel B. 
 
The U-shaped non-linear association indicates that, at a low level, a negatively 
significantly association between the largest shareholder’s ownership concentration and 
firm value is found and, at a high level of the largest shareholder’s ownership 
concentration, they are positive and significantly related. The inflection point of the 
largest shareholder’s ownership concentration is calculated at 46%. This indicates that 
for each 1% increase in the largest shareholder’s ownership concentration between 0% 
and 46%, firm value decreases by an average 0.106. For each 1% increase in the largest 
shareholder’s ownership concentration beyond 46%, firm value increases by 0.115.  
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Consistent with the findings of Joh (2003) and Hu and Izumida (2008), the 
results suggest that ownership concentration can still expropriate small shareholders, 
thus harming firm value even at a low level. The expropriation act is also significantly 
found when only the largest shareholder holds a large fraction of firm shares, and is not 
found in the concentration of the largest five shareholders. This reveals that small 
shareholders can still be expropriated by a single person or a company/institution 
who/which holds the largest fraction of firm shares. In addition, the expropriation costs 
are shared among the shareholders, no matter whether they are large or small 
shareholders, whereas the expropriation benefits are received solely by large 
shareholders (Hu & Izumida, 2008). Hence, a firm’s largest shareholder enjoys the 
benefits of this expropriation and is not concerned, even though the act is also 
destructive to firm value. 
 
The finding that the largest shareholder tends to expropriate firm small 
shareholders disproves La Porta et al.’s (1998) contention that investors’ protection is 
strong in common law countries. Hence, the finding in this study supports the 
arguments by Graff (2008) and Spamann (2008) that La Porta et al.’s (1998) investor 
protection index construction is not complete.      
 
However, when the total percentage of shares owned increases, the largest 
shareholder feels bonded to the firm. The reason is that if a firm is highly valued by the 
market, by holding a high percentage of the shares, the largest shareholder maximises 
his share value. Thus, the largest shareholder plays a role as an effective monitoring 
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mechanism in mitigating agency problem I between shareholders and managers. As the 
interest of managers who run the firm is aligned with the vital interest of shareholders, 
which is to maximise firm value, firm managers will make corporate decisions aimed to 
achieve this. As a consequence of the effective monitoring role played by the largest 
shareholder, this act enhances firm value. 
 
In the same model 1 where the other variable of interest is debt shows that the 
coefficients of debt ratio are 3 = 1.21 and 1.34 in the equations in Panel A and Panel B 
respectively. Contrary to the previous findings using FE estimation, the insignificance 
of these coefficients indicates that debt does not related to firm value when the dynamic 
endogeneity issue is taken into account. 
 
Model 2 exhibits the non-linear relationship between ownership concentration 
and debt ratio. However, there are inconsistencies in the results shown in the 
regressions in Panel A and Panel B, not only in terms of insignificance but also in terms 
of the signs of the coefficients. The coefficients of the linear, quadratic and cubic 
functions of OC1 are 1 = -1.32, 2 = 4.40, and 3 = -4.36 respectively, while the 
coefficients of the linear, quadratic and cubic functions of OC5 are 1  = 0.53, 2 = -
1.25, and 3 = 0.61 respectively. Only the coefficients of OC1 are found to be 
significant at the 10% level, and not the coefficients of OC5. Thus, the discussion 
focuses only on the non-linear association between OC1 and debt ratio. 
 
The relationship between the largest shareholder’s ownership concentration and 
debt is found to be non-linear. First, this indicates that at a low level of the largest 
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shareholder’s ownership concentration, debt decreases as the largest shareholder’s 
ownership concentration increases. Second, debt then increases together with the 
largest shareholder’s ownership concentration at a high level of the latter. Third, debt 
decreases again as the largest shareholder’s ownership concentration increases at its 
highest level. Two inflection points of the largest shareholder’s ownership 
concentration are found: 23% and 44%. This indicates that for each 1% increase in the 
largest shareholder’s ownership concentration between 0% and 23%, debt decreases by 
an average 0.0132. For each 1% increase in the largest shareholder’s ownership 
concentration from 23% to 44%, debt increases by 0.044. For each 1% increase in the 
largest shareholder’s ownership concentration above 44%, debt decreases again but at a 
slightly higher rate of 0.0436.  
 
The non-linear relationship between the largest shareholder’s ownership 
concentration and debt suggests that at 0% to 23%, ownership concentration is 
significant and negatively related to debt. Linking this finding with the previous finding 
in model 1, where it is found that largest shareholder tends to expropriate firm small 
shareholders if he holds up to 46% of firm shares, this non-linearity between the largest 
shareholder’s ownership concentration and debt suggests that the largest shareholder 
utilises debt in his expropriation act. This supports the free cash flow hypothesis, where 
the largest shareholders intentionally reduce the debt level in order to avoid the 
disciplinary function of debt.  
 
As the largest shareholder’s ownership concentration becomes higher between 
23% and 44%, it increases together with the debt level. Taking into account the 
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previous finding in model 1, where at 46% of ownership concentration, the largest 
shareholder expropriates firm small shareholders, this suggests that the largest 
shareholder still exploits debt in his expropriation act. Thus, it supports the control 
preference hypothesis that the largest shareholder employs a high debt level in order to 
retain his large fraction of ownership. In addition, with high debt level, the largest 
shareholder uses this as a device to avoid the firm being taken over. 
 
When the largest shareholder’s ownership concentration becomes higher, that is 
above 44%, debt level reduces as the ownership concentration increases. This suggests 
that with up to 46% of ownership concentration, the largest shareholder still exploits 
debt in his expropriation act, thus purposely reducing the level of debt to avoid its 
disciplinary function. However, above 46%, where the finding in model 1 shows that 
the largest shareholder tends to be an effective monitoring mechanism in mitigating 
agency problem I between shareholders and managers, the largest shareholder is now 
using debt as a substitute corporate governance mechanism in monitoring firm 
managers. 
 
The other variable of interest in model 2 is Tobin’s Q. It is found that the 
coefficients of Tobin’s Q are 4 = -0.00016 and 0.00 in the equations in Panel A and 
Panel B respectively. It is found that Tobin’s Q is insignificantly associated with debt 
ratio, which suggests that firm value is not a determinant of firm debt selection. This is 
consistent with the finding in model 2 using FE estimation. As firm value may also 
represent the growth opportunities of the firm, this suggests that the largest Australian 
firms’ debt financing decisions are not influenced by their growth opportunities. 
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The findings in model 3 show that debt ratio has a non-linear relationship with 
Tobin’s Q. These are shown in the coefficients of the linear, quadratic and cubic 
functions of debt ratio where 1  = -7.16, 2  = 14.7 and 3  = -5.22 respectively. These 
are found in the equation in Panel A. As for the equation in Panel B, the coefficients of 
the linear, quadratic and cubic functions of debt ratio are 1 = -6.79, 2  = 13.8 and 3  
= -4.91 respectively. These coefficients are significant at the 5% and 10% levels of 
significance, except for the coefficient of the linear function of debt ratio in the 
equation in Panel B which is not significant. The discussion therefore focuses on the 
non-linear association between debt ratio and Tobin’s Q in the equation in Panel A.  
 
The non-linear relationship found between debt ratio and Tobin’s Q suggests 
that first, at a low level of debt, firm value decreases as debt increases. Second, firm 
value increases together with the increment of debt at a high debt level. Third, firm 
value decreases again as debt increases when the latter is at its highest level. Two 
inflection points of debt ratio are found: 29% and 159%
23
. This indicates that for each 
1% increase in debt between 0% and 29%, firm value decreases by an average 0.0716. 
For each 1% increase in debt from 29% to 159%, firm value increases by 0.147. For 
each 1% increase in debt as it rises beyond 150%, firm value decreases again but at a 
slightly slower rate of 0.0522.  
                                                 
23
 The high second inflection point is due to the maximum debt ratio of 220%, which is found in the 
descriptive statistics presented in Chapter 3. 
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The non-linear relationship between debt and firm value suggests that, at 0% to 
29%, debt is not an effective disciplinary mechanism in mitigating agency problem II 
between large and small shareholders. This might be due to the expropriation of the 
largest shareholder on small shareholders found in model 1. Further, in model 2 it is 
found that the largest shareholder tends to exploit debt in the expropriation act, which 
means that debt fails to play a role as a disciplinary mechanism to mitigate agency 
problem II. As a consequence, it is destructive to the value of the firm.  
 
When debt level increases from 29% to 159%, it can play a role as an effective 
disciplinary device. Two consequences might emerge as a result of the disciplinary act 
played by debt. First, debt could mitigate agency problem II, aligning the interests of 
large and small shareholders. When having similar interests and objectives, firm 
shareholders would make the same corporate decisions. Second, if a firm employs a 
high level of debt, it reduces the firm’s free cash flow as debt carries a fixed obligation 
to pay a fixed amount of interest on a fixed schedule. Hence, this can prevents 
perquisites on free cash flow by ownership concentration
24
. These two consequences of 
employing a high debt level have a positive and significant effect on firm value. 
 
This model also shows that beyond 159% of debt level, debt has a significantly 
negatively association with firm value, because as debt level increases, the agency 
problem of debt financing between shareholders and debt holders increases as a result 
of the increase in the conflict of interest between these two parties.  
                                                 
24
 The perquisites of large shareholders through their concentration of ownership can be, for instance, 
convincing firm managers to make corporate decisions that only benefit them without considering 
whether the outcome might also benefit the firm’s small shareholders. 
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The other variable of interest in model 3 is ownership concentration. The 
coefficients of ownership concentration are 4 = -2.09 and 0.94 in the equations in 
Panel A and Panel B respectively. The coefficients of ownership concentration are not 
significant, thus supporting the finding in model 1 that ownership concentration is a 
nonlinear function to firm value.  
 
For the control variable of investment, its coefficients show that 4 = 4.23, 5 = 
0.61 and 5 = -0.94 in models 1, 2 and 3 respectively. This is for the equations in Panel 
A. For the equations in Panel B, the coefficients of investment in models 1, 2 and 3 are 
4 = 2.08, 5 = 0.21 and 5 = -2.12 respectively. Contrary to the findings in the 
equations using FE estimation, which ignore the endogeneity of investment, investment 
is now found not significantly related to Tobin’s Q but significantly related to debt 
ratio. However, the significantly positive relationship between investment and debt 
ratio is only found in the equation in Panel A, where it is found significant at the 10% 
level. 
 
The insignificant relationship between investment and firm value does not 
conform to the expectation that investment, which could also represent the production 
capability of a firm, can enhance firm value due to the anticipation of firm good future 
prospects by investors (Hu & Izumida, 2008). Hence, the result found in this study 
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suggests that investments made by the largest Australian firms do not make a 
significant difference
25
.  
 
As for the significant relationship between investment and debt, again, after 
investment is treated as endogenous, this suggests that the positive relationship between 
investment and debt level might be due to the shortage of internal funds. It should be 
noted once more that the significance of this relationship is only found in the equation 
that uses OC1 as the proxy for ownership concentration. Hence, this supports the 
findings in models 1 and 2 that the largest shareholder expropriates the firm’s small 
shareholders at his low level of ownership, and tends to exploit debt in the 
expropriation act. One of the expropriations might be the use of internal funds for his 
perquisites. Shortage of internal funds results in firms funding their investments by 
issuing more debt. 
 
The coefficients of the next control variable, size, show that 5 = -1.18, 6 = -
0.002 and 6 = -1.15 in models 1, 2 and 3 respectively for the equations in Panel A. For 
the equations in Panel B, the coefficients of size are 5 = -0.82, 6 = 0.009 and 6 = -
0.95 in models 1, 2 and 3 respectively. These findings contradict the findings in the 
models which use FE estimation. When size is treated as endogenous, its coefficients 
are not significant. This indicates that size is not the determinant of Tobin’s Q in 
models 1 and 3. The exception is the equation in Panel B of model 3, where it is found 
that size is significant at the 1% level. This indicates that size is negatively related to 
                                                 
25
 Note that the average investment is only 7% shown in the descriptive statistics in Chapter 3. 
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Tobin’s Q. This supports the hypothesis that large firms might be faced with high 
agency cost and thus be difficult to monitor. The finding suggests that investors are not 
confident in the monitoring role played by the largest five shareholders in the largest 
Australian firms. However, this is not the case when the monitoring role is performed 
by the largest shareholder, which suggests that investors do not react to the size of the 
firm. The findings also indicate that size is not the determinant of debt ratio in model 2. 
Firm size and debt are expected to be positively related as a larger firm has a lower 
probability of financial distress due to the tendency to be more diversified (Setia-
Atmaja et al., 2009). Contrary to expectation, size does not show a significant effect on 
debt in this study which remains a puzzle. However, this finding is consistent with the 
finding in Hu and Izumida (2008).  
 
In the equations in Panel A, the coefficients of age are 6 = 0.057 and 7 = 0.18 
in models 1 and 3 respectively; the coefficients of change in assets turnover are 7 = -
0.20, 7 = -0.006 and 8 = -0.48 in models 1, 2 and 3 respectively; the coefficients of 
return on assets are 8 = 8.07 and 9 = 5.89 in models 1 and 3 respectively; and the 
coefficient of lagged return on assets is 8 = -0.001 in model 2. In the equations in 
Panel B, the coefficients of firm age are 6 = 0.064 and 7 = 0.18 in models 1 and 3 
respectively; the coefficients of change in assets turnover are 7 = -0.24, 7 = -0.006 
and 8 = -0.53 in models 1, 2 and 3 respectively; the coefficients of return on assets are 
8 = 7.64 and 9 = 5.47 in models 1 and 3 respectively; and the coefficient of lagged 
return on assets is 8 = 0.048 in model 2. The findings where all these variables are 
treated as endogenous show that they are not significant. Hence, this suggests that age, 
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change in assets turnover and return on assets are not the determinants of firm value, 
and change in assets turnover and previous year return on assets are not the 
determinants of debt.  
 
In conclusion, the non-linear tests find that ownership concentration is non-
linearly related with firm value and debt while debt is non-linearly associated with firm 
value. These findings provide evidence that ownership concentration does expropriate 
its small shareholders as well as playing a role as an effective monitoring mechanism. 
In the former case, it tends to exploit debt in implementing the expropriation act, 
whereas in the latter case it also has an impact on debt level. Debt is also found to have 
dual functions in determining the value of a firm. At its lowest level, debt fails to play a 
role as an effective disciplinary device and at its highest level, it might harm firm value 
due to the disadvantage of employing too high a level of debt. However, there is also 
evidence that debt can still perform as an effective disciplinary mechanism which 
enhances firm value. 
 
As for the research question regarding the influence of the dynamic endogeneity 
issue on the relationship between corporate governance and firm value in the largest 
Australian firms, it is found that after controlling for dynamic endogeneity, it only 
affects the ownership concentration of the largest shareholder. This is due to the 
coefficients of OC1 that become significant in both models 1 and 3 in the equations 
which use GMM estimation. The insignificance of the ownership concentration of the 
largest five shareholders and the non-linearity of debt are found to be consistent in both 
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FE and GMM estimations. This suggests that they are not affected by the dynamic 
endogeneity issue.  
 
6.2.3 Robustness Test: GMM Estimation 
A robustness test is conducted to examine whether there is variation if the linear 
and non-linear functions of the variables of interest are considered as endogenous 
variables, while all control variables are considered as exogenous in the GMM 
estimation. As such, models 1, 2 and 3 are re-estimated and the results are shown in 
Table 6.3. OC1 is used as a proxy for ownership concentration and the findings are 
represented in Panel A while Panel B shows the results where OC5 is used as the proxy.  
 
Table 6.3 presents the results of the non-linear test by using GMM estimation 
for the following models: 
 
Model 1: 
itititititititititit XROAATAGESIINVDOCOCQ  876543
2
210 
 
Model 2: 
  itititititititititit YROAATSIINVQOCOCOCD  187654
3
3
2
210 
 
Model 3: 
ititititititititititit XROAATAGESIINVOCDDDQ  987654
3
3
2
210 
 
where i  and t  denote firm and year respectively. The variables of interest are Q, D and 
OC which denote Tobin’s Q, debt ratio and ownership concentration respectively. 
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Control variables are INV, SI, AGE, AT, ROA and ROA(-1) which denote investment, 
firm size, firm age, change in assets turnover, profitability and lagged profitability 
respectively. itX  and itY  are the error terms which have been transformed into 
itti    where i , t  and it  are the firm-specific effects, time-specific effects 
and random disturbance respectively. All variables of interest in their linear functions 
(OC1, OC5, D, Q), as well as their quadratic and cubic functions (OC1
2
, OC1
3
, OC5
2
, 
OC5
3
, D
2
, D
3
) are treated as endogenous variables whilst all control variables (INV, SI, 
AGE, AT, ROA, ROA(-1)) are treated as exogenous variables. Robust t-statistics are 
presented in parentheses. Constant terms are omitted for convenience. *, ** and *** 
denote statistical significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels respectively. 
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Table 6.3 Robustness test 3: GMM estimation 
 
 Panel A Panel B 
Model 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Variable Q D Q Q D Q 
              
OC1 -3.41 -1.49 -2.24    
 [-0.45] [-1.48] [-1.38]    
OC1
2
 -0.21 5.28*     
 [-0.024] [1.83]     
OC1
3
  -5.24**     
  [-2.00]     
OC5     -5.80 0.34 -1.26 
     [-0.47] [0.37] [-1.04] 
OC5
2
     6.33 -0.85  
     [0.50] [-0.48]  
OC5
3
      0.46  
      [0.45]  
D 0.38  -7.86*** 1.02  -6.89** 
 [0.21]  [-3.46] [0.82]  [-2.43] 
D
2
   14.3***   13.2*** 
   [4.51]   [3.16] 
D
3
   -4.74***   -4.46*** 
   [-4.68]   [-3.26] 
Q  0.001   0.002  
  [0.45]   [0.80]  
INV 0.61 0.20* -0.085 0.54 0.18* -0.26 
 [0.40] [1.87] [-0.074] [0.44] [1.87] [-0.22] 
SI -0.26 0.010 -0.038 -0.16 0.008 -0.010 
 [-1.25] [1.28] [-0.27] [-0.94] [1.19] [-0.095] 
AGE 0.056  0.11 0.070  0.13** 
 [0.57]  [1.37] [0.50]  [2.06] 
AT 0.054 -0.009 0.080 0.040 -0.010 0.084 
 [0.40] [-1.20] [1.10] [0.38] [-1.45] [1.00] 
ROA -0.99  -0.72 -0.54  -0.85 
 [-1.29]  [-0.80] [-0.64]  [-0.98] 
ROA(-1)  0.013   0.020  
  [0.20]   [0.37]  
        
Observations 940 940 940 940 940 940 
Number of instruments 60 70 71 60 70 71 
Number of groups 165 165 165 165 165 165 
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AR(1) -2.08 -3.22 -2.18 -2.03 -3.85 -2.32 
[P-value] [0.04] [0.00] [0.03] [0.04] [0.00] [0.02] 
AR(2) -1.52 1.23 -1.50 -1.68 0.78 -1.55 
[P-value] [0.13] [0.22] [0.13] [0.09] [0.44] [0.12] 
Hansen test 49.62 57.78 42.43 26.56 45.90 38.10 
[P-value] [0.14] [0.21] [0.77] [0.95] [0.64] [0.89] 
Difference-in-Hansen test 38.4 51.73 29.64 24.47 41.52 29.18 
[P-value] [0.36] [0.23] [0.96] [0.93] [0.62] [0.97] 
F statistics 41.00 282.64 157.45 45.25 228.73 187.66 
[P-value] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Time effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
 
 
In this robustness test, little variation is found when the linear, quadratic and 
cubic functions of variables of interest are treated as endogenous while all other control 
variables are treated as exogenous. In model 1, the only variation is found in the linear 
and quadratic functions of OC1 in Panel A, where the coefficients 1 = -3.41 and 2 = -
0.21 respectively are not significant in this robustness test whereas in the previous 
model the quadratic and cubic functions were significant. Furthermore, these 
coefficients show that the largest shareholder’s ownership concentration is not non-
linearly associated with firm value as both functions exhibit negative signs. 
 
In model 2, a variation of findings in this test is found on the coefficient of 
linear function of OC1 in Panel A, 1 = -1.49, where it becomes insignificant. In Panel 
B, the coefficient of investment 5 = 0.18 is now significant at the 10% level, which 
suggests that investment shown in Panel B is also positive and significantly related to 
debt. 
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Model 3 exhibits three variations of its findings which involved only Panel B. 
First, the linear function of debt ratio 1 = -6.89 becomes significant at the 5% level, 
which suggests that at a low level, debt is negative and significantly associated with 
firm value. Thus, it is consistent with the finding shown in Panel A. Second, the 
coefficient of size is now not significant where 6 = -0.010. Third, the coefficient of 
age 7 = 0.13 becomes significant at the 5% level, suggesting that age is positive and 
significantly related to firm value.  
 
On the whole, it can be concluded that whether control variables are treated as 
endogenous or exogenous does not much affect the estimation of the non-linear models 
of either ownership concentration or debt with firm value, or ownership concentration 
and debt. Thus, it is suggested that the main previous findings are robust. 
 
6.2.4 Multicollinearity Issue 
It should be noted that the linear, quadratic and cubic functions of ownership 
concentration and debt yield multicollinearity issue as their VIFs are higher than 10. 
However, since the objective of this part of the study is to investigate the nonlinear 
relationship between ownership concentration and debt on the one hand and firm value 
on the other hand, the estimations still need to use the linear, quadratic and cubic 
functions of ownership concentration and debt without dropping any of the functions. 
 
As explained in Chapter 5, the centring method is conducted in an attempt to 
overcome the multicollinearity issue. In this method, the mean of the linear, quadratic 
and cubic functions of ownership concentration and debt are computed; and the values 
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of the functions are then replaced with the values of the differences between them and 
their means. Finally, the models are re-estimated. The results are qualitatively the same 
as in the main model and are shown in A6.1 and A6.2 in the Appendix. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
The objective reported in this chapter is to investigate the non-linear 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm value, and how this relationship 
affects the non-linearity between ownership concentration and debt. The non-linear 
association between debt and firm value is also examined. Therefore, the study is able 
to answer the question of whether large shareholders through their concentration of 
ownership monitor firm managers as well as expropriating small shareholders, and how 
these acts affect firm debt selection. The findings also relate to the roles played by debt 
in the largest Australian firms. 
 
Based on the main GMM model, it is found that the ownership concentration of 
the largest shareholder expropriates small shareholders at a low level of ownership and 
becomes an effective monitoring mechanism on firm managers at a high level. This U-
shaped non-linear association does affect the non-linearity between ownership 
concentration of the largest shareholder and debt. When the largest shareholder 
expropriates small shareholders, he tends to exploit debt by first lowering debt level 
and then purposely employing a high level of debt. On the other hand, debt is used as a 
substitute by the largest shareholder when he effectively monitors managers. In 
addition, at a low level, debt is found not to play a role as an effective monitoring 
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device, but becomes effective at a high level. However, at the highest level, debt 
increased the cost of debt financing. 
 
After controlling for dynamic endogeneity, the insignificance of the ownership 
concentration of the largest shareholder using the FE estimation changes to be 
significant when using the GMM estimation. This suggests that dynamic endogeneity 
does affect the non-linearity of the largest shareholder’s ownership concentration. On 
the other hand, the non-linearity of debt is found to be consistent in both FE and GMM 
estimations, which suggests that it is not affected by the dynamic endogeneity issue. 
Finally, the results of the non-linear test are found to be robust regardless of whether 
the control variables are treated as endogenous or exogenous. 
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CHAPTER 7:   CONCLUSION 
 
7.1 Introduction 
Endogeneity is an increasingly recognised issue in studies pertaining to the 
relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and firm value or performance. 
Previous studies have revealed mixed results where some show that corporate 
governance mechanisms affect firm value or performance and others show the reverse. 
Henry (2010) states that endogeneity can be either in the form of reverse causality 
and/or in a dynamic sense.   
 
This thesis focuses on the relationships between corporate governance 
mechanisms which are proxied by ownership concentration and debt, and firm value of 
the largest Australian firms. Ownership concentration is chosen because of the previous 
inconclusive findings on the role played by large shareholders. It remains questionable 
whether large shareholders through their concentrated ownership contribute to the 
solution of agency problems between shareholders and firm managers or whether they 
make them worse by creating agency problems between themselves and small 
shareholders. Research on corporate ownership focuses mainly on insider ownership as 
a proxy rather than on large shareholders. The motivation for choosing debt is due to 
the dual role of debt, that is, it either functions as a disciplinary device on large 
shareholders, in which case there are problems between large and small shareholders, 
or it may increase the agency cost of debt financing between shareholders and debt 
holders. In addition, these two corporate governance mechanisms have a unique 
relationship that is interesting yet lacks sufficient exposure in previous studies.  
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The analyses in this thesis deal with the central issue of the relationships 
between ownership concentration, debt and firm value in three particular settings, 
which develop the focus of each of the three empirical approaches. The focus of each 
approach is to investigate the causal relationship, the interaction effect and the non-
linear relationship between these three variables of interest. While undertaking these 
three empirical approaches, the study also examines whether the dynamic endogeneity 
issue is an important determinant of the relationship between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm value in the largest Australian firms. Therefore, the study 
investigates the following research questions: 
 
1. Are there any causal relationships between ownership concentration, debt and firm 
value?  
 
2. Should ownership concentration, debt and firm value be utilised as a group in order 
to ensure their effectiveness as corporate mechanisms? 
 
3. (i)  Do ownership concentration and firm value have a non-linear relationship, and 
how does the relationship affect the non-linear relationship between ownership 
concentration and debt? 
(ii)  Are debt and firm value also non-linearly related? 
 
4. Is the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and performance in 
the largest Australian firms influenced by the dynamic endogeneity? 
186 
7.2 Thesis Summary 
This section summarises the thesis. Chapter 1 introduces the study. Chapter 2 
presents existing theoretical and empirical literature related to the focus of each of the 
three empirical approaches of the study. Samples and years of studies, findings related 
to the focus of each section in this thesis, proxies that were used and estimations that 
were employed (and whether the dynamic endogeneity issue was taken into 
consideration or not) were reviewed thoroughly. The survey shed light on gaps in the 
literature and provided motivation for this thesis. It was noted that there was limited 
research on using causality tests for panel data and using tests on the substitutability or 
complementarity of ownership concentration, debt and firm value, and limited research 
on the roles of ownership concentration and debt as corporate governance mechanisms 
in the largest Australian firms. This thesis aims to fill these significant gaps in our 
understanding of corporate governance and corporate finance.  
 
The data used in the thesis is described in Chapter 3. The sample consisted of 
the largest 100 non-financial Australian firms for the period of study 1997 to 2008. This 
was obtained from FinAnalysis and DatAnalysis provided by Aspect Huntley. Other 
variables used in this study were collected from various sources such as DataStream, 
OSIRIS, Aspect Huntley, Connect-4, the firms’ websites and the State Library of 
Victoria archive. Chapter 3 also provides details of summary statistics of the variables 
used in the study. Overall, on average, the summary statistics of the variables of interest 
show that the largest Australian firms have fairly concentrated ownership, low debt 
level and high firm value. Further, Chapter 3 describes the methodologies used to 
estimate the models in this study. Two-way fixed effects (FE) and two-step system 
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generalised method of moments (GMM) estimations are used in the analysis. The 
former controls for unobserved heterogeneity and the latter controls not only for 
unobserved heterogeneity but also for dynamic endogeneity and simultaneity. Even 
though GMM was the main estimation used to draw conclusions from the findings (as it 
controls dynamic endogeneity), the reason for employing both estimation methods was 
to answer the fourth research question.  
 
The investigation to identify the direction of the causality (if any) between 
ownership concentration, debt and firm value is reported in Chapter 4. The 
investigation found endogeneity in the form of reverse causality from firm value to 
ownership concentration and/or debt, as well as dynamic endogeneity, by comparing 
the findings in the FE and GMM estimations. Reverse causality was found from firm 
value to ownership concentration and it was in a negative direction. It was found that 
causality runs from debt to firm value, also in a negative direction. There was no 
causality found between ownership concentration and debt. However, in the sub-sample 
of high ownership concentration of the largest shareholder, it was found that causality 
runs from ownership concentration to debt in a negative direction. In summary, Chapter 
4 revealed that: 
1.  The market does not respond when there is an increased or decreased level of 
ownership concentration. 
2.  A high level of debt increases the agency cost of debt financing and vice versa. 
3.  The largest Australian firms’ debt financing decision is not influenced by the value 
of the firm or the level of ownership concentration. 
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4.  Large shareholders through their concentrated ownership do not sell (buy) firm 
shares when there is an increased (decreased) in the level of debt. 
5.  The opportunity cost hypothesis is supported, where large shareholders intend to sell 
their shares if a firm is valued relatively high by the market, or they increase their 
holding positions to support weak firms. 
 
Finally, on the whole, findings in which both FE and GMM estimations were 
used showed consistency. Therefore, dynamic endogeneity is not an issue in the largest 
Australian firms.  
 
It has been argued that corporate governance mechanisms should be employed 
as a group rather than as stand-alone mechanisms to ensure their effectiveness. The 
analysis reported in Chapter 5 examines whether the variables of interest are best 
utilised as a group by including an interaction variable between two of these variables 
at a time. Together with this interaction effect test, the substitutability or 
complementarity of the variables was identified. Also, the study was able to find 
endogeneity in the form of dynamic sense by comparing the findings in the FE and 
GMM estimations. The results show that ownership concentration, debt and firm value 
are not significant regardless of whether they are utilised as stand-alone mechanisms or 
as a group. An exception was the stand-alone effect of the ownership concentration of 
the largest five shareholders, which was found to substitute for debt. Thus, this study 
fails to find evidence of substitutability or complementarity among these variables, 
therefore failing to support the argument that these mechanisms should be employed as 
a group in order to achieve mutual effectiveness. Finally, on the whole, it was found 
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that the dynamic endogeneity issue affects ownership concentration and firm value only 
when they are utilised as stand-alone mechanisms. However, the consistency of the 
interactions effects found in both the FE and GMM estimations reveals that they are not 
affected by the dynamic endogeneity issue. 
 
The investigation of the non-linear relationship between ownership 
concentration and firm value on the one hand and debt on the other hand, as well as the 
non-linear relationship between debt and firm value is reported in Chapter 6. This test 
used the linear, quadratic and cubic functions of the explanatory variable, and the 
inflection points were calculated. Comparison of the findings in FE and GMM 
estimations was conducted to find out whether the dynamic endogeneity issue affects 
these non-linear relationships. The result confirms that the ownership concentration of 
the largest shareholder and firm value have a non-linear relationship where the 
inflection point of the former is 46%. This non-linear relationship also affects the non-
linearity of the ownership concentration of the largest shareholder and debt, with the 
inflection points of the former being 23% and 44%. This investigation also shows that 
debt and firm value are non-linearly associated and the inflection points of debt are 
29% and 159%. In summary, Chapter 6 revealed that: 
1.  The largest shareholder expropriates small shareholders when he holds up to 46% of 
ownership and exploits debt in his expropriation act, thus the free cash flow and control 
preference hypotheses are supported. However, beyond 46% of ownership, the largest 
shareholder is an effective monitoring mechanism in mitigating agency problems 
between shareholders and firm managers and he uses debt as a substitute corporate 
governance mechanism for monitoring firm managers. 
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2.  As one of the corporate governance mechanisms, debt fails to play a role as a 
disciplinary mechanism on the largest shareholder at the 0% to 29% level. However, at 
the 29% to 159% level, debt becomes an efficient device. Further, beyond the 159% 
level, debt results in an increase of the agency cost of debt financing between 
shareholders and debt holders.  
 
Finally, as a whole, it was found that the non-linear relationship between 
ownership concentration on the one hand and firm value and debt on the other hand are 
affected by the dynamic endogeneity issue. However, the non-linearity between debt 
and firm value was found to be largely consistent in both FE and GMM estimations, 
and therefore this relationship is not affected by the dynamic endogeneity issue.   
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7.3 Key Contributions 
Although the topic of the endogenous relationship between corporate 
governance mechanisms and firm value has been discussed widely in the literature, to 
the author’s knowledge, this study is the first one to directly investigate the complex 
relationships between corporate governance mechanisms, which are proxied by 
ownership concentration and debt, and firm value in the largest Australian firms. This 
section verifies the five key contributions of this thesis to the knowledge of corporate 
governance and corporate finance literature.  
 
The first contribution is the causality test for the panel data model. The study 
employed the model developed by Nair-Reichert and Weinhold (2001) to investigate 
the causal relationship between ownership concentration, debt and firm value. This is 
the first study in the field of corporate governance and corporate finance to use this 
model. Most of the previous studies employed the simultaneous equation model while 
some used the Granger causality test for panel data to examine the causal relationship 
between the variables under investigation, particularly between corporate governance 
mechanisms and firm value or performance. As such, this thesis contributes to the 
literature by providing evidence that the model can also be employed in this field of 
study to find the causal relationship between corporate governance mechanisms and 
firm value. 
 
The second contribution of this thesis relates to the relationship tests between 
ownership concentration, debt and firm value. The study conducted causality, 
interaction and nonlinear tests. The causality test and the nonlinear test revealed that 
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these three corporate mechanisms are interrelated. Each corporate mechanism can 
affect the others. Hence, this thesis contributes to the literature by providing evidence 
that ownership concentration, debt and firm value are important in decision making by 
all parties – shareholders, debt holders, managers and regulators – in the largest 
Australian firms.  
 
The third contribution is an in-depth study using the concentrated ownership of 
the large shareholders. Ownership structure in the form of the ownership concentration 
of the large shareholders has received little attention in previous studies compared to 
managerial ownership or insider ownership. This study provides new insights into the 
need for the largest Australian firms’ small shareholders to pay attention to the 
percentage of shares held by the firm’s largest shareholder, as they might be 
expropriated by this largest shareholder. It means that small shareholders should not 
totally rely on the corporate governance system even though, as a common law country, 
Australia should have high investors’ protection. Thus, this thesis contributes to the 
literature by calculating the inflection point of the percentage of shares held by a firm’s 
largest shareholder as guidance for small shareholders on whether they might be 
protected or expropriated by the largest shareholder. 
 
The fourth contribution is that debt financing decisions are important in the 
largest Australian firms. The study conducted a thorough examination of the role 
played by debt by investigating its effects on firm value. It provides new insights for 
the largest Australian firms’ shareholders, debt holders, managers and regulators that, at 
different levels, debt has different impacts on the value of a firm. Therefore, this thesis 
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contributes to the literature by calculating the inflection points of debt level as guidance 
for all parties in the largest Australian firms on the ideal debt level to be employed. 
 
The fifth contribution relates to the dynamic endogeneity issue in the largest 
Australian firms. Most previous studies have investigated this issue by using sample 
firms in the US, which are suggested to have a dispersed type of ownership. This thesis 
reveals that dynamic endogeneity is not a serious issue for the largest Australian firms, 
contrary to the findings in previous studies which used US firms. As a result, this thesis 
contributes to the literature by providing evidence of the different effects of dynamic 
endogeneity on concentrated and dispersed types of ownership. 
 
7.4 Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
The thesis has a number of limitations, which are mostly related to data issues. 
For instance, firm value which is proxied by Tobin’s Q might be compromised by 
forward-looking bias in the causality test. Hence, an analysis employing accounting 
returns such as return on assets and return on equity would certainly enrich our 
understanding of the causality relationship between ownership concentration, debt and 
firm value. 
 
This study focuses on large shareholders and debt in the context of firm value. 
Other corporate governance mechanisms may be more effective when functioning as a 
group in explaining firm performance in the largest Australian firms.  
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The sample in this study is limited to the largest Australian firms. A possible 
extension could involve analysis of more samples not restricted by size. Thus, a wider 
range of ownership concentration, debt level and firm value could possibly offer a 
variation of the results of the relationships between these three corporate mechanisms.          
 
Finally, this thesis relies on a 12-year period of study, which could be 
considered to be rather short in time series. A longer period of study with balanced 
panel data could be an important extension to test the robustness of the results found in 
this thesis.  
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APPENDICES    
 
 
A3.1 Filtered data 
This section presents the observations that are identified as outliers. In order to 
identify outliers, scatter diagrams of year versus variable are plotted, as shown in 
Figure A3.1. The outliers are then removed in order to reduce their effects in the 
unfiltered data.   
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Figure A3.1 Scatter diagrams 
    
      
 
One observation is identified as an outlier for both debt ratio and Tobin’s Q 
variables. For debt ratio, the observation that is removed is from company code PRT in 
year 1999 and for Tobin’s Q, the observation that is removed is from company code 
SSC in year 2003
26
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 This company exhibits an outstanding Tobin’s Q value at 6680 due to the lowest book value of total 
assets which is only at AUD46,000. 
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Two observations are identified as the outliers for investment variable whilst 
one observation for size variable. For investment, the observations that are removed are 
from company code ARO in years 1997 and 1998. For size, the observation that is 
removed is from company code SSC in year 2003. 
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One observation for both change in assets turnover and ROA variables is 
identified as an outlier. The observations for both variables that are removed are from 
company code SSC in year 2003. 
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A5.1 Interaction test: FE estimation (centring) 
 
The table presents the results of the interaction test by using FE estimation for 
the following models: 
Model 1: 
  ititititititititititit XROAATAGESIINVDDOCOCQ  876543210 
 
Model 2: 
    itititititititititit YROAATSIINVQQOCOCD  176543210 
 
where i  and t  denote firm and year respectively. The variables of interest are Q, D and 
OC which denote Tobin’s Q, debt ratio and ownership concentration respectively. 
Control variables are INV, SI, AGE, AT, ROA and ROA(-1) which denote investment, 
firm size, firm age, change in assets turnover, profitability and lagged profitability 
respectively. itX  and itY  are the error terms which have been transformed into 
itti    where i , t  and it  are the firm-specific effects, time-specific effects 
and random disturbance respectively. Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
Constant terms are not reported for convenience. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively.  
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Model 1 2 2 
Variable Q D D 
        
Q (Centring)  -0.003 -0.004 
  [-0.61] [-0.95] 
D (Centring) 1.02**   
 [2.07]   
OC1  -0.000  
  [-0.001]  
OC5 -0.86  0.009 
 [-1.29]  [0.13] 
Q*OC1 (Centring)  0.12  
  [1.60]  
Q*OC5 (Centring)   0.035 
   [1.65] 
D*OC5 (Centring) 3.00   
 [1.23]   
INV 2.44* 0.26 0.27 
 [1.73] [1.53] [1.49] 
SI -0.87*** 0.061*** 0.060*** 
 [-4.59] [3.10] [3.06] 
AGE 0.29   
 [1.27]   
AT 0.11 -0.009 -0.010 
 [1.34] [-0.53] [-0.61] 
ROA 1.18   
 [1.34]   
ROA(-1)  -0.13* -0.13* 
  [-1.79] [-1.76] 
    
Observations 1,189 941 941 
R-squared 0.09 0.17 0.14 
F statistics 3.91 6.73 6.65 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Time effects Included Included Included 
Firm effects Included Included Included 
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A5.2 Interaction test: GMM estimation (centring) 
 
The table presents the results of the interaction test by using GMM estimation 
for the following models: 
Model 1: 
  ititititititititititit XROAATAGESIINVDDOCOCQ  876543210 
 
Model 2: 
    itititititititititit YROAATSIINVQQOCOCD  176543210 
 
where i  and t  denote firm and year respectively. The variables of interest are Q, 
D and OC which denote Tobin’s Q, debt ratio and ownership concentration 
respectively. Control variables are INV, SI, AGE, AT, ROA and ROA(-1) which denote 
investment, firm size, firm age, change in assets turnover, profitability and lagged 
profitability respectively. itX and itY  are the error terms which have been transformed 
into itti    where i , t  and it  are the firm-specific effects, time-specific 
effects and random disturbance respectively. All variables on the right-hand side are 
treated as endogenous variables except lagged profitability (ROA(-1)) that is treated as 
exogenous in model 2. Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. Constant terms 
are omitted for convenience. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1 
percent levels respectively. 
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Model 1 2 2 
Variable Q D D 
        
Q (Centring)  -0.000 -0.000 
  [-0.045] [-0.11] 
D (Centring) 2.16   
 [0.63]   
OC1  -0.19  
  [-0.88]  
OC5 1.62  -0.20 
 [0.52]  [-1.61] 
Q*OC1 (Centring)  0.030  
  [0.42]  
Q*OC5 (Centring)   0.009 
   [1.00] 
D*OC5 (Centring) 3.25   
 [0.27]   
INV 7.26 0.43 0.37 
 [0.94] [1.61] [1.17] 
SI -1.13 0.007 0.017 
 [-1.55] [0.26] [0.94] 
AGE 0.060   
 [0.18]   
AT -0.26 -0.009 -0.003 
 [-0.38] [-0.44] [-0.24] 
ROA 7.73   
 [0.99]   
ROA(-1)  0.020 0.032 
  [0.37] [0.58] 
Observations 940 940 940 
Number of instruments 110 89 89 
Number of groups 165 165 165 
AR(1) -1.81 -3.73 -3.70 
 [0.07] [0.00] [0.00] 
AR(2) -0.76 0.91 0.70 
 [0.45] [0.36] [0.48] 
Hansen test 93.81 66.57 60.11 
 [0.37] [0.59] [0.79] 
Difference-in-Hansen test 88.00 55.89 51.94 
 [0.28] [0.73] [0.84] 
F statistics 24.78 228.44 199.24 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Time effects Included Included Included 
Firm effects Included Included Included 
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A6.1 Non-linear test: FE estimation (centring) 
 
The table presents the results of the non-linear test by using FE estimation for 
the following models: 
Model 1: 
itititititititititit XROAATAGESIINVDOCOCQ  876543
2
210 
 
Model 2: 
  itititititititititit YROAATSIINVQOCOCOCD  187654
3
3
2
210 
 
Model 3: 
ititititititititititit XROAATAGESIINVOCDDDQ  987654
3
3
2
210 
 
where i  and t  denote firm and year respectively. The variables of interest are Q, D and 
OC which denote Tobin’s Q, debt ratio and ownership concentration respectively. 
Control variables are INV, SI, AGE, AT, ROA and ROA(-1) which denote investment, 
firm size, firm age, change in assets turnover, profitability and lagged profitability 
respectively. itX  and itY  are the error terms which have been transformed into 
itti    where i , t  and it  are the firm-specific effects, time-specific effects 
and random disturbance respectively. Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. 
Constant terms are not reported for convenience. *, ** and *** denote statistical 
significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. 
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 Panel A Panel B 
Model 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Variable Q D Q Q D Q 
              
OC1   -0.43    
   [-0.87]    
OC1 (Centring) -0.62 0.077     
 [-0.84] [0.56]     
OC1
2
 (Centring) 0.091 -0.67     
 [0.053] [-0.77]     
OC1
3
 (Centring)  -0.55     
  [-0.25]     
OC5       -0.70 
       [-1.01] 
OC5 (Centring)     -0.95 -0.005  
     [-1.41] [-0.054]  
OC5
2
 (Centring)     -0.60 -0.36  
     [-0.34] [-1.24]  
OC5
3
 (Centring)      -0.39  
      [-0.36]  
D 1.25**    1.26**   
 [2.08]    [2.15]   
D (Centring)   0.077   0.10 
   [0.15]   [0.21] 
D
2
 (Centring)   4.51***   4.42*** 
   [2.75]   [2.67] 
D
3
 (Centring)   -1.51*   -1.48* 
   [-1.89]   [-1.84] 
Q   0.002   0.002 
   [0.40]   [0.50] 
INV 2.46* 0.23 2.44* 2.45* 0.25 2.44* 
 [1.73] [1.37] [1.74] [1.71] [1.35] [1.74] 
SI -0.90*** 0.065*** -0.81*** -0.91*** 0.064*** -0.81*** 
 [-4.74] [3.81] [-4.21] [-4.78] [3.48] [-4.20] 
AGE 0.34   0.25 0.34  0.26 
 [1.55]   [1.11] [1.55]  [1.14] 
AT 0.10 -0.009 0.060 0.11 -0.007 0.069 
 [1.32] [-0.60] [0.62] [1.37] [-0.46] [0.67] 
ROA 1.17   1.25 1.18  1.25 
 [1.29]   [1.51] [1.31]  [1.52] 
ROA(-1)  -0.13*   -0.12  
  [-1.88]   [-1.61]  
        
Observations 1,189 941 1,189 1,189 941 1,189 
R-squared 0.09 0.15 0.10 0.09 0.13 0.10 
F statistics 4.08 6.12 4.39 3.93 5.97 4.39 
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 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Time effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
 
 
213 
A6.2 Non-linear test: GMM estimation (centring) 
 
The table presents the results of the non-linear test by using GMM estimation 
for the following models: 
Model 1: 
itititititititititit XROAATAGESIINVDOCOCQ  876543
2
210 
 
Model 2: 
  itititititititititit YROAATSIINVQOCOCOCD  187654
3
3
2
210 
 
Model 3: 
ititititititititititit XROAATAGESIINVOCDDDQ  987654
3
3
2
210 
 
where i  and t  denote firm and year respectively. The variables of interest are Q, D and 
OC which denote Tobin’s Q, debt ratio and ownership concentration respectively. 
Control variables are INV, SI, AGE, AT, ROA and ROA(-1) which denote investment, 
firm size, firm age, change in assets turnover, profitability and lagged profitability 
respectively. itX  and itY  are the error terms which have been transformed into 
itti    where i , t  and it  are the firm-specific effects, time-specific effects 
and random disturbance respectively. All variables on the right-hand side are treated as 
endogenous variables except lagged profitability (ROA(-1)) that is treated as exogenous 
in model 2. Robust t-statistics are presented in parentheses. Constant terms are omitted 
for convenience. *, ** and *** denote statistical significance at 10, 5 and 1% levels 
respectively. 
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 Panel A Panel B 
Model 1 2 3 1 2 3 
Variable Q D Q Q D Q 
              
OC1   -2.01    
   [-1.35]    
OC1 (Centring) -4.12 0.024     
 [-1.47] [0.083]     
OC1
2
 (Centring) 7.90 1.10     
 [1.49] [1.24]     
OC1
3
 (Centring)  -3.79     
  [-1.51]     
OC5       0.86 
       [0.36] 
OC5 (Centring)     0.60 -0.36**  
     [0.18] [-2.22]  
OC5
2
 (Centring)     8.26 -0.34  
     [0.63] [-0.93]  
OC5
3
 (Centring)      1.31  
      [1.11]  
D 1.07    1.41   
 [0.51]    [0.71]   
D (Centring)   -0.40   -0.50 
   [-0.24]   [-0.20] 
D
2
 (Centring)   10.5*   9.93* 
   [1.93]   [1.88] 
D
3
 (Centring)   -5.18**   -4.89** 
   [-2.13]   [-2.09] 
Q  0.001   0.002  
  [0.32]   [0.66]  
INV 4.27 0.64* -1.69 2.75 0.20 -2.45 
 [0.80] [1.89] [-0.58] [0.62] [0.67] [-0.97] 
SI -1.25** 0.009 -1.13 -0.93 0.009 -0.96** 
 [-1.97] [0.39] [-1.52] [-1.08] [0.45] [-2.15] 
AGE 0.051   0.20 0.004  0.19 
 [0.27]   [1.00] [0.023]  [0.70] 
AT -0.27 -0.005 -0.45 -0.21 -0.007 -0.53 
 [-0.54] [-0.41] [-0.99] [-0.27] [-1.04] [-0.63] 
ROA 8.33   6.00 7.62  5.61 
 [0.91]   [0.89] [0.82]  [0.84] 
ROA(-1)  0.006   0.044  
  [0.12]   [0.83]  
        
Observations 940 940 940 940 940 940 
Number of instruments 110 100 121 110 100 121 
Number of groups 165 165 940 165 165 165 
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AR(1) -1.69 -3.42 -1.65 -1.77 -3.97 -1.70 
 [0.09] [0.00] [0.09] [0.07] [0.00] [0.08] 
AR(2) -0.96 1.17 -1.37 -1.19 0.72 -1.50 
 [0.34] [0.24] [0.17] [0.23] [0.47] [0.14] 
Hansen test 87.69 79.63 92.83 86.66 76.27 103.75 
 [0.55] [0.49] [0.68] [0.58] [0.60] [0.38] 
Difference-in-Hansen test 73.72 68.04 78.75 79.36 64.42 90.94 
 [0.71] [0.61] [0.80] [0.53] [0.73] [0.45] 
F statistics 21.29 216.56 50.51 30.55 151.93 61.60 
 [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] [0.00] 
Time effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
Firm effects Included Included Included Included Included Included 
 
 
